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Abstract:
The purpose of this licential dissertation1 is to explore the complexities of 
relating Swedish history to general and European history, and to argue the 
necessity of doing so. This perspective requires that Swedish history must be 
understood as European history, and that European history - in particular 
economic/historical/social-scientific theorization of this history - has to assimi­
late the Swedish experience, in order to fully realize its explanatory 
potential.
To substantiate these claims I point out a number of important aspects 
where Sweden’s position in this wider context is crucial, exceptional or 
contradictory enough to warrant inclusion into the problematization.
I also present a re-conceptualization of the ‘Rise of the West’ or ‘European 
Miracle’ as three separate, but presumably interconnected ‘miracles’ (unique, 
prima facie inexplicable and advantageous transformations) that constitute 
Europe as a system of societies vis d vis the rest of the world.
I label them ‘Conquest’, ‘Growth’and ‘Voice’.
From among the theories and empirical generalizations addressing this 
problem complex, I select six synthesizing projects for closer scrutiny, on 
the basis of two criteria: They have to take on more than one of the three 
‘miracles’, and they must attempt explaining the diversity of European devel­
opment as well as the singularity.
The approaches chosen are those of: Barrington Moore, Douglass North, 
Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Tilly and Robert Brenner.
Finally, I discuss in what contexts these theories might be useful for 
discerning and analyzing problems of Swedish history, and point out argu­
ments for why these models need to include the Swedish example.
^he published version is somewhat revised, as the arguments of Ronald Axtmann, who acted as 
opponent, made me realize that I had to clarify my standpoints concerning theory. I have also 
made other additions and clarifications after discussing the contents with Lars Herlitz, Carl-Johan 
Gadd and Jan Jörnmark at the department of Economic History, and Mats Andrén and Martin 
Peterson at the European Studies Project. For helpful suggestions and important facts, I also owe 
thanks to Göran Therborn, Urban Herlitz, Martti Rantanen and Christina Dalhede.
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Sweden and the European Miracles
INTRODUCTION:
Peculiarities of the Swedish
Sweden has often been considered exceptional in a variety of ways, and as 
long as international - or European - history is interpreted in a unilinear 
fashion, this merely reinforces the tendency to view European and inter­
national developments as exogenous factors influencing a largely endogenous 
Swedish development, which now and then may exercise an exogenous influ­
ence on the rest of the continent or of the world.
That Sweden is also part of Europe and part of the world, which makes all 
Swedish developments internal to the larger systems, should be self-evident, 
but requires a double perspective combining a European eye on what happens 
in Sweden with a ‘Sweden-including’ overview of what happens in Europe. In 
my present search for such a perspective I have been led to explore the latest 
(or is it already the second latest?) generation of socio-historical synthesis, 
largely sparked off by similar concerns from other national (or continental) 
horizons.
The debates over the ‘peculiarities of the English’ or the German 
‘Sonderweg’ are symptoms of the same problematic2, and there is a tension 
between the necessity of a historiography accepting the multilinearity of 
national histories (the realization that every path is a Sonderweg), and the yet 
undiminished need of theoretical tools for handling the magnitude of modern 
social, economic and political change (within which at least the Western 
Sonderwege tend to converge)3. Out of the attempts to render this tension 
manageable new theoretical syntheses have emerged and in this essay I will 
discuss advantages and limitations of some of those approaches in the light 
of:
(1) a proposed perspective on what are the most essential aspects of the 
singularity of European modernity in a global context, and
(2) their relevance and potential fruitfulness for achieving the double 
perspective I require: to see what is European in Sweden and what is 
Swedish in Europe - all of this as part of a sustained argument for 
the necessity of such an endeavour.
2Maybe also Braudel’s refocusing from ‘The Perspective of the World’ to ‘L’Identité de la France’, cf 
Anderson: ‘Fernand Braudel and National Identity’(in 1992b:251-78)
3As their diversity also tends to pale beside their contrast with the non-Western world.
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As I cannot try out these propositions within the confines of this disserta­
tion, it is to be regarded as a reconnaissance tour through the theoretical and 
historiographical grounds of possible relevance to my discussion: a prelimi­
nary survey of problems and available theories.
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PART ONE: THE PROBLEMS
1:1 The ‘Rise of Europe’ - a Recurrent "Debate
The question of how to explain Europe’s spectacular rise to world dominance 
through the modern era, has been a central problem ever since ambitions of 
scientific explanation first appeared within historical and social sciences. The 
classic approaches of Smith, Marx and Weber still dominate the field4 at 
least as building-blocks for new syntheses. Until the failure of the moderni­
zation paradigm grew obvious in the sixties, the European experience was gen­
erally expected to be replicated with nothing more than a time-lag throughout 
the rest of the world, and thus the question of its origin did not seem too 
relevant to present-day concerns. The sudden wave of new attempts at explana­
tory synthesis in the middle of the seventies5 was largely sparked off by 
attempts to handle the diversity of historical development paths, which neither 
conventional development theory nor traditional historical materialism had 
taken into account.
A forceful restatement of the uniqueness of the European experience was 
made by E L Jones in The European Miracle (1981), where the very title 
seemed to signal a renewed historical self-assertedness after a period of 
Western bad conscience and self-denigration. When the same expression was 
used as the title of a symposium in Cambridge6 Ernest Gellner tried to give 
it a less arrogant twist: the miracle is not Europe, but something that hap­
pened to Europe7, and an important aspect of the miraculousness is that it 
happened in such an unlikely part of the world. Interpreted in this way, 
‘miracle’ is a rather useful designation of the problem; the historical devel­
opment often described as ‘the Rise of the West’ does indeed qualify as a 
miracle : a unique, advantageous8, and prima facie inexplicable transformation 
of a relatively marginal portion of the civilized world, into a dynamic centre 
capable of transforming the rest of the world 9.
4Sombart might also still qualify, at least as an indirect influence, and Hintze’s star has been 
steadily rising during the last decades. I will, however, not discuss any of these classics (and as 
such we would also have to count at least Schumpeter and Polanyi) in this essay, but only present- 
day attempts to confront the problem in the full dimensions apparent to us today.
5North-Thomas 1973, Anderson 1974a,b, Wallerstein 1974, Tilly (ed) 1975, and Brennerl976.
6Published as ‘Europe and the Rise of Capitalism’ ( 1988; eds: Baechler-Hall-Mann )
7'...[W]e do not know what hit us. We cannot take credit for it.’ (op cit : 1)
8At least to Europeans, although Wallerstein would probably disagree.
9Cy"Hobsbawm in Hilton(ed) 1978
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1:1.2 One, two or three miracles?
On closer inspection, the miracle threatens to decompose into two or three 
separate miracles, all as unique, inexplicable, and advantageous: The miracle of 
conquest, which from the end of the 15th until the early 20th century put al­
most the entire planet under European10 control, and the miracle of groivth, 
which successively has made economic growth an imperative objective of all 
modern societies, as well as the necessary foundation for their existence, but 
which originally was an exclusive feature of a few European societies. Both 
of these advantages must be part of the explanation of European global domi­
nance, and neither seems possible to derive from the other in any obvious 
way11. The same thing goes for the third miracle I will consider: the trans­
formation of political participation ultimately resulting in democracy. 
Although not in itself constituting an advantage of power, in the way of the 
first and second miracles, we cannot but consider democracy an advantage for 
the population of Europe12. Equally unique, equally difficult to explain and 
with an equally transformative influence over the rest of the world, 
democracy - despite the definitional problems involved - will have to be 
considered as much of a miracle as world conquest and economic growth.
It might be thought fully sufficient to relate the ‘success story’ of Europe 
only to the modes of supranational power competition - military and 
economic - as the relation between these categories is complex enough by far, 
and the development of democracy might at most have an indirect bearing on 
performance within the arena of international power play. Still the covariance 
between democracy and the other miracles is both striking and contradic­
tory13, and what makes this aspect of the problem most difficult to ignore, is 
the fact that even when not explicitly confronted, it’s one of the fundamental motives 
behind this kind of endeavour.
Among the theorists I am about to discuss, Anderson, Wallerstein, Brenner 
and Tilly are engaged in finding explanations for diversity in development 
for reasons that are as sensitive to the questions of political freedom and in­
fluence as are those of authors explicitly discussing the question of democ-
10Whenever applicable, I will assimilate European settler-states like the USA and Australia into 
the definition of Europe without further specification.
^On this question there is no consensus - at least Wallerstein would argue a virtual identity of 
the two processes; we will have to return to this question.
12In this respect - as an internal advantage - it resembles Growth but not Conquest.
13The groups of countries involved - over the long run - in the three ‘miraculous processes’ are 
largely congruent, although the accumulation and concentration of military power is often 
directly contrary to any development towards democracy (Cromwell, Napoleon). There are also 
many instances where economic growth has proved to be quite compatible with even a reversal of 
democratization processes (the Third Reich was more economically successful than was the 
Weimar Republic; Chile under Pinochet or China after the Tien-an-min massacre are other cases 
in point).
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racy: Moore and North. Noticing this, I could not but apply the same conclu­
sion to myself: of course the origins of Swedish democracy must be every bit 
as crucial to an understanding of the interrelation between Swedishness and 
Europeanity as Swedish economic growth and Swedish militarism-turned- 
pacifist. Thus I will have to begin to confront this issue, even though I had 
originally intended to limit myself to only the period in which the separate 
trajectories leading up to present nation-states are established14, and the 
‘European Miracle’ will have to be considered as three separate but 
(presumably) interrelated processes.
I propose this conception of a triple miracle as a context for discussing the 
unique success story of Europe and the various theoretical models offered as 
explanations for it. I will in principle limit myself to discussing macro- 
historical approaches ambitious enough to take on more than one of the 
miracles, and inclusive enough to also take on the problem of diversity 
within the European development^.
The general approaches I will consider are those of Barrington Moore, 
Douglass North, Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Tilly, and 
Robert Brenner. I do not aspire to the role of umpire between these magnifi­
cent storytellers, but will focus my attention on the part played by one of the 
minor actors in the plot: Sweden.
My fundamental motivational questions are:
• In what ways might these theories give us a picture of Swedish his­
tory more intelligible and less accidental than conventional national 
history usually proves to be?
and
• In what ways can the example of Sweden throw a different light on
the processes of the triple miracle, and on the different theoretical 
approaches considered here?
The first question might obviously be of interest at least to Swedes, but will 
even the second question be of interest to anyone else? Is there any reason to 
suppose that the subplot of Swedish history will have any bearing on the 
main plot, or will it only confuse the issues? Before moving on to the dis­
cussion of the different theories, it may be necessary to argue for the rele-
l4Reasonably later 16th to early 18th century, thus stopping far short of any democratic 
breakthrough.
^The first delimitation excludes purely political analysts like Reinhard Bendix, and the second 
one excludes E L Jones. Michael Mann certainly qualifies, but not unequivocally before the 
appearance of part II of Sources of Social Power . As I had not yet had time enough to digest part II it 
was by far too late to revise the structure of discussion in order to make place for his approach as 
well. I will return to his case in the end of the second part of this essay.
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vance of including Sweden in the discussion, especially as one of the analysts 
explicitly denies this.
1:2 The relevance of ‘smaller country’ history
Barrington Moore squarely refuses to consider ‘smaller countries’ in his gen­
eral model on the grounds that his focus is on the countries that have led the 
way, not on ‘the spread and reception of institutions that have been hammered 
out elsewhere’. Smaller countries are seen as dependent on the ‘big and 
powerful ones’ and therefore ‘the decisive causes of their politics lie outside 
their own boundaries’16. Perry Anderson, on the other hand, argues - against 
Heckscher’s similar dictum that peculiar developments in ‘countries of 
second rank’ should not be allowed to complicate the discernment of general 
evolutions - that the ‘differential character’ of ‘a region that controverts 
many of [historical science’s] accepted categories’ forms a necessary control 
for historical generalizations and typologies17.
Beginning with Moore’s arguments, we can see that they are in practice 
self-defeating, because although he claims that the ‘risk of anti-peasant bias’ 
that his exclusion of Switzerland, Scandinavia and the Low Countries might 
be thought to entail, is vitiated by his general method of combining generali­
zation with analysis of specific cases (the ‘larger countries’ pioneering differ­
ent lines of development), we can later on notice that the disowned example 
of these ‘smaller client democracies’ proves necessary as one of the points ol 
reference in his discussion of possible (and impossible) options for India. 
Thus the ‘larger countries’ simply do not provide the necessary range of ex­
amples and analytical concepts, despite Moore’s protestations that ‘the ques­
tion of commercial agriculture among the peasants has less relevance for de­
mocracy'18.
His object of analysis is the web of interconnections between agriculture, 
bureaucratization, commercialization and the growth of democracy or 
dictatorship from the early modern period until the 20th century. 
Outdefining all economic and political lines of development that have not 
led to great power status in the 20th century cannot be legitimized by describ­
ing the excluded countries as ‘marginal’.
l6Moore 1967:xii f. As Skocpol (1973) has pointed out, external influence is every bit as 
important in the analysis of ‘larger countries’.
17Anderson 1974a:173nl,173-
18Loc at and p 422f; also on p 430. To the extent that successful land reforms might prove to be a 
necessary condition for third world economic growth (Taiwan and Chile are cases in point) the 
relevance or lack of relevance of peasant-based commercialization will be a question of utmost 
relevance.
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1:2.1 ‘Marginal’ innovators
In fact, many of them were far from marginal in the beginning of the period, 
and many of the institutions examined were ‘hammered out’ before this 
century - largely by today’s ‘smaller countries’:
• England borrowed key economic institutions from Holland19, as well 
as agricultural techniques, and although England was the first country 
to carry through an industrial revolution, the close second, and the 
only other country that has been suggested as a possible case of an 
independently developed industrial revolution, was not any of the 
‘larger countries’ but Belgium20. Swedish institutions generally 
lagged behind both Holland and England, but Sweden was the first 
country to open a central bank (in 1668), and it was also the first 
country in Europe to introduce paper money.
• In early modern Europe the innovations of the greatest immediate 
social impact - those in the military field - were diffused from 
successive pioneering countries: first Switzerland, then Holland, then 
Sweden21 whose military and administrative methods were studied and 
copied by neighbours feeling threatened (notably Prussia and 
Russia)22.
• Within the political and ideological fields the Swiss confederacy pro­
vided examples for democrats and republicans23, the Dutch carried 
through what is widely considered to be the first bourgeois revolu­
tion24, and Sweden made the first experiments with a system of par­
liamentary party government25.
19North/Thomas 1973:146, Tilly 1992:57, Wallersteinl980:77. Even Moore himself puts 
Holland before England in his list of countries successively developing the 'institutional complex’ 
of capitalism: 'Italy, Holland, England, France and the United States.’(p 427)
20Senghaas (p 28f); the third country in the ‘first generation of industrial nations’ was also a 
“smaller country”: Switzerland.
21Finer 1975:105-7, Roberts 1967:196-204
22C/Anderson 1974b:199-202,Roberts 1967:65, 1979:57, Downing 1992:82 
23Brady 1991:140
24E g Tilly 1992:65,73-6, Anderson 1974b:75, 1992:110; also cf quotes in Wallerstein 1974:201- 
11.
25Although Whigs and Tories predate Caps and Hats the English cabinet was not made 
responsible to Parliament until the 1830’s. (Metcalf 1987:131f)
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1:2.2 Or even: A key role for Sweden?
Returning to Anderson, we can conclude that his standpoint that theories with 
pretentions to general validity should be able to explain not only the easily 
assimilated cases, but also, and more importantly, those that are most diffi­
cult to subsume under a generalized model, would be hard to oppose in a 
convincing way using Moore’s arguments2^.
Also Anderson’s more specific discussion of the Swedish case reveals fur­
ther reasons to reject explanations that do not take Swedish history into con­
sideration; according to his claims, Sweden is not only a unique combination 
of western and eastern European traits, but also a key element in the very defini­
tion of the contrast: while western absolutism is endogenous, a consequence of 
internal class conflict, the eastern variant is exogenous - a response to 
external military pressure. This pressure, though supposedly derived from 
western absolutism is - paradoxically - transmitted through the threat of 
Sivedish military expansion. Thus Sweden is, to his explanation, central, and 
not marginal.
In Wallerstein’s model Sweden also plays an important role: as the first 
country to rise to semi-peripheral status in the world economy (Venice, Spain 
and Portugal sank to that level from a formerly more central position) it suc­
ceeded to make use of a favourable natural resource endowment to escape 
marginalization (‘the OPEC of its time’). That is: Sweden is an example of how 
the ‘development of underdevelopment’ can be avoided - a most central concern in a 
theory about the rise of international dependence.
1:2.3 Part of the system - part of the miracle
These examples refer to Sweden’s role in the interaction of European states, 
and if the sharply divergent standpoints involved in the revitalized debate on 
‘the Rise of the West’ can be said to have reached a consensus on anything, it 
would be this:
Europe as a system of interacting hut independent and competing states 
had a much higher potential for dynamic development than traditional-style 
empires that typically tend to aspire to self-sufficiency21
^°Did the historical formation and social structure of the ‘smaller countries’ appear to be nothing 
but permutations of traits from the ‘larger countries’ it might carry some conviction, but, as I 
have tried to demonstrate, this is not the case.
22Theda Skocpol observed (1977) this aspect as a common feature of the Anderson and Wallerstein 
syntheses (both 1974), as well as of essays in Tilly (1975). Jones (1981) put this argument into the 
centre of his explanation and Michael Mann has generalized this dynamic into his concept ‘multi­
power actor civilizations’ (1986:534). That it is now widely accepted as an indispensable central 
component ol any explanation, is evidenced by Pearson and Brady in Tracy 1991 (pp48 and 120); 
see also Holton (1985), Hall (1985:133-141 and 1988) and North(1993b). The renewed interest in 
Hintze is connected wih this awareness of state-system dynamics.
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In the formalization of this state system at the treaty of Westphal, Sweden 
played one of the leading roles. A system-dynamic approach also allows us to 
consider indirect contributions to the miracles:
1. The ‘military revolution’ where Sweden is usually acknowledged to be 
one of the pathbreaking countries28 was crucial to the possibility of world 
conquest. Portuguese hegemony over trade in the Indian Ocean was largely 
won through the key military advantage of ships armed with cannons - 
increasingly imported from Sweden during the 17th century29.
2. In the achievement of full democracy, Sweden can hardly be considered a 
pioneer. Among the core OECD countries surveyed by Therborn (1977), 
Sweden shares fifth place with Austria, at 15 years after number 1 
(Australia), and at only one year before the median. Still, this is ten years be­
fore Britain30, which is often conventionally assumed to have led the way in 
the development of democracy.
Obviously this development has been a lot more complex and uneven, with 
different countries acting as ‘reference societies’31 at different times, inspiring or 
justifying breach of tradition and precedent. The ‘social laboratory’ image of 
post-Second World War Sweden has made it a reference society in a variety of 
social, economic and political respects, but already in early modernity 
Sweden could serve as a reference:
• in justifying peasant freedom and autonomy as compatible with 
lawabiding Christianity (Switzerland in early modern times32),
• as an example of representative government and freedom of press cited
by political theorists of the French and Italian Enlightenments33
3. Within the ‘miracle of growth’, Sweden has been considered as a ‘late 
starter’ but also as one of the most dramatic examples of ‘catching up’34. Re­
cent research has tended toward the position that the foundations of this rapid 
economic development must have been laid during a long time ‘underneath’ 
the visible surface of measurable indicators. The importance of the degree of 
growth should be obvious, but also the obscurity of its emergence.
28Roberts 1965:65, Parker 1988:24f, Downing 66-7,71-3, Finer 1975:107.
29Cipolla 1965:56.
30Or the same year but for both sexes while the UK still kept women outside politics. In the US 
and Switzerland non-discriminatory suffrage was not achieved until the late 60s-early 70s . 
(Therborn 1977)
31 The term is coined by Reinhard Bendix (1978:292).
32Blickle 1989.
33C/ Roberts 1986:59 for the high opinions of Swedish liberty held by Voltaire, Mably and 
Rousseau, and Mastellone 1989 for Italian discussions of Sweden - together with Venice - as an 
example of the republican state form.
34Still in 1990 it can be claimed that: ‘From 1870 to 1950 the per capita GNP growth rate in 
Sweden seems to have been the fastest in the world’ (Lindbeck)
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1:3 Sweden as the (Most Drastic Modernizer’
A drastic and far-reaching modernization is part of the received image of Swe­
den, but the extent of it might still be underestimated. Even though the pic­
ture of Sweden as a poor and regressive backwater suddenly bursting into un­
precedented growth may be considerably exaggerated35, there are several 
aspects where Sweden moves from one end of the scale to the opposite, 
‘outmodernizing’ its competitors in such fundamental dimensions of the mod­
ernizing process as de-agrarization, de-militarization and secularization.
1:3.1 The disappearance of the peasants
From having been a country overwhelmingly dominated by peasants, Sweden 
has been transformed into a society where ‘self-employed’ farm operators are 
scarcer than in any European country save Great Britain, and maybe 
Belgium36
Of course any predominantly agricultural society - which all early modern 
European societies were - can be described as dominated by peasants, but 
within the scope of diversity possible during this period, I would consider it 
quite obvious that in no other European country west of Russia peasants pre­
dominated to a higher degree than in Sweden. As the evidence is sparse and not 
very compatible, we have to mix inferences of indirect and direct nature:
A higher degree of urbanization, a more numerous nobility and a larger 
proportion of landless people among the rural population are factors that 
infer a lower relative proportion of peasants.
1. Starting with urbanisation: De Vries (1984) - counting only cities 
over 10,000 - puts Scandinavia at 0,9 % in 1500. As Copenhagen is 
the only city counted in this index, Sweden and Norway would stay at 
0%, together with Ireland and Poland. Other European countries are 
at 3% upwards, except for Switzerland, Scotland and Austfia-Bohemia, 
all at 1,5-1,7.
Using Bairoch’s (1988) wider definition (cities over 5,000) Scandi­
navia rises to 2,2%; Sweden (including Finland), with only Stock­
holm qualified, could not lie far above 1%. This is not only far 
lower than Switzerland (6,8%) and Austria-Hungary-Czechoslovakia
35Therborn’s observation (1989:81) that Sweden moved from having been, in the late 19th 
century, the poorest country in western Europe north of the Pyrénées (Ireland excepted) to one of 
the richest, is based on Maddison’s historical data, which have been put in considerable doubt. 
Still, even if Sweden was a lot less poor at the starting-point than is usually imagined, the further 
development remains impressive.
36See the table below. Depending on from which figures Belgian peasant population is computed, 
the 1989 figure will come out at 2.3, 2.5 or 2.8, even using only official EC statistics (The 
Agrarian Situation..A- According to ILO it might be even lower.
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(4,8), but also than Poland at 6%, European Russia (5,4%) and 
Rumania (3%). Ireland, on the other hand, would only reach 0,8% 
(using Bairoch’s database together with de Vries’ total population fig­
ure), and Norway probably something similar.37
2. The Swedish nobility comprised no more than 0,5% of the popula­
tion, as against 2% in France and in England (including the gentry), 
and more than 5% in Poland, Spain and Hungary38. Apart from sheer 
weight of numbers, we have to consider economic and political impor­
tance, etc: Peasants dominated by their landlords will of course have a 
smaller impact on society, than independent peasants. In this respect 
few countries would be comparable to Sweden. Switzerland, of course 
(cf Blickle), and reasonably Norway.
3» The rural proletariat in Sweden cannot have been very numerous in 
comparison to other European countries, at least not before the 19th 
century, when the decisive polarization into landless and proprietary 
strata seems to have taken place (Winberg 1990). Myrdal-Söderberg 
show that the 16th century was - contrary to what is taken to be the 
common pattern in Europe - not a period of growing peasant differen­
tiation in Sweden; in fact, rather the opposite (199TES525). Gadd 
(1990) counters the stereotype of Sweden’s poverty by observing that 
its peasants were rather affluent compared to conditions in other coun­
tries - it was the upper classes that were (relatively) poorer.
The development from 1880 until today is described in the table below. Of 
course the reliability of all such statistics is highly debatable, and I have to 
emphasize that I do not want to take responsibility for all the information 
appearing in it: My only purpose is to convey the extreme proportions of the trans­
formations - from one end of the scale39 to the other.
37As the names of the units imply, both of the authors define them primarily from present 
borders, which makes their relevance debatable.
38Samuelson 1993:49f, ES* 270. (For some reason the gentry is only described as 'large in 
numbers’ in the English summary). The Polish nobility has even been estimated at 8-10% (in the 
17th century; Braudel 1981:376), and the Spanish at ll%(in late 16th century; Wilson-Parker 
1977:58).
* I will use the letters ES to designate references to English summaries within works written in 
Swedish. Whenever a relevant passage can be found in the English summary, I have chosen that 
place of reference.
39And 1880 is not a very suitable year to begin with, as the compatibility of the compared figures 
at that point is quite uncertain. However, going further back, as I argued above, we can find a 
much more unequivocal point of extremity.
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Chart 1: The disappearance of the peasants. 
Europe 1880-1938 and 1946-8640
Diagram A Diagram B
Male heads of households 
relative to total population
Total non-wage labour 
agricultural workforce 50 
(incl family labour) rela­
tive to total workforce .c
* -
- Swz *..... ..... ............... SWEDEN (B)
NB: This line refers to scale (B) over entire chart
SWEDEN
(A)
* The curve breaks off at 1980 as I could find no compatible Swiss figures after that year, which 
has moreover been adjusted in proportion to the more comprehensive 1976 figures.
^Figures computed from data in Flora et al 1987 - for the later years also from EC and ILO 
statistics - as well as from Swedish official census statistics.
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1:3.2. From military state to centennial peace
From having been a thoroughly militarized society where:
• all other needs were subordinated to the requirements of aggressive 
military expansion41
• a higher proportion of the population - 8% ‘at its peak toward 1710’42
- was placed in the military than in any other known instance
• the degree of militarization as indexed by the status of military offi­
cers relative to other social groups was higher than or equal to that of 
Prussia still in the middle of the eighteenth century43,
Sweden has been transformed into a country holding the current world record 
in unbroken peace. The reasons usually given for this development are stan­
dard arguments applicable to the evolution of developed states in general44 
They might be sufficient for an argument about why modern ‘nation-states’ 
have evolved from a military state stage to a more civilian one, but they can­
not explain why a country at one end of a ranking-list ranging from war- 
makers to peacekeepers can move to the other extreme, thus overtaking all 
other countries moving in the same direction from similar reasons.
1:3.3. From household inquisition to empty churches
After the reformation and a period where remaining catholic sympathies were 
discredited by association first with Sweden’s last large-scale peasant rebel­
lion, and then, in the dynastic struggle between king Sigismund and Duke 
Charles, with the losing side, with Poland and pretentions to aristocratic in­
dependence, Sweden was molded into extreme religious conformity - ‘the Lu­
theran Spain’ according to Roberts45; all other religious beliefs were out­
lawed, and orthodoxy was scrupulously controlled down to household level
4lS A Nilsson 1973:165.
42Tilly 1990:123.
43Arteus 1982:141-2.
44Arteus 1982:390 lists the decline of aristocratic dominance, the loss of the military monopoly of 
violence through the increase in the number of civilians trained in the use of arms, the increase in 
state revenues made possible by industrialization and growing trade and the growing civilian 
administration necessitated and financed by these factors, the wider scope of non-military career 
possibilities for upper-class youths and the shrinking percentage of officers within the upper 
classes etc; the only specifically Swedish component is the lack of counterbalancing militarizing 
tendencies evident in those countries that continued to get involved in warfare. However, why 
Sweden didn’t, despite its antecedentia, is the very problem requiring explanation.
451979:64. See also Roberts’ comments on compulsory catechetical instruction and the control of 
orthodoxy (1973:140,168-170).
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through the institution of husförhör Today (early 1990’s) Sweden is the 
only country in western Europe where the majority of the population pro­
fesses not to believe in God, and where the level of at least monthly church 
service attendance is the lowest - approached in this respect only by the other 
Nordic countries. Only Russia, Belarus and Bulgaria rank as more secular­
ized than Sweden on both counts, and even the figures for Eastern Europe as a 
whole indicate a considerably higher level of religious belief and church 
attendance than in Sweden.
Chart 2: Religiosity and secularization in Europe and the US
100
Au_ * Port
■WGe■ W. Eur
.No Nl
Latv QEast Eur
n EGe
At least monthly church service
^Explained as ‘catechetical meetings or household examinations’ in Nilsson 1988:34
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1:4 SUMMING UP:
Why bother about Sweden ?
Consequently, I plead that large-scale modernization history theorists have to 
find a place for Sweden in their models to be fully convincing, and I con­
sider the attempts made by some of them to be suitable test-cases for 
evaluating their approaches. My demand for a European history capable of 
integrating Sweden, can be summed up thus:
1. If part of the mystery surrounding the reasons for Europe’s ‘Rise’ 
lies in that such a marginal part of the then civilized world suddenly 
came to the fore - then marginal civilizations must be very important to 
analyze. Portugal, England, Holland and Sweden - all among the 
countries furthest away from the old civilizational heartlands - 
emerged one after the other as important powers (Roberts 1979). 
Sweden, as the most marginal one, cannot be considered to be of mar­
ginal importance to the phenomenon of ‘the rise of marginal regions’.
2* If the system of states is crucial to the explanation, Sweden as one of 
the powers blocking an imperial solution and establishing a balance 
of forces cannot be left outside the analysis47.
3. Sweden’s crucial role in the military revolution is necessary to ana­
lyze in a European perspective as it had important direct and indirect 
consequences for:
d, divergent development in eastern Europe (Anderson 1974b) 
b, the development of efficient state machineries (as above, and 
Roberts 197 9)
C. the military balance between Europe and the rest of the world 
(Parker 1991)
4« Sweden’s role as a pioneer of parliamentary rule and civil rights in 
the 18th century (Metcalf, Roberts) and the exceptional wideness of 
its constituency at a very early date make it impossible to overlook in 
a discussion of the antecedents of democracy. In 180948 its electorate
47Tilly 1990:166-7 Anderson 1974b:52,199- Even if its role in this context might only have been 
as a catalyst, the need for one, and the timely appearance of this particular catalyst, need to be 
explained.
4^And there is no reason to believe that there had been any numerically significant broadening of 
the electoral basis since the Age of Liberty. On the contrary, the loss of Finland should have
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comprised around 13% of the adult population, a figure that Britain, 
often conventionally assumed to lead the way towards democracy, did 
not surpass until 1869- In 1831 the comparable figure for Britain was 
less than 4%, in the US by 1820 it was less than 8, and in Europe no 
country reached a higher figure before the revolutions of 1848 (if we 
do not count the single universal male franchise election to the Con­
vention of France in 1792)49.
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens argue that the central aspect of 
democracy is ‘the extent of the suffrage, and in particular the extent to 
which it transcends class boundaries’ (1992:44).
In this perspective Sweden’s Age of Liberty becomes even more excep­
tional: representation through separate Estates was undoubtedly very 
unequal, yet it would be hard to claim that it did not transcend class 
boundaries.
3. Another important reason to study Swedish development is the con­
tradiction between the precocious development of political and eco­
nomic institutions, and the belated realization of their potential 
(Sandberg, Therborn). In this context the “cultural level” established 
during the Imperial Age must be of great importance. Cultural factors 
are difficult to define adequately - they easily tend to get invoked as a 
catch-all residual, but the importance for institutional development of 
such factors as a shared conception of the world or a common frame 
of reference is inescapable50. The scrupulously enforced religious 
homogeneity undoubtedly has had important beneficial consequences 
on literacy, but we also have to consider the question of which of the 
following contrasting factors that has had the greatest impact on 
Swedish culture and general development:
increased the relative weight of noble-owned land, and thus decreased the proportion of freeholders 
and Crown peasants in the population.
^^International figures are taken from Flora 1983 (adult population defined as at least 20 yars of 
age), except the US figure which is computed from the 4% notation in Eisenstadt-Rokkan (p 193: 
Table A) and the age structure information in U S Bureau of the Census 1966. The Swedish figure 
is calculated from Wohlin 1909 (freeholding peasants), Studier över ... (nobility, burghers) and 
Agardh-Ljungberg 1857 (burghers, clergy, crown peasants), complemented by age structure 
statistics in SCB I860. Norway from 1815 lay on a slightly lower level than Sweden, but as the 
degree of representativity was decreasing in both systems it might have surpassed Sweden at some 
point before Sweden’s reform of representation in 1865-66. Hardly by more than 1%, though. 
5^Andersonl974b:426-8, Jones 1981:111-7, Mannl986:363-71, North 1993c.
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(a) the negative consequences of not experiencing the intellectual stimu­
lus of religious debate - obviously of great importance in England 
and Holland, or
(h) the positive advantage of having a consensual ideological basis?
The sudden development of a precocious parliamentary party system after 
the failure of absolutism and the contemporaneous flowering of Swedish 
science seem to prove that the advantages at least must had outweighed the 
risk of intellectual suffocation.
6• That Sweden was incorporated into the intraeuropean economic system 
as a producer of raw materials, without getting marginalized (cf the 
accounts by Wallerstein, Karlsson, Åström referred to in section 
II:VI below)
7. Sweden’s sudden, fast and drastic modernization is a challenge to any 
generalizations about modernization processes, and the various dimen­
sions and temporalities of its transformations raise important ques­
tions about the interconnection of different aspects of the process.
U. The speed, suddenness and formidable success of (at least the deci­
sive stage of) the economic transformation51
b. The drastic and very complete de-agrarization of one of Europe’s 
most peasant-dominated countries.
C. The transformation of a thoroughly militarized society into a 
totally non-belligerent one.
d. The absolute secularization of a religiously extremely homogenous 
and orthodox nation.
51 Whether the ‘spurt’ started from as low a level as traditionally presumed, or from a level of 
slowly accumulated ‘invisible’ wealth, and whatever are the proportions between “true growth” 
and “increasing statistic visibility of already existing wealth" within these figures, the degree of 
transformation, of whichever type, remains extreme.
17
Sweeten and the European Miracles
1:5 SUMMING UP:
The Triple Miracle of Europe
I have argued that to explain the ‘Rise’, ‘Advantage’ or ‘Miracle’ of Europe 
we have three distinct questions to answer:
1. How could Europe conquer the world?
2. Why and how did sustained, long-term growth develop to become 
the foundation of society and why did this happen in Europe?
3. How come public participation in the selection of authorities devel­
oped and successively widened to eventually encompass the whole 
population - and why did this also happen in Europe?
We can immediately notice a certain assymmetry between the miracles: the 
miracle of conquest refers directly to the relation between Europe and the rest 
of the world, while the other two refer to (apparently) internal processes52. 
There is another assymmetry distinguishing the first two miracles, which 
refer to objective advantages in the military/political and economic areas, 
from the more subjectively defined achievement of democracy which does not 
automatically entail any superiority in international competition.
A possible line of argument would be to claim that democracy leads to 
stronger forces of cohesion in a society, and in that way confers a superior 
strength upon the democratic states vis-à-vis non-democracies. Unfortunately 
this hope-inspiring argument hardly holds up to scrutiny, even though the 
eventual triumph of democracy all over Europe as a culmination of the whole 
modernization process would seem to imply some kind of long-run relation­
ship between:
(1) a state tenable under military competition,
(2) an economy capable of encouraging and sustaining productivity 
growth, and
(3) a political system conferring legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens55. 
The impossibility of giving a strictly objective definition of democracy weak­
ens the case, and it is further undermined by the disappointing fact that the 
degree of state legitimacy as subjectively perceived by the citizens (or sub­
jects), and as an incentive for them to willingly risk their lives in its defence, 
shows no appreciable correlation with the formal definitions of a democratic
52The question of whether growth and/or democracy may be in some sense contingent upon world 
conquest will have to be considered later.
^Note that these three aspects coincide with the typical Weberian categories of power: political 
power (conventionally defined by military strength), economic power and ideological power 
(better: normative power, to follow the suggestion of Poggi 1990:4).
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polity54. In the absence both of an objectively valid definition of democracy, 
and of a convincing argument for identifying subjectively cohesive power 
(“legitimacy” or “normative consensus”) with democracy however defined, I 
will use Hirschmann’s less absolute concept ‘Voice' to denote the miracle or 
tendencies toward it.
Democracy in the full sense might be subdivided into four factors:
1. Inclusion 2. Equality 3. Responsibility and 4. Efficiency.
If (1) all of the population are not included in the system, if (2) all of them 
don’t carry the same weight in the forms of decision-making, if (3) the lead­
ership do not carry full responsibility towards those it represents or if (4) 
the procedures for decisionmaking do distort the opinions they are supposed 
to transmit - or the premises for forming relevant opinions - then we do not 
have democracy in the ‘full’, ideal sense55. The variable most difficult to 
assess is obviously the last one - efficiency. ‘Legitimacy’ can be interpreted as 
a reflection of whether the population considers the efficiency of democracy 
adequate or not.
The degree of inclusion into the political system corresponds to the extent of 
voice; otherwise the vocabulary remains unchanged.
5 lOtherwise we would have no instances of dictatorial rule established as a consequence of 
democratic elections, as in the Third Reich, and we would also have to explain why Danes did not 
fight more valiantly than Japanese during World War II.
55This definition is of course nothing but an asymptotic ideal, and, as I just argued, like all 
alternative definitions it cannot be applied with objectivity. The advantage, for my purposes, of 
this particular formulation, is that it admits separation between factors that are amenable to 
objective assessment, and those that aren't. Putnam 1993 attempts to measure the elusive efficiency 
factor through interviews and comparisons between stated goals and objective results, (cf ch.3: 
measuring performance). The high degree of consistency in his results suggests that the efficiency 
factor corresponds to objective realities. Dahl’s distinction between the two dimensions of 
participation and contestation is analytically very useful, but the very concept of Voice includes the 
notion that those who have voice, can contest. Participation can - in a narrow interpretation - be 
equated with inclusion (or ‘inclusiveness', as Dahl does in 1971:7), or - more widely understood - 
with inclusion as modified by degree of equality and efficiency. However, Dahl uses these concepts 
to define the more limited real-life occurrence of polyarchy, and states that ‘democracy may involve 
more dimensions than [these] two’ (p8). Rueschemeyer et al employ a three-dimensional definition: 
(1) universal suffrage, (2) responsibility of state, and (3) civil rights and freedoms; (1) comprises 
my first two categories, while (3) are conditions for efficiency. As I do not believe that even the 
fullest civil rights and freedoms can guarantee efficiency, I prefer to employ an openly subjective 
definition for that dimension.
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1:6 EXCURSUS: Why stop at Three Miracles?
There are, of course, other aspects of European history that might also be 
considered ‘unique’. A Weberian would, for example, claim rationality to be 
the central problematic and might point to the particular European develop­
ment of the modern state, or to the varying roles of religion and ideology as 
more fundamentally important lines of inquiry. That, however, is just the 
point. With a pre-chosen theoretical paradigm the problem is posed in those 
terms which that particular theory is designed to handle.1 attempt to approach the 
question ‘Why Europe?’ with a mind open enough to consider the debate in as 
full a scope as is manageable, starting from the most wide-ranging synthetic 
perspectives. My point of reference is the double perspective of Sweden as 
part of Europe and Europe including Sweden. To also choose a preconceived 
theoretical or methodological point of departure would be to introduce a 
rival organizing and demarcational principle, limiting the range of relevance 
for what conclusions I might be able to reach.
‘Rationality’ is a proposed answer - like ‘truck and barter’ or ‘class strug­
gle’. I would want to know: What particular kind of rationality, truck and 
barter or class struggle, in what particular subprocess within the totality con­
stituting the European advantage? The provisional theoretical agnosticism I 
impose on myself in an attempt to do justice to a wide range of attempts at 
theoretical synthesis is neither a form of naivete, nor a ‘chickening out’56 
Theoretically innocent ‘facts’ are not easy to find, but I believe that the 
‘interparadigmatic’ debates over the ‘Rise’ of Europe have created enough of 
a common ground to accommodate the kind of discourse I want to pursue - 
to keep the the larger debate going while at the same time discussing how 
developments in one part of the definitional area relate to the entire problem 
complex.
Thus I want to subdivide Weber’s ‘Old Question’ into questions of equal 
importance to have answered, not into stages of a preconceived explanation. 
To equate ‘Conquest’ with colonialism, ‘Growth’ with capitalism, and ‘Voice’ 
with constitutional procedure, would in my view be to mix up questions with 
answers. The modern nation-state is obviously part of the explanation for 
Conquest and it is also the very context within which Voice has evolved. I 
cannot, however, find anything particularly ‘miraculous’ about this state per 
se. ‘Rationality’ in a wider sense is by no means limited to the Western world 
or to the period of the ‘Rise’, and if we start to specify what kind of rational-
56That I would any day choose the egalitarian stance of Marx over the elitism of Weber or the 
complacent self-interest of Smith, is just an even stronger argument for avoiding premature 
conclusions about the validity of their theories - or their followers’ theories. Reiterating the 
trajectory of dogmatization is hardly amenable to attempts at ‘understanding the world’ - and even 
less to ‘changing it’. Self-delusion would be a far more likely outcome.
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ity, we get entangled in all of the three ‘miraculous’ subproblems. Between 
them, I would expect that all of the aspects necessary for delimiting a spe­
cifically ‘Western’ form of rationality57 would be covered.
Likewise, I expect that ideological development would enter into the argu­
ments on many decisive points, but I can see no reason for formulating more 
than three ‘miraculous’ problematics. On the other hand I can see no way of 
reducing the number, except by taking some ‘boldly’ reductionist standpoint. 
At this stage of the debate, though, I suspect that reductionisms have already 
delivered their contributions.
Thus I maintain that there are three ‘miracles’ to explain:
Conquest, Growth and Voice.
57Or, alternatively: all the aspects necessary for rejecting the concept of a specifically ‘Western’ 
form of rationality.
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PART TWO: THE THEORIES
11:0.1 The early 70’s
- a time to grasp for wide-ranging explanations
Most of the theories to be considered here belong to the ‘sudden wave of new 
attempts at explanatory synthesis in the early seventies’ I mentioned in the 
beginning of part one:
North-Thomas’ Rise of the Western World (1973), Anderson’s Passages from 
Antiquity to feudalism and Lineages of the Absolutist State (1974a,b), 
Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System (1974), Tilly’s The formation of 
National States in Western Europe (Tilly (ed) 1975; based on seminars held in 
1970 and 1971), and Brenner’s Agrarian Class Structure and Economic 
Development in Pre-Industrial Europe (first published in 1976; an earlier version 
was delivered to seminars in 1974). The actual timespan between the original 
studies is so short that they hardly even mention each other’s theories except 
in a few final editorial additions58
This is a very important aspect, as the five approaches are parallell attempts 
to address what is fundamentally the same problem, but through applying 
widely contrasting perspectives and methods. Still there is a considerable 
potential for compatibility between the models, as their theoretical 
foundations are largely built upon various combinations of Smith, Marx, 
Weber and - in some cases - Hintze, and their factual bases derive from 
similar lists of sources59. Moreover, in the further development of the 
various models - and in all of these cases I consider additions published well 
into the 90’s - these theorists have had considerable influence on each other, at 
least through an awareness of the competition.
As the aspect of democracy is not really discussed by these authors - 
excepting a recent and quite tentative article by North (1993) - I have added
58Brenner has a short footnote criticism of North-Thomas, and Tilly mentions Wallerstein in his 
introduction and conclusion. Wallerstein is the only one to make positive use of concepts and 
discussions from the other theorists - transaction cost arguments from North-Thomas’ 1970 
theoretical article, and the concept of‘stateness’ from draft copies of Tilly’s chapters for the 1975 
anthology.
59Barraclough, Bloch, Blum, Cipolla, Dobb, Duby, Lane, Postan, Schlicher van Bath and Tawney 
figure prominently in almost all of the accounts, as well as, everywhere Sweden is mentioned: 
Roberts and Heckscher. Among the theorists Weber and Hintze have hardly influenced Brenner at 
all, except maybe through Weber’s concept of patrimonialism, and Smith’s influence on Anderson 
or Tilly must be negligible.
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Barrington Moore (1966)60 to the list of relevant models. His approach is 
also valuable here because different authors have tried to apply his model to 
Sweden, or revise it to incorporate the Swedish route61. I will also to some 
extent consider those attempts, of course.
Expounding these different theories, I will begin by discerning two 
fundamental explanatory dimensions:
(1) the ‘trajectory’ aspect - i e the actual single-society chains of events 
and developments that finally resulted in those particular states we 
encounter at the point in time our analysis refers to.
(2) the ‘system’ aspect - here confined to the supranational level: a 
system of states and/or a trans-societal system of economic 
interconnections.
As long as the general development is seen as one-dimensional, as in 
simplistic versions of modernization theory or historical materialism, it just 
provides a blueprint for analyzing the individual trajectory of any country. 
When we have to admit that all societies are not necessarily travelling in the 
same direction the relations between system and single trajectory become 
considerably more complex.
11:0.2 Trajectories and systems 
- a preliminary survey
Moore groups the dominant trajectories into ‘routes’ leading to different 
forms of society (democracy or dictatorship of either a fascist or a 
communist type), but does not bring the system level into the discussion 
except in one - admittedly very important - aspect: the temporal order of the 
modernizations of different countries.
North and Thomas 1973 take world market formation into account as a 
matter of course, and also take notice of the role played by military rivalry 
in the emergence of modern Europe. Still, these are secondary features and do 
not yet lead to much theoretical reflection. Market relationships are not 
problematized and the emphasis falls on endogenous removal or persistence 
of obstacles to growth. In North’s later development of this theory, these 
factors are pursued much farther and he has recently (1993b) also adopted 
Jones’ view of state-system development.
The full emphasis on system dynamics does not appear until Anderson’s 
and Wallerstein’s macrohistorical projects are both launched in 1974.
6()Quotes are from the British edition, Moore 1967.
61Tilton 1974, Katzenstein 1985, Stephens 1989, Winberg 1990, Downing 1992, Aronsson 1992.
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Anderson pays close attention to the specificity of individual trajectories, 
while at the same time making broad generalizations and discerning crucial 
conceptual subdivisions. The general character of his proposed system is a 
system of military redistribution, based on the ‘feudal dynamic’ of a 
productivity-raising tug-of-war between lords and peasants about the control 
over the agricultural surplus. Through identifying ‘extra-economic coercion’ 
as the economic foundation of feudalism (and the centralized version of it, that 
he considers absolutism to be) he has succeeded to find a formula for 
integrating economics and politics (maybe at the price of complicating the 
question of transition to capitalism beyond disentanglement, as his projected 
third volume on bourgeois revolutions has not yet appeared, although now 
twenty years have gone by since the publication of the first two parts).
To Wallerstein, on the other hand, the balance between individual trajec­
tory and the system as a whole, or between economic factors and political, are 
not allowed to present any problem. The system as a whole has absolute pri­
ority in his analysis, where individual trajectories are but movements between 
different positions in the system, and economic and military/political power 
are treated as definitionally congruent. The descriptive force of his holistic 
model (the ‘Modern World-system’) derives from the square identification of 
the process of conquest with the creation of the modern world.
As the division of wealth and power in the world of today still bears an 
uncomfortable resemblance to the division of roles within the drama of 
world conquest, his model cannot be lightly dismissed, despite its lacunae - 
the miracles of Growth and Voice are treated as epiphenomena by postulate - 
and even if the European (in the wide sense) dominance has eroded somewhat 
in recent years, his model is still the only one with a built-in mechanism for 
rise and fall within the system, and should thus in principle be capable of 
accommodating any “rises and falls of great powers”.
Tilly started out propagating a state-building paradigm with warfare 
providing the motive force and taxation systems the mechanisms for 
transforming the economy, but has successively refined it into a two-sided 
war-and-trade model contrasting ‘capital-intensive trajectories’ with ‘coercion­
intensive’ ones, and making them converge through a competitive warfare 
system.
Brenner’s model is basically a typology of endogenous trajectories, 
primarily determined by class and property relations, although his research 
on the role of merchants in the English revolution62 suggests that a key role 
may still be necessary for exogenous factors.
After this brief introductory overview, I will describe the contending 
approaches one by one, emphasizing:
62The latest version of his argument is summed up in Brenner 1993.
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• Their explanations for the European advantage
• Their viewpoints concerning the dynamics of the system, and the 
relations between Conquest, Growth and Voice.
• Typologies of trajectories, and the defining features of these, with 
special notice taken of the divergence between the Eastern and 
Western halves of Europe, and between England and France.
• The place for Siveden - if any - within the model.
I will continue discussing these theorists in the rough chronological order of 
their first interventions into the debate, that is: as above.
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11:1 BARRINGTON MOORE:
Political Destinies and Social Origins
11:1.1 The agrarian foundations of modernity.
Barrington Moore (1966) tries to analyze the emergence of modern society 
and the wide divergence of resultant political systems in the major countries. 
As he regards the transformation of agrarian societies into industrial ones as 
the basic content of modernization (xi), he draws attention to the structure of 
agrarian society and the conditions under which it is transformed, as the key 
to the divergence between different variants of modern industrial society. 
This means focusing on the roles of 'Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World’ (the subtitle of ‘Social Origins'), rather than on urban 
classes:
‘We seek to understand the role of the landed upper classes and the peasants 
in the bourgeois revolutions leading to capitalist democracy, the abortive 
bourgeois revolutions leading to fascism, and the peasant revolutions leading 
to communism. The ways in which the landed upper classes and the peasants 
reacted to the challenge of commercial agriculture were decisive factors in 
determining the political outcome.’(xvii)
As some form of commercialization of agriculture seems to be the more or 
less unavoidable shape, which any ‘transformation of an agrarian society’ into 
one compatible with industrialization will have to take (the theoretically 
possible road of a state-led organization of agriculture coordinating it with an 
industrial sector without market production playing any significant role in 
the process, has so far hardly proved to be a convincing alternative), the 
significance of Moore’s approach should be obvious, as well as the 
importance of his questions concerning the genesis of political systems.
The time of appearance of his analysis puts him halfway between 
conventional modernization theories, and the “new syntheses” of the early 
seventies. Where the neo-synthesists start from the realization that extra- 
European modernization is not simply a delayed repetition of Europe’s 
development (and go on to draw quite diverging conclusions from this) 
Moore is still posing the question. In his endeavour to encompass European 
and Asian developments he identifies Germany and Japan as parallell cases65
65An interesting parallell comparison from a Japanese historian can be found in Takahashi’s 
discussion of Marx’ concept of ‘two roads to capitalism’ in his 1952 intervention in the Dobb- 
Sweezy debate (Hilton(ed)1978). In a totally different context, the present-day economic systems of 
Japan and Western Germany have been compared as typifying a ‘pattern of economic action’ 
described as ‘institutional co-operation’, in contrast to ‘the laissez-faire economies of Great Britain 
and the United States, the family entrepreneurship economies of Italy and Taiwan, and the state-
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and China as following the same route as Russia. The serious problems 
appear with India as an Asian example of the democratic path.
The ‘fourth pattern’ of incomplete modernization he has to devise for the 
Indian case is an admission of the problem that will continue to provoke 
several new macrohistorical analyses within less than a decade. In my term it 
might be phrased like this: Why has the combination of Growth and Voice been 
possible to extend outside the continent of Conquest only in a very weak form? Moore 
himself offers no explanation for this - he analyzes and defines the European 
road to democracy, and leaves the fate of India an open question, which is an 
important reason why his model is not yet obsolete and still invites attempts 
at revisions. These we will have cause to return to.
First, though, Moore’s own theory:
11:1.2 The Three Routes to Modern Society
1. The bourgeois revolutionary route, leading to the combination of 
capitalism and political democracy. There are two or three variants: either the 
peasants are eliminated and landowners join the bourgeoisie in 
commercializing agriculture, as in England, or else the landowners oppose 
this development and are eliminated, as in France. The US turns out to be 
something of a mixed case: the landowning and slaveholding elite in the 
South are defeated in the Civil War64, a bit like the French case; as the 
Northern bourgeoisie allies itself to the Western farmers, the outcome will 
more or less coincide with the English. If an alliance between slaveholders 
and Northern industrialists had taken place instead, the result would have 
been a ‘reactionary alliance’ like in Prussia.
2. The reactionary capitalist route leading to a ‘revolution from above’, is 
typified by Germany and Japan. A bourgeoisie too weak to take power by 
itself65 allies itself as a junior partner to the ‘militarized fusion of royal 
bureaucracy and landed aristocracy’(436). This ‘reactionary alliance’ between 
landowners and bourgeoisie, amounts to a common front against peasants and 
workers. If this coalition is economically successful, a ‘semiparliamentary’ 
authoritarian regime develops, and, if successful enough, a ‘conservative 
modernization’ is carried through as a ‘revolution from above’. This means 
removing “feudal” obstacles to industrialization’, and to the extent it leads to 
democracy, this will be a weak and unstable democracy unable to withstand
orchestrated economies of France and India’(Orrii 1993)
^The reai democratic revolution, according to Moore, who claims that the original anti-English 
Revolution ‘did not result in any fundamental changes in the structure of society’(l 12)
^In one of the most condensed versions of Moore’s argument ‘abortive bourgeois revolutions’(xvii) 
is said to lead to fascism.
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the challenge of fascism, which is essentially the mass alternative to 
democracy of a ‘reactionary alliance’ increasingly dependent upon militarism.
3. The revolutionary communist route is a result of the double failure of the 
two earlier routes. If the bourgeoisie is not only too weak to seize power on 
its own, but even too weak to be of much use as an ally for the landed 
classes, then reactionary movements (the ‘Black Hundreds’ or the 
Kuomintang) won’t be successful either as modernizers, nor in establishing a 
mass base among those threatened by modernization. This means peasant 
resistance to traditional exploitation will remain the strongest threat to the 
stability of the society, and when a peasant revolution is exploited by 
disappointed modernizers, as in Russia or China, it has resulted in a 
communist regime, proceeding to ‘make the peasants its primary victims’(xvi) 
by carrying through a radical version of ‘modernization from above’.
4. A ‘fourth general pattern’ with only a ‘weak impulse toward 
modernization’ is found in India, where no revolutionary transformation has 
been carried through, neither from below nor from above. This is partly due 
to the inheritance from Mogul India, leaving little room for the development 
of a strong trading class or an independent aristocracy, and partly to the 
British rule, which pre-empted the reactionary solution through its own 
alliance with the landed upper classes, but without any ambition to 
modernize. Instead it enforced free trade to the advantage of British export, 
stunting handicrafts and generating urban resentment. The anti-British 
movement therefore could develop a democratic ideology, and neither 
repression nor revolutionary resistance has ensued. On the other hand, neither 
has democracy been successful in transforming society, but has rather 
conserved existing deadlocks. Thus: democracy but no real modernization.
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Residual Categories
As observed in part I, Moore argues against having to consider the trajectories 
of ‘smaller countries’, although he still has a need for “peasant 
commercialization” route as an analytical category when discussing the whole 
spectrum of possible developments. There (422) he briefly outlines a road 
where ‘peasants have become part of democratic systems by taking up fairly 
specialized forms of commercial farming, mainly dairy products, for the 
town markets’. Scandinavia and Switzerland are referred to as examples, and 
in the introduction ‘the Low Countries’ are added to a similar list (xii), which 
makes it appear somewhat puzzling that in the same context, and as an explicit 
contrast to this “peasant road”, he keeps insisting that ‘By and large, the 
elimination of the peasant question through the transformation of the 
peasantry into some other kind of social formation appears to augur best for 
democracy’.
That he considers the political instability of democracy during large parts 
of the post-revolutionary history of France to be due to the survival of the 
peasantry as a social class he has stated elsewhere (105-8,426), but in what 
way has Scandinavian, Swiss or Dutch democracy proved more unstable than 
English or US-American? The 'antipeasant bias’ he tries to disown in the 
introduction, is all too obvious to the reader. The existence of a peasantry has 
to signify economic backwardness and the presence of a ‘massive reservoir ... 
to serve the reactionary ends of the landed upper classes’, which ‘England’s 
“final solution of the peasant question” through the enclosures’ saved her 
from (426). We will have to return to the question of peasant-based 
modernization, and to Moore’s prejudices.
Another residual category only tentatively sketched, is the subcategory of 
reactionary states that didn’t make it all the way through to a revolution from 
above, but where a more traditionally conservative variant of authoritarian 
rule led to stagnation instead of modernization (438). Poland, Hungary, 
Rumania and Greece belong to this group, while Spain hovers on the border 
toward the countries of true reactionary modernization: Germany, Japan and - 
less successfully - Italy.
An open question: the post-war world
Moore doesn’t discuss post-war democratization at all in his book. An 
interesting but tantalizing hint is given in a late review article on Japanese 
peasant struggle, which he ends with a short comment to the effect that 
democratization in Japan was brought about not by its internal development (e 
g the struggles of its peasants), but by the defeat in the Second World War 
and the American occupation. ‘Under certain conditions, defeat in war can act 
as a substitute for a revolution’(1988). Still, there is no real discussion of 
the fact that the fascist solution didn’t endure, and that route two in the 
longer run has proved to lead to democracy as well. Today, though, not only
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routes from fascism to democracy, but also to ‘communism’ and from 
‘communism’ to democracy, would have to be considered.
11:1.3 Five conditions for democratic development
In his discussion of India’s still unresolved route to modernization, Moore 
formulates five conditions - based on the discussion of England, France and 
the US - that he considers necessary for the development of democracy (430- 
1):
(1) The development of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or too 
independent a landed aristocracy
(2) A turn toward an appropriate form of commercial agriculture either 
on the part of the landed aristocracy or the peasantry
(3) The weakening of the landed aristocracy
(4) The prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the 
peasantry
(5) A revolutionary break with the past
I will return to these conditions after discussing the post-Moorean 
development of this line of inquiry. But first I want to challenge their 
relevance from a quite different angle.
11:1 A The dangers of backwardness: 
a Gerschenkronian undertext
Partly hidden within the argumentation, there is a secondary line of reasoning 
relating to the timing of industrial breakthrough. The ‘reactionary alliance’ 
essential to route 2, is a response to the threat of a growing industrial 
proletariat and to the necessities of standing up to the challenge of world 
market competition. English development faced very different conditions:
‘the English bourgeoisie from the seventeenth through much of the nineteenth 
century had a maximum stake in human freedom because it was the first 
bourgeoisie and had not yet brought its foreign and domestic rivals to their 
full powers’ (424).
That France did not develop along a reactionary route is explicitly credited 
to the Revolution, to the radical urban crowds and to the temporary 
coincidence of their interests with those of the peasants (109), while the non- 
appearance of a reactionary coalition between Southern slaveholders and 
Northern industrialists in the US is ultimately attributed to the civilizational 
gulf between the South, and the West, whose compatibility with the North 
was much greater66 Still, another perspective also crops up:
66In fact, the division into three separate cultures is the key(132-6, 141, 152).
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‘[Firstly:] The absence of any strong radical working-class threat to 
industrial capitalist property in the North. Secondly, the United States had no 
powerful foreign enemies. In this respect, the situation was entirely different 
from that facing Germany and Japan, who both experienced their own 
versions of political modernization crises somewhat later’(l40-l).
Thus, distilling a set of conditions for democracy no longer supposed to be 
valid by 1868-71 obscures an important part of Moore’s conception.
Once again: to be of any possible relevance for present-day modernization 
and democratization the later transitions to democracy also have to be 
considered67
11:1.5 Critiques and revisions
Although Moore’s model is the oldest one reviewed in this essay, the 
discussion opened by him is still very much alive. I will consider some68 of 
the later contributions here: Timothy Tilton (1974), because he tries to 
integrate Sweden; Peter Katzenstein (1985), because he purports to formulate 
a general path for the residual 'small countries’ category; John D. Stephens 
(1989) because he sums up important criticism and suggests useful 
emendations. Brian M. Downing’s (1992) attempt to integrate the ‘military 
revolution’ and the question of absolutism into Moore’s problematic, I 
postpone treatment of until part III, where I will make use of it in the 
comparative discussion. The other contributions I will discuss in reverse 
temporal order, as that will allow me to narrow in on the Swedish question.
^Compare this perspective to Anderson’s discussion in ‘The Notion of Bourgeois Revolution’ of 
‘two temporalities’ in the series of bourgeois revolutions, where 1S48-49 marks the watershed 
between old-style ‘[p]olitical alliances against the old order mingling proto-capitalist and pre­
capitalist forces’ and the ‘epoch of revolutions from above’ where the political risk of arousing 
masses now increasingly industrial - and thus potentially anti-capitalist - was no longer to be­
taken ( 1992a: 116-8). In essence the perspective seems identical, as Moore also calls the American 
Civil War ‘the last revolutionary offensive on the part of what one may legitimately call urban or 
bourgeois capitalist democracy’(112).
68One of the critiques that I will not discuss here, is the arguably most influential one - Skocpol 
1973 - as she proposes not a revision of categories, but an entirely different perspective. Although 
her approach might be developed into a fullscale competitor (as suggested in Skocpol 1976), she 
has not (yet?) done so. Another very interesting contribution which I will not discuss here, is Gale 
Stokes’ 1989 analysis of the ‘small countries’ of Eastern Europe. Any full-scale revision of Moore 
would have to come to terms at least with Czech democratic development (briefly discussed also 
by Stephens as a ‘counterfactual’ to the Austrian case), as well as the typical examples of the 
‘authoritarian stagnation’ subvariant: Poland (not treated by Stokes), Hungary and Rumania.
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11:1.6 John D. Stephens: revising the reactionary route
Stephens (1989) attempts to test the validity of Moore’s argument through 
comparing the instances of democratic breakdown in Western Europe 1870- 
1939 with those countries that did remain democratic, applying Moore’s 
criteria to the cases discussed. He also discusses the factual basis for Moore’s 
analyses, and sums up important criticisms. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens (1992) includes this article and extends the analysis to a larger 
number of countries, and to a higher level of generalization. Here I will 
only refer to Stephens 1989, though, as the points I want to discuss are 
already present there69.
1. Moore overrates bourgeois contributions to democratic development and 
neglects the crucial importance of working-class demands for universal 
suffrage(c/Therbornl977; further developed in Rueschemeyer et cd).
2. Moore follows the conventional misrepresentation of the German 
bourgeoisie as ‘supine’ and politically dominated by the Junkers.However, 
Stephens concludes, this ‘reactionary coalition’ was perfectly compatible with 
bourgeois interests and in fact the initiative would rather have come from the 
bourgeoisie (references to Blackbourn, Eley, Calleo).
3. Stephens claims that Moore’s thesis has to be revised in the case of 
modernization, as neither Spain nor Austria carried through any ‘revolutions 
from above’. Moore himself, however, is also doubtful about modernizing 
tendencies in Spain, and suggests the residual ‘authoritarian stagnation’ 
category as an alternative. Austria is not mentioned, and might also be a 
borderline case, although its “failure” can be questioned. Stephens also 
rejects the label ‘fascist’ for the authoritarian regimes of these countries. 
Moore’s equation of authoritarian capitalism with fascism is, however, tied to 
the ‘revolution from above’ analysis.70
69Important additions in (1992) are the concept of democracy as advanced by the contradictions of 
capitalism, rather than by 'the capitalist market or capitalists as the new dominant force’ (7, 302) 
and the reconceptualization of ‘Moore’s "labor repressive” landlords as “landlords dependent on a 
large supply of cheap labor”.(288)
70C/Mann 1993:333f - the ‘failure’ of Austrian-Hungarian modernization is also questioned by 
Stephens himself. Stephens also discusses Skocpol’s criticism (1973) that Moore neglects state 
‘strength’ as a necessary variable, and concludes that this is only required if the reactionary 
coalition tried to carry out a “revolution from above”, a project of rapid economic development 
(1073). This is exactly what Moore discusses, though, and the difference between ‘fascist 
modernization’ and ’authoritarian stagnation’ should be observed. Stephens’ assertion that only 
Germany fully meets the criteria neglects Japan, and Moore never claims a full-scale reactionary 
modernization for any other countries - Italy is considered an only partial success, and Spain is 
explicitly treated as a borderline case - even less successful but not as obviously stagnant as 
Poland, Hungary and Rumania. Stephens’ ambiguous analysis of Austria might imply a position 
similar to either Italy or Spain)
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4. Stephens’ analysis confirms that ‘late industrialization in [Germany, 
Italy, Spain and Austria] was associated with tariff policies and state 
intervention in the economy that facilitated the formation or strengthening of 
Moore’s landlord-state-bourgeoisie coalition, and in case this was further 
reinforced by an armaments policy that made heavy industry very dependent 
on the state and imperialistic policies’ (1070), and in Stephens’ 
reinterpretation, this provides an alternative to Moore’s ‘bourgeois 
dependence on landlords’ argument: the bourgeoisie had solid economic 
reasons to choose a reactionary coalition rather than push for a democratic 
development.
Small countries - a homogenous group ?
In the table where Stephens compares ‘social and historical factors leading to 
authoritarianism’ for the countries discussed, the ‘small countries’ are treated 
as a homogeneous group, with no differentiation recorded on any of the 
criteria. There are several questionable points in this list:
(1) A politically significant landed upper class, historically engaged in 
labour-repressive agriculture, existed at least in Denmark71
(2) The bourgeoisie is supposed to have been more politically powerful 
than the ‘landed class’ in all of the small countries. As the Swedish 
bourgeoisie still by the early 20th century lacked an appropriate political 
party representation, this is hardly correct for Sweden, and probably even 
less for Denmark72.
(3) None of the states is considered to be ‘strong’; at least for Sweden, 
this is doubtful. Of course this depends on the period discussed and, even 
more, on the definition of strength. However, the strong state evidenced in 
the present century as well as during the imperial era suggests a continuity of 
at least potential strength.
(4) No ‘revolutionary break with the past’ in any of the cases. For 
Belgium, this is clearly wrong (Palmer 341-57), and also for the 
Netherlands (cf Anderson, Tilly). The discontinuities of Finnish history are 
drastic enough to qualify for at least one revolutionary break. The case of 
Sweden I will shortly return to.
71‘The labor obligations of peasants in the Danish realm, and especially in Holstein, were 
possibly the heaviest in all Europe.’ (Blum 1978:54)
72Therborn 1989 argues that they therefore had to choose between two inadequate alternatives: 
The Right was a heterogeneous gathering with ‘an eloquent pre-capitalist element of academics, 
craftsmen, landowners, officers and officials’ and the Liberals were ‘in most places dominated by 
either smaller farmers or craftsmen with a radical bent, often engaged in the temperance, dissenter 
or anti-militarist movements or (in Stockholm) by intellectual radicals, doctrinary 
parliamentarists and social reformers’.(167; my translation)
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11:1.7 Peter Katzenstein’s ‘democratic corporatisms’
Katzenstein aims to complement Moore’s analysis of ‘the conditions that fa­
vored the emergence of democracy, fascism, and communism in the twentieth 
century’ with an investigation of ‘conditions that differentiate democratic cor­
poratism from other forms of democracy’ (183). ‘Democratic corporatism’ 
is, according to Katzenstein, the form that the political systems in the ‘small 
European states’ have had to evolve because of their economic openness and 
dependence on the world market.(34)
Although it was the experiences of depression, fascism and war during the 
30’s and 40’s that forced this development, it also required historically 
transmitted conditions enabling these societies to successfully meet the new 
demands set by the new international context73. Though the countries he dis­
cusses correspond to Moore’s list of ‘small client democracies’ (plus Aus­
tria), his analysis is not a further specification of the ‘peasant commercializa­
tion route’ hinted at in Social Origins. Despite his invocation of Moore, their 
criteria diverge considerably, and, furthermore, he specifies not one but two 
democratic corporatist routes, with Sweden as an in-between case: liberal and 
social corporatism.
Two variants - liberal and social corporatism
In both cases a crisis situation forced a political compromise between Center- 
Right and Left. In liberal corporatist regimes - Switzerland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands - the ‘traditional consociational strategy for coping with con­
flicts between minorities’(174) was extended to incorporate the Left into the 
‘culture of compromise’ because of ‘the threat of war, the war itself, or Nazi 
occupation’! 189). In the social corporatist regimes of Scandinavia, it was the 
‘increasingly strong labor movement’ that had ‘prevailed because it [had] 
constructed successful alliances with farmers’ which, in order to deal with 
the effects of the Depression, opted for a ‘truce in class confIict’.(173f, 189) 
This reflects fundamental differences in the ‘historical determinants’ that 
have ‘shaped business and labor’:
( 1) ‘less radical labor movements’ (a consequence of early industriali­
zation, which is measured by the size of industrial workforce and 
industrial production per capita at the turn of the century)
(2) international orientation (encouraged by ‘war avoidance’ and/or 
‘possession of an overseas colonial empire’)
(3) cultural heterogeneity dominating over social division (measured 
by ‘ethnic and linguistic division’ and ‘religious division’).
These factors made for a liberal corporatism, and their opposites for the 
social variety. Austria after 1945 converged with social corporatism,
73He cites Britain in the 60’s and Poland in the 70’s as examples of how political systems are not 
always able to recast themselves in response to changing conditions.
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Katzenstein argues with support of his indicators (those mentioned within 
parentheses above), which are also supposed to show that Sweden tends to fall 
into an 'intermediate position’: ‘Its labor movement approximates the pattern 
of social corporatism, while its business community resembles the pattern of 
liberal corporatism’ll 77). The adequacy of his indicators, though, appears to 
be questionable.74
Democratic corporatism - common features
Katzenstein defines democratic corporatism through three distinctive traits:
( 1 ) an ideology of social partnership expressed at the national level,
(2) ‘a relatively centralized and concentrated system of interest groups’, 
and
(3) ‘voluntary and informal coordination of conflicting objectives 
through continuous political bargaining between interest groups, state 
bureaucracies, and political parties’75
Central to the formation of this system are the ‘cross-class’ compromises 
struck in the 30’s. These were made possible by two factors distinguishing the 
smaller countries from the larger:
(1) a Right that was ‘weaker and more divided’, and
(2) closer ‘links between different economic and social sectors' due to 
export specialization.(137)
74Katzenstem’s indicators - following the 'expected ranking’ with an accuracy of 88% according 
to his 'detailed pairwise comparison’(181) - do not seem too convincing. The high degree of trade- 
union militancy in Belgium is an inconsistency throwing doubt both on the causal relationships 
involved in the explanation and the value of the carefully compiled ‘neat rankordering’ (for some 
reason this is crucial to Katzenstein - see 177). His ad hoc explanation - focusing on industrial 
structure - neither saves the credibility of the correlation (among the three ‘first generation 
industrialize^’, it holds only for the third one - Switzerland) nor of the rankordering. (Belgium's 
early industrialization is counted into the 88% successful predictions in the rankordering, 
although this variable enters into the analysis only because of its supposed effect on the degree of 
radicalism in the labour movement - which is the variable integral to the explanation.) Some of 
the other variables also seem untrustworthy: the index for 'War avoidance since 1815’ is -7 for 
Switzerland and -3 for Sweden, indicating that Sweden should have been at war at some point 
during this period; as each negative point represents '25 years of peace and declared neutrality’, 
there are two explanations: either Norway’s peaceful secession from the union with Sweden is 
somehow defined as equivalent to war, or else the absence of a formally declared policy of 
neutrality is considered to invalidate the effects of peace. Neither explanation inspires much 
confidence in Katzenstem’s use of sources. Similarly, the index for ‘possession of an overseas 
colonial empire’, supposed to reflect the importance of the colonies for the extroversion of the 
economy, is 1.0 for Belgium and 0.3 for the Netherlands. In sharp contrast to this valuation, 
Bairoch's figures for 1913 (Bairoch 1993) show that the ratio of colonial exports to the exports of 
the motherlands was 66.6% for the Netherlands against only 1.6 % for Belgium (computed from 
Table 7.2, p 83)
75(32f)’these traits make for low-voltage politics’, he states, without specifying his standard of 
comparison. Are US politics more high-voltage?
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11:1.8 Timothy Tilton’s addition: the ‘radical liberal 
route9 of Sweden
Tilton has tried to complement Moore’s model with the example of Sweden. 
Going through Moore’s five conditions for the rise of democracy, he 
considers point (1) - balance between crown and aristocracy - to be amply 
fulfilled through the strength of each of the two contending hereditary- 
monarchical and aristocratic-constitutional traditions ‘mutually checking] 
any enduring claims to absolute rule’ (references to Roberts).
Condition (2) - turn toward commercial agriculture - he finds more 
questionable as Moore’s example of peasant-led commercialization explicitly 
refers to specialization in dairy products. He argues however, that the 
function of this condition in Moore’s model, is to ‘produce a sound economic 
base for the peasants’ rendering them ‘impervious to Fascist and Communist 
appeals’. As the Swedish enclosure movement led to a considerable extension 
of the rural proletariat, emigration became the Swedish solution to what 
Moore calls ‘the peasant problem’.
Point (3) - a weakening of the landed aristocracy - is provided by the 
reduction, and by Gustav III:s devaluation of noble privileges 1789, and (4) 
- prevention of reactionary coalition - is taken more or less for granted 
through the emergence of new professional categories encroaching on the 
noble prerogatives.
Condition (5) - the ‘revolutionary break with the past' - on the other hand, 
‘simply does not appear’. There was wide-spread fear of revolution 
underlying Conservative capitulation for the demands of suffrage reforms, 
Tilton observes: ‘Swedish democracy had triumphed without a revolution, but 
not without the threat of a revolution’. From the Swedish example, he 
modifies Moore’s five conditions to allow for what he defines as the radical 
liberal model of democratic development:
His First three conditions are essentially equivalent to Moore’s conditions 
(1), (3), and (4), while the remaining two hold double, alternative options:
(IV) Elimination of the peasant problem through massive emigration 
and/or the growth of commercial agriculture as a means of 
eliminating a financially unstable and politically dangerous 
peasantry.
(V) In the absence of a revolutionary break, radical reform can substitute 
under four conditions:
(a) the availability of parliamentary institutions in which concessions 
can be extracted
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(b) the absence of a professional standing army available for repressive 
purposes
(c) the presence of massive unrest and some minor outbraks of violence
(d) the conviction among the elite of the possibility of revolution and 
also of the possibility of a peaceful resolution to grievances76
To make evaluation easier I present a chart comparing the different 
countries in Moore’s model with his five conditions, adding two versions of 
Sweden: in Tilton’s interpretation - including his alternative conditions - plus 
a column expressing possible alternative viewpoints on Swedish conditions. I 
will only discuss these points quite tentatively, as any real discussion of 
Sweden’s position in the various models would require a much more 
comprehensive analysis of Swedish history.
Here I am only making a sketch of the theoretical preconditions, but as 
Moore's and Tilton’s models have been challenged by Winberg and 
Aronsson, I seize the opportunity to list other questionable points as well.
76The ruling elements have to have both the incentive and the possibility to settle affairs short of 
revolution; they would not grant reforms willingly, but only as the choice of lesser evils
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Sweden and the European MiracLed
11:1.9 Sweden’s place in Moore’s typology: 
questions to confront
It would be premature to attempt an analysis of Sweden at this stage: the 
Moore model can probably not be extended without revision to any other 
societies than those explicitly analyzed in it. This means that different 
possible standpoints as to the Swedish case have to be discussed along with 
the question of what kinds of revision that will be necessary. Here I will 
only point out some of the complexities that will have to be confronted in the 
context of the ‘five conditions’:
1. Sweden's ambiguous position with both a strong constitutional heritage, as 
the Ständestaat lineage of many of its democratic institutions makes obvious, 
and an absolutist authoritarian heritage.
2. ‘The transformation of the peasantry into some other kind of social 
formation appears to augur best for democracy’ Moore argues (422) 
explicitly not referring to Scandinavia; however, there is a widespread if 
theoretically rather heterogeneous notion of the transformation of the Swed­
ish Estate of Peasants into a class of freeholders (or rather a polarization into 
a class of agrarian proprietors and a landless agrarian proletariat) which 
might be interpreted as another ‘kind of social formation’. Somewhat differ­
ent versions of this line of argument are cited against Tilton by Winberg 
(1990:56,63) and against Moore by Aronsson(343).
As there was a turn towards commercial agriculture among the peasants in 
Sweden - and why would only dairy products count? - I don’t really see why 
the emigration argument has to come in at this point. Obviously it is 
important, but inserting it into an argument based on other factors will 
hardly help us to evaluate its specific contribution to the development at this 
time. There is a trait of ‘peasant elimination’, though, in this massive exit, but 
rather, it seems, of the sub-freeholder stratum of crofters (cf Bäck) than of 
peasants proper77.
Substituting emigration for this condition also removes the central 
variable in Moore’s theory. It is the form of agrarian commercialization 
that most decisively determines the social development, and thus forms a 
crucial nexus between economic development and political form (i e between 
Growth and Voice). In this context one of the most important peculiarities 
of Swedish development is also located: an at least partly peasant-led 
commercialization neither under a dominating influence of a landed upper 
class nor under that of a bourgeoisie.
77 However, we should be wary about too facile equations of peasant status terms from different 
societies, especially over time.
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3. The contention that the landed upper class was not politically dominant in 
Sweden around the turn of the century would require more careful 
specification. What class could be considered ■ dominant at this time? Hardly 
the bourgeoisie, (cf Therborn 1989 as cited above). However, the trans­
formations of the traditional nobility and the military corporation may 
require a thorough reappraisal of the 19th century upper-class structure.
4. Some kind of ‘revolutionary coalition’ along the lines of Moore’s English
argument can be envisioned for the proposed 1719 revolutionary break78. Per
Nyström’s 1680 suggestion would require a very different kind of coalition
between the royal bureaucracy and the rising bourgeoisie against the
aristocracy.
5. Besides the possible revolutionary dates just mentioned, 1809 has been
suggested as the year of the Swedish ‘bourgeois revolution’ by A S Kan, and 
1865 is Göran Therborn’s suggestion - but as a ‘revolution from above’ 
(Therborn 1989:31). If the concept ‘bourgeois revolution’ is interpreted in 
the somewhat revisionist sense of ‘destroying constraints’, rather than
'grasping power’79 both of these solutions are worth taking very seriously. 
Anderson’s redefinition of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ as ‘a series of successive 
ruptures with the existing settlement’ (1992a:155f) suggests that the datings 
may not have to be mutually exclusive.
6. What is actually meant by a ‘revolutionary break’ in Moore’ model, is not 
altogether obvious. A large part of the post-Moore discussion takes for 
granted that his ‘revolutionary break with the past’ has to signify the 
bourgeoisie wresting social power from the landed upper classes. Strong 
elements of what Brenner (1993) calls the ‘traditional social interpretation’ 
of the English (as well as of the French) Revolution are undoubtedly 
present, and in the US case Moore’s argument is obviously that the 
‘weakening of the landed aristocracy’ through the Civil War (the only “real” 
American revolution according to Moore) is what makes it a ‘revolutionary 
break’. In the English case, on the other hand, his argument evidently refers 
to a break with the ‘royal absolutism’ or ‘agrarian bureaucracy’ (as 
landowners and bourgeoisie ally against the crown). In the French case the 
revolution seems to serve both purposes. As the ‘weakening of the landed 
aristocracy’ is already taken care of by condition #3, there seems to be no 
reason for a further condition unless it has some other significance -eg 
breaking the power of the crown.
781719 is considered among the 'democratic revolutions’ of Europe by RR Palmer (1959:31). 
Michael Roberts (1986:lff) and Gunnar Artéus (335-7) also consider it a revolution, and Roberts 
also cites other examples of this viewpoint (1986:59).
79Blackbourn-Eley 1984:89- This view is perfectly compatible also with a North-inspired 
framework: (/Rosenthal 1992.
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We can, however, approach the problem from another direction: The result 
of the revolutionary break should be democracy, and Moore describes this as 
‘a long and certainly incomplete struggle to do three closely related things: 
1) to check arbitrary rulers, 2) to replace arbitrary rules with just and 
rational ones, and 3) to obtain a share for the underlying population in the 
making of rules’. (Notice that in this definition, democracy is a process, not a 
goal!)
As this was more or less achieved in Sweden during the Age of Liberty80, 
1719 should reasonably be considered a revolutionary break. However, the 
19th century Swedish regime would maybe rather correspond to his ‘semi­
parliamentary authoritarianism’. Still it succeeded to make the transition to a 
stable democracy, instead of to an unstable democracy unable to withstand the 
challenge of fascism. Stephens argues that the lack of ‘an agrarian upper class 
with an electoral base in the countryside’ as a strong enough alliance partner 
for a reactionary bourgeoisie too weak by itself to effectively resist 
democratic reform, is what makes Swedish development deviate from German 
(1047-8). If we also take his Finnish example into consideration, we can see 
that a smallholding peasantry having ‘mobilized autonomously’ in the 
‘absence of a strong landed upper class’(1056) is the crucial factor in this 
explanation.
If this is valid for Sweden, the decisive factor should be that the peasants 
were not dispossessed, and the most reasonable explanation for this would 
seem to be that their social and political position during the Age of Liberty 
had become so entrenched, that royal autocracy could only regain power 
through mobilizing peasant resentment against the nobility.
80Obviously (1) and (3) were, and the conditions for achieving (2) were established. The realization 
of this goal is much more debatable, but that goes for any democracy.
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11:2 DOUGLASS NORTH:
Property Rights and Transaction Costs
11:2.1 From efficient institutions to path dependence
The next approach to be considered is the ‘property rights’ or ‘transaction 
cost’ approach to institutional economic theory as developed by Douglass 
North. In ‘The Rise of the Western World’ (1973) - written together with Robert 
Thomas - he explained economic growth as the result of efficient institutions. 
Changes in relative prices - in RWW attributed to population growth as a 
triggering influence - creates incentives to construct more efficient institu­
tions, particularly better defined property rights, which are seen as the fun­
damental prerequisite for economic growth.
The basic idea is the simple homo oeconomicus assumption that any economic 
activity has to be rewarding enough in order to be undertaken; what’s new is 
the focus on the preconditions necessary for the benefits to accrue to the same 
person that makes the choice to undertake that activity - otherwise material in­
centives will not elicit the responses assumed.
North does not really create any typology of different development paths 
as Moore, Anderson and other of these theorists do - indeed explaining diver­
sity is the main stumbling-stone of RWW, and his later revisions are primar­
ily motivated by the difficulty of explaining ‘the persistence of inefficient 
institutions’. His examples are - at least before the 90’s - strictly limited to 
'the Western World’, not even Eastern Europe is seriously considered, and 
his central problem is that even within this rather narrow comparative uni­
verse the contrast between Anglo- and Latin American institutions seems inex­
plicable. The latter seem to be taken over from the Spanish colonizing power, 
despite their lack of efficiency. How come?
In ‘Structure and Change in Economic History’ (1981) he ‘abandoned the effi­
ciency view of institutions’ and explained the prevalence of inefficient prop­
erty rights from the observation that ‘rulers devised property rights in their 
own interests’, and that this tended to lead to high transaction costs and there­
fore to an inefficient economy. This change of perspective brought another 
question into focus: ‘Why wouldn’t competitive pressures lead to the elimina­
tion of inefficient institutions?’
In ‘Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance’(1990) he re­
formulates his case in terms of ‘the difference between institutions and 
organizations, and the interaction between them’ (1990:7). As his central ex­
planatory mechanism for divergence, the concept of ‘path dependence’ is in­
troduced: the pattern of interaction between organizations (‘the players’) and 
institutions (‘the rules’) becomes self-reinforcing, leading toward greater ef­
ficiency, as in the case of England, or conserving inefficient property rights
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in a structure of vested interests, as in the cases of Spain or France.The dif­
ference between a discussion of individual trajectories as following the logics 
of their own particular paths, and a cumulation of ad hoc explanations is not 
always easy to pinpoint; although ad hoc argumentation still dominates at this 
point, elements of path-dependence reasoning appear already in the RWW 
discussion of differential development in the late 17th century: ‘winners, like 
Holland and England, ‘also rans’ like France, and clear losers such as Spain, 
Italy and Germany.’(1973:103) Primarily, though, this line of reasoning is 
found in the discussion of England, which follows the logic of rising effi­
ciency81
The 1981 discussion of differential development is considerably more 
sophisticated, and as later developments in general have been concentrated to a 
more abstract level, I will largely stick to this version in the following ex­
position. There he explicitly states that ‘the nature of the property rights that 
had developed’ was the result of ‘the particular way each nation-state devel­
oped’, especially of how the growing state costs were funded, and that this 
variance was the reason for ‘differential growth’(l48). The underlying cause 
is found in forms of government, and the ‘bargaining process’ between rulers 
and constituents. Ultimately, ‘the key to future differential development ... 
within Europe’ boils down to the fate of the “representative” bodies (North’s 
quotation marks) with whom the crown had to bargain (Parliaments, Estates 
General and the like): whether these bodies succeeded to 'retain this privilege’, or 
whether they lost it. Three factors are advanced as determinants of relative bar­
gaining strengths, and thus of the direction of the whole development:
(1) Extent of potential gains to constituents from letting the state take 
over the protection of property rights (from local authorities or vol­
untary organizations)
(2) Ability ol rivals of the state to provide the same service
(3) Cost/benefit structures of the various types of taxation available to 
each state 82
Essentially, this is an argument linking Voice and Growth, as is made clear 
in a recent paper where he observes that ‘the pioneers of modern economic 
growth, the Netherlands and England, were also the pioneers in the develop­
ment of representative government and civil freedoms’ (1993b:2). This 
claim is not really substantiated, as his focus is put on the development of 
property rights, and although the argument that ‘well specified and enforced 
property rights are only secure when political and civil rights are secure’
81Ekelund-Tollison’s 'rent-seeking paradigm' offers a more substantial analysis endorsed by North 
U981:l49n, 156n). The application of homo oeconomicus self-interested postulates to already 
privileged individuals yields what is in essence a class interest analysis.
820g cit (141). The same factors are present already in 1973:100 and are still emphasized in 
1993b:21
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(1993b: 1) is not to be slighted, a strong position for property owners might 
as well ensure the same without any wide-spread extension of liberties. Oli­
garchy can be quite sufficient, and the likelihood of any further development 
into democracy would have to be argued in closer detail.
Extra-European Conquest is discussed mainly in the context of its negative 
(!) impact on the development of Spain (see below), but the development of 
military technology through intereuropean warfare during the late Middle 
Ages is emphasized as an important factor behind the emergence of nation­
states. The argument is that changing military technology - seen as a form of 
change in relative prices, leading to significant economies of scale - will lead 
from a competitive equilibrium towards an oligopoly solution. Thus the 
formation of centralized nation-states is interpreted as a kind of “oligopoly in 
the protection industry”(1973:94-96,1981:137-9,1993b:6).
11:2.2 Winners or losers - trajectories as game results
There is a strong game-theory flavour to this kind of institutional efficiency 
theory - organizations are ‘players’ playing according to the ‘rules’: ‘humanly 
devised constraints that structure human interaction’, i e institutions. ‘They are 
composed of formal rules..., informal constraints..., and the enforcement 
characteristics of both.’(1993a:7) This model is considerably more sophisti­
cated, than any of his applications so far, where the language suggests sim­
pler kinds of games: states are described as ‘winners’ (the Netherlands and 
England), ‘also-rans’ (like France) and ‘losers’ (Spain, Italy Ger­
many).(1973:103)
France: War-induced chaos makes it necessary to reconstruct the country. The 
Estates General are called in to vote emergency taxes. Somehow the king ac­
quires the power to go on levying these taxes without repeated consent. Why 
the Estates General accepted this is not satisfactorily explained83. Rising 
military costs (‘economies of scale’) and tax exemption for nobility and 
clergy (‘to neutralize potential rivals’) leads to ‘trading property rights for 
taxes’ which requires a growing bureaucracy. As regional disparity makes uni­
form taxation extremely difficult, the crown utilizes the ‘already developed 
infrastructure for raising fiscal revenue’ of the guilds. ‘The French economy 
remained regional in nature, and ...gains from a growing market were sacri- 
fied...As a consequence, France did not escape the Malthusian crisis of the 
seventeenth century.’(148-50)
Spain is a similar case, with the Cortes relinquishing control over taxation84, 
and the granting of monopoly rights becoming the major source of income. 
External sources of income (Netherlands, Naples, America) makes possible a
83No explanation is offered as to why their ‘fervent desire ...[for] end to chaos' should ‘outlast the
emergency’.(149)
81 Anderson argues that this was possible because the nobility were not taxed.
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huge improductive sector: church, army, government, in effect discouraging 
productive activities.
The Netherlands, on the other hand, developed into an international market 
place, where economies of scale in transaction costs encourage the growth of 
the market, and property rights ‘fosterling] the growth of trade’ are protected 
(and can afford to pay for protection, without too much loss of efficiency!). 
This argumentation makes sense for describing the mechanisms encouraging 
growth of centralized market areas, but how did the Netherlands get started 
on this positive, self-reinforcing road, and how come other market zones - 
Northern Italy, say - did not develop in a similar way?
The representative assembly - the States General - hade a ‘make-up’ favor­
ing legislation protecting efficient property rights - this reasonably means 
that an assembly of business people (the States General was an indirect 
assembly - made up from representatives of local estates assemblies - city- 
councils, more or less) protects business interests. Was it that prosperity 
made them too tempting targets for plunder and/or taxation? Then the mili­
tary defense capacity must be crucial. ‘The ever-more exacting demands of 
Philip II led to the successful revolt of the seven northern provinces’, North 
tells us. It figures.(152-4)
England, finally, is a more surprising case, not having the initial advantage 
of being a market centre. The Tudors attempted to use the same methods as 
French kings, ‘as opportunistic in their dealings with property rights as any 
continental king’, and eventually it all boils down to the question of Parlia­
mentary power to tax: ‘a group whose interests were to halt restrictive prac­
tices and ensure private property rights and competition by constraining the 
powers of the king’ had gotten decisive control over taxation.
This is really the crux of the matter: ‘the key to future differential patterns 
of development’ in Europe, North has already told us, is the fate of the late 
medieval representative bodies taking shape during bargaining over the taxa­
tion necessary to pay for the rising military costs. ‘In some instances [they] 
retained this privilege; in others, they lost it.’(l4l) His explanation for the 
English case is conventional and not very convincing:
• The geographical position insulating it against rivals.
(If the Channel didn’t protect France from England, why ■would it in the other 
direction?)
• Internally, there were often several contenders for the throne, limit­
ing the power of the king or queen.
(This argument is contrary to the earlier one - is rivalry positive or not? Why 
is it overcome in one country, but not in the other?)
• The nature of the economy led to a dependence on an export staple,
wool, which was easily measured and taxed.
(Why didn't the wool export of Spain produce a similar effect?)
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Finally it boils down to the argument that : ‘The power to grant property 
rights increasingly fell [!] to a group whose own interests were best served 
by private property and elimination of crown monopolies’! 154-6) ‘Fell’, 
how? Despite all the talk about ‘bargaining strength’ and a ‘shift’ in power, 
the ‘effective opposition’ from Parliament in the end - as Moore points out - 
required a revolution and the beheading of a king to ensure that no English 
king would dare ‘to take royal absolutism seriously again’ (Moore 1977:16- 
7) Similarly, without the successful revolt against Philip II (‘the first bour­
geois revolution’, according to Anderson and Tilly), the Dutch merchants 
would not have been allowed to define their own property rights structure.
Without ever discussing the question of ‘bourgeois’ revolutions, North’s 
arguments still require that these events took place. The French revolution he 
never refers to, but his evaluation of the constraints upon the French economy 
during the Ancien régime, makes it obvious that a drastic change was necessary. 
Closely related to this lacuna in the argumentation, is his ambiguities about 
class interests85.
11:2.3 Where does Eastern Europe come in?
In (1971) and (1973) the manorial system of the Middle Ages is described as 
a form of ‘contractual’ relationship. The massive criticism against this rather 
absurd description (e g Kahan 1973, Fenoaltea 1975) made North back off, 
and in (1981) he instead describes the medieval ‘warrior class’ as ‘analogous 
to the Mafia in extracting income from the peasantry’ (130-1). Fie does not, 
however, make any corresponding adjustments in his theory about the effect 
of demographic change:
In North-Thomas (1971,1973) the rising land/labour ratio during the late 
medieval crisis was seen as a fundamental cause of the strengthened position 
of the peasants, as lords compete to attract and retain tenants, lower rents and 
relax servile obligations. The opposite development occurred in Eastern 
Europe where the lords instead increased rent pressure and bound the tenants 
to the soil under the so-called ‘second serfdom’. These contradictory 
developments86 were insulated from each other as pertaining to different 
systems of labour: for the Eastern case, they referred to Evsey Domar’s 
model (coercive labour-systems like slavery and serfdom, correspond to a 
high land/labour ratio), but maintained that this logic did not apply in 
Western Europe, as the serf-seigneur relationship was not exploitative, but
85J-L Rosenthal (1992) has made an interesting interpretation of the French Revolution as a 
fundamental revision of property rights structure, published in a series co-edited by North. I will 
return to the question of North’s implicit class considerations in 111:2.3.
86Emphasized by Dobb, they form the basis of the 'Brenner Paradox’ (see below, section VI), 
pointing out the diametrical contradiction between demographically based explanations for 
Eastern enserfment and for Western emancipation. A J Field’s criticism of North-Thomas parallels 
Brenner’s argument in this respect(1981:190fß.
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contractual 1971). Having once abandoned this argument, North is left 
without any explanation for the divergence and does no longer mention these 
aspects of it. His only reference to ‘the late serfdom in eastern Europe’ in 
(1981) is, though, to Witold Kula’s model of the ‘feudal economy’, where 
the scattered strips structure in the open-field system is interpreted as a device 
for monitoring the output and keeping peasant holdings at a minimum size to 
increase demesne production. This means that the divergence between Eastern 
and Western Europe can no longer be explained by the presumed given 
difference87 in institutional preconditions, and is instead quietly subsumed 
under the general contrast between Western Europe and Oriental cultures. 
North’s growing tendency to fall back on traditional cultural explanations (cf 
North 1993b) may have been partly caused by this retreat.
The map below refers to the earlier model.
Map 2: North-Thomas’ typology of Europe
In Western Europe the rising costs of war­
fare and the rising land/labour ratio force 
rulers to bargain with their constituents
In England and the Netherlands this leads to 
democracy and a common interest in economic 
growth betwen rulers and constituents
r
France is seen as an 
'In-between case'
In Spain, Portugal, Italy and 
Germany rulers tend to choose 
confiscatory policies and sale of 
privileges, crushing opposition
Eastern Europe 
relations between 
seigneurs and serfs 
are not contractual 
as in the West - 
therefore a decrease 
in population didn't 
lead to a 'stronger 
bargaining position' 
but to an intensified 
labour control 
3E
87Of course other given differences might be substituted. North hasn’t (yet) done that.
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11:2.4 What about Sweden?
Sweden is not mentioned by North, but if we look at the treatment of 
‘winners and losers’ the critérium for success is escaping the Malthusian 17th 
century crisis88. The most fundamental cause of differential development is 
the survival or destruction of parliamentary control over taxation. As to the 
question of parliamentary survival versus absolutism, Sweden is a borderline 
case - undoubtedly one of the absolutist states and undoubtedly possessing a 
surviving parliament as well89.
Of course the crucial aspect in North’s model is the incentive structure 
provided by the institutional constraints of the society - do they minimize the 
difference between social and individual cost or not? The importance of Estate 
assemblies and their survival depends on their being the locus for the bar­
gaining process between ‘ruler and constituents’, in which institutional inno­
vations in the interest of those who stand to gain by efficient property rights, 
are traded for financial support of the state.
We should therefore be able to evaluate Sweden’s position through an 
assessment of its institutional development. No real check-list of what North 
considers to be the essential institutional innovations has been presented after 
the summary relating to 17th century England in ( 1973)90:
(1) ‘the first patent law’ (the Statute of Monopolies 1624)
(2) ‘the elimination of many of the remnants of feudal servitude, with 
the Statute of Tenures’ (probably referring either to the Tenures Abo­
lition Act of 1660, or to its 1656 predecessor)
(3) ‘the burgeoning of the joint-stock company, replacing the old regu­
lated company’
(4) ‘the development of the coffee-house, which was a precursor of 
organized insurance’
(3) ‘the development of the goldsmith into a deposit banker issuing bank 
notes, discounting bills and providing interest on deposits’
(6) ‘the creation of a central bank’.
With the help of a checklist drawn up by Charles P. Kindleberger in his 
Financial History of Western Europe - where he estimates French financial insti-
88 It is hard to find clear-cut statements on whether Sweden underwent such a crisis. De Vries 
1976:4-22 is wary of the Malthusian explanation, but counts Sweden into the North-Western 
European area least affected, and also explicitly excepts Sweden (together with the Dutch 
Republic) from the general economic decline (at least until 1660).
89 But note Downing’s attempt (cf below, section 111:2.6) to distinguish between absolutism and 
the 'populist militarism’ of Swedish Caroline absolutism, Dutch Stadhouder rule and (with certain 
reservations) Cromwell’s protectorate.
99 North-Weingast 1989 adds conditions for political stability as a guarantee that the positive 
institutional “rules of the game” will not be overturned by an unrestrained state power.
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nations to lag behind England roughly a hundred years on average - we can 
make the following tentative comparisons between some of the factors 
enumerated91:
Chart 5: Institutional change in England, France and Sweden:
England France Sweden
patent law 1624 1791 1819
abolition of feudal 1645, 1789 1680,
restrictions on pro- 1656, 1720,
perty rights in land 1660 92 1789 93
Lloyd's coffee-house marine: early marine insurance
insurance
1680 * 18th century law 1667
'the big expansion fire,life: regularly companies, inch
taking place in 1720' after 1815 * fire: 1730-40's94
widespread use of 18th century * after middle of (attempted 1661-4)
bank notes 19th century * continuously from 
1726
central bank 1694 * 1800 * 1668
91To make comparison between the dates for when joint-stock companies superseded regulated 
companies in England, on the one hand, and for when aktiebolag companies were established in 
Sweden (during mid-19th century) would be grossly misleading, as the categories are not 
comparable. The Encyclopedia Britannica lists four defining features of the modern corporation: 
(1) Limited liability (2) transferability of shares (3) juridical personality and (4) indefinite 
duration. As the last legal obstacles to this were not removed until well into the 19th century, 
even in Britain, the precise property-rights implications of early forms of corporations would have 
to be assessed much more precisely before any relevant comparison could be made. One maybe 
overrated but still interesting factor is the early Swedish example of negotiable shareholding in 
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslag already in medieval times.
Kindleberger 1985
92 Halsbury's Laws of England, §318
93 Winberg 1985
94 Söderberg 1935:135-7
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11:2.5 Institutional discussions of Sweden - Sandberg 
and Myhrman
Sweden as an ‘impoverished sophisticate’?
Kindleberger discusses Sweden only briefly, taking exception to Lars G 
Sandberg’s conception of mid-eighteenth century Sweden as an ‘impoverished 
sophisticate’, with ‘human capital stocks ... wildly disproportionate to income 
levels around 1850’95 Their difference of opinion centers on the assessment 
of thebanking system around 1850. Kindleberger bases his objection on 
general statements about the level of development of Swedish banking culled 
largely from Swedish business historians96, while Sandberg, as he emphasizes 
in his reply, discussed ‘sophistication’ as compared to relative level of per 
capita income.
Though Kindleberger based his own criticism against cliometric 
reassessments of the French economy on the institutional time-lags charted in 
his table of comparison (see above), he made no real attempt to put the 
evidence for Sweden into the same context (it certainly doesn’t appear to share 
the ‘hundred year lag’ imputed to France), and it is a bit surprising that he 
does not even discuss Sandberg’s quantitative support for his thesis.
Inserting Swedish data into Rondo Cameron’s survey of the growth of 
‘comparative financial ratios’ (total bank resources relative to national 
income) against a composite time scale relative to the start of modern 
economic growth, he shows that whether 1850, I860 or 1870 is chosen as 
‘time zero’, the Swedish development rate is more impressive than even the
96Sandberg 1979:237, Kindleberger 1982, 1985:132f; Sandberg’s reply is in (1982a).
96And, of course, from Heckscher, who formulated what was to become the conventional view of 
Swedish economic history so forcefully, that it wasn’t seriously challenged until in the last 
decades. Hammarström’s 1956 questioning of the 'medieval' characteristics of Gustavus Vasa’s 
reign had a delayed impact, and the réévaluation of Swedish peasant agriculture during the 18th 
and 19th centuries (summarized in Winberg 1990) was carried through during the 1970’s and - 
80’s. Heckschers evaluation of Swedish banking might also be due for reassessment: Bredefeldt 
(1994) has shown that at least during the 17th century the Bank of the Estates (later the Riksbank) 
was not so irrelevant for commercial credit as Heckscher believed, as the owners of ironworks 
were frequent borrowers and in many cases also depositors.(132-166; E188), taking four times 
their proportionate share of the loans, which were 3,5-4,7 times the size of other borrowers’ loans. 
(Figures for 1693-5; cf 150). For the end of the next century, the Riksbank - together with the 
‘discount banks’ figuring in the Kindleberger-Sandberg exchange - is assessed thus by Sven Fritz 
(1990:50f): 'In the late eighteenth century, Sweden had got a certainly very small but advanced 
banking system. Most remarkable is perhaps that the Bank of Sweden to an amazing degree acted 
as a bankers’ bank, thus integrating the organized sector of the credit market and giving it a 
higher liquidity and capacity than would otherwise have been the case. The considerable deposit 
business of the discounting firms ... is also surprising in view of the conditions of other 
comparable Scandinavian and central European countries’.
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Japanese and Scottish ones, and ‘resembles [Cameron’s theoretical optimum 
of} a logistic curve at least as much’ as do the curves of those countries.
As the selection of different years zero ‘introduces an element of 
arbitrarinesses Cameron himself admits: p307), and the composite time 
scale compares countries in very different international economic contexts, I 
will instead transform the comparison into time lags:
Chart 6: Comparative financial ratios - time-lags relative 
to England-Wales
Time lag (in years) since England-Wales reached the same comparative financial ratio 
level:
Year: Sweden Belgium97 France Prussia USA Japan
1 850 7 5 +
1 855 7 5
1 860 3 5
1 865 3 5
1 870 2 5 + 2 5 + 9 5 - 4 5 + 10 0 +
1 875
1 880 3 5 +
1 885 9 0
(If we instead compare the financial ratios of other countries to Sweden 
around the turn of the century, we find that countries like the USA, Japan and 
Austria lag behind Sweden by something like 15-20 years98.)
Kindleberger’s hundred year time lag for France seems to be supported by 
this table, but it also shows that Sweden is nowhere near such a level, but 
much closer to Belgium. If these figures are reliable, Sandberg’s case 
remains convincing.
99 Not really comparable as only joint-stock banks are counted; Cameron estimates that including 
private banks would raise the ratio for 1875 to 'the vicinity of 60 per cent'(303), a level Sweden 
didn't reach untill883-4.
98The time-lags compared to Sweden are: USA (1897-1901): 14+1 Japan (1898-1902)/ 18+2 
Austria (1901-3)\15±1. Scotland’s development is by far in advance of other countries and its last 
recorded figure, 80% for 1865, was not approached by Sweden until just before the turn of 
century. On the other hand, even the US didn't quite reach that level before the second World 
War.
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The more general characterization of Sweden’s ‘sophistication’, especially 
the exceptional level of early literacy", and the high level of education is not 
disputed by Kindleberger. Within Sandberg’s argumentation, this 
‘sophistication’, is interpreted as a legacy of Sweden’s imperial past100. This 
also goes for the role of the ‘cultural factors’ of literacy and a ‘very strong 
“taste” preference’ (i e: not economically motivated) for the ‘production and 
accumulation of human capital’(238). This sophisticated cultural level made 
the population capable of quick acceptance of new economic institutions, 
thereby lowering transaction costs (1982a:921 n3 and above). That is also 
what is measured by Cameron’s ‘comparative financial ratio’ curves, he 
argues101.
These ideas obviously are important to our discussion, as are also the
interesting implications for late industrialization, that he draws, putting the 
arguments into the context of Gerschenkron’s ‘relative backwardness’ 
hypothesis. Arguing that ‘the large governmental role predicted by 
Gerschenkron for countries exhibiting a high degree of backwardness’ 
(1979:229) is related to the need for human investment and institutional 
innovation, and that the ‘relatively small role played by government in 
Swedish industrialization’ is a consequence of these factors being in advance 
of the demands made by industrialization102. In (1982b) he proposes a 
revision of Gerschenkron’s thesis, by subdividing the concept of
"Sandberg 1979:229-3 U982b:687f.
1 "‘Eighteenth and Nineteenth-century Sweden inherited a set of institutions and a bureaucratic 
class and tradition that had been created to administer a great seventeenth century empire. 
Without the Great Power Era, these institutions would not have evolved, at least not at that time’ 
(1979:241).
101Another challenge to his thesis, based on the upward revision of Swedish 19th century GNP 
figures was posed at the 1990 economic history congress. The criticism is only available through 
his own report to the congress, but his counterarguments are worth quoting: ‘The question is, 
what would happen if the national income accounts of the other countries were to be subjected to 
the same kind of scrutiny? Is it credible that only the Swedish data, previously thought to be very 
good, were grossly inaccurate? How was it that the earlier figures showing Sweden to be so 
relatively poor were accepted without objection when they were produced?’(232-3) If a revision of 
the other countries would yield similar results, Swedish development would remain exceptional 
in its quantitative aspects; if not, this would seem to indicate that the qualitative transformation of 
the social and economic condition was exceptional in a comparative perspective.
102As far as I understand, he does not claim that these instutional factors ‘led’ industrial 
development, only that they were at hand at the beginning of industrialization so that the process did not 
have to be unduly retarded by high transaction costs.( 1979:232, 1982a). This means that Fisher- 
Thurman’s (1989) rest of Swedish ‘financial sophistication’, concluding that ‘the Swedish financial 
sector followed rather than led the Swedish economy as it rapidly industrialized’(624) is 
misdirected; indeed they admit that: ‘we have not been able to deal directly with the first 
proposition, Sandberg’s, that Sweden’s rapid growth during its industrial take-off was related to 
the extraordinary relative size and quality of its financial capital stock around 1850’ and they ‘do, 
however, feel that the idea has merit and that the Swedish financial sector, although small in size, 
was indeed sophisticated in 1850’(633).
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backwardness into two components: 'poverty' and ‘ignorance’. Through a 
comparison of literacy and income levels in 19th century Europe, he can 
show that data appear to be compatible with this revised theory: while 
economic backwardness represents an opportunity for rapid industrialization 
(provided a lack of natural resources did not inhibit such a process), the 
ability to make use of this opportunity will be seriously hampered by a lack 
of human capital, and in those cases heavy government intervention to reduce 
‘bottlenecks’ will be required.
Or as a case of delayed credibility ?
Johan Myhrman (1994) has tried to apply North’s analysis to Swedish 
economic development, ascribing it to the enclosure movement, to a growing 
organizational power and political impact of ‘progressive businessmen and 
farmers’,and to three (rather vaguely separated) waves of reforms (1) 
liberalizing ‘exchange activities’, (2) diminishing entrepreneurial risk 
through money-value stabilization and more reliable banking and credit 
market institutions, and (3) establishing a ‘credible commitment’ through 
fundamental law and parliamentary reform .(1030- The last point is 
emphasized as the most decisive one, as the willingness to make large 
investment depends on guarantees against confiscation of the resultant profits. 
This is a somewhat puzzling argument in the context of Sweden in the 1860’s. 
Are we to suppose that potential entrepreneurs were afraid of getting their 
fortunes confiscated during the first two thirds of that century, and therefore 
were reluctant to make investments? This analysis - explicitly referring to 
North-Weingast’s analysis of the Glorious Revolution and its consequences - 
seems to have taken over the whole implicit context of English 17th century 
conditions along with the theoretical argument.
The crucial importance that North-Weingast attach to ‘credible commitment 
to secure rights’ is directly related to the political context: In 1640 the Crown 
had ‘seized £130,000 of bullion which private merchants had placed in the 
Tower for safety, causing numerous bankruptcies’(812). Although this was 48 
years bygone at the time, and a Civil War had removed the monarchy for a 
large part of the intervening period, the reign of the Stuarts had been restored 
in 1660, and the pattern of ‘political struggle with constituents’ tending to 
result in ‘the king's arbitrary encroachment’ was repeating itself, while the 
Crown seemed well on its way to eradicate political opposition through 
manipulating parliamentary franchise(815). Is there anything in Swedish 
society during the nineteenth century that would correspond to the quite 
rational motives to fear for the security of property rights that businessmen 
held in Restoration England according to North-Weingast?
In several respects, the modernizations of Swedish institutions was delayed, 
in other ways it was quite precocious, which is the paradox Sandberg is 
addressing, and which Myhrman skirts by (1) stressing the very latest part of
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the reforms as decisive, and (2) emphasizing the role of natural resources103 
in Sandberg’s model, thus being able to bracket him with the ‘traditional 
viewpoint’ on Swedish industrialization.
Both of these authors, however, are stuck within the Heckscherian 
conception of a backward peasant agriculture, and although enclosures and 
rising agricultural productivity have a crucial position in the very beginning 
of Myhrman’s series of factors(90-2,103) their property rights implications 
are hardly even discussed104.
103Neither does he do justice to the subtlety of Sandberg’s argument, stressing that the relative 
international market value of Sweden’s natural resources had been in deep decline until there was a 
large exogenous increase in the international value and economic usefulness’ of forests, rivers and 
the ‘enormous deposits of phosphoric iron ore...useless until the development of the basic process 
in 1878.’(1979:227)
An amazingly misleading passage about noble exemption from land tax (64) suggests that he 
hasn’t looked very far into this question; apart from a certain terminological confusion, he seems 
to claim that the nobility lost this privilege in 1809; what happened in 1809 was only that the 
last restrictions on selling tax-exempt land to commoners were removed, which transformed tax- 
exemption into a saleable commodity. The tax-free status of such land remained in effect during 
the rest of the century.
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11:3 PERRY ANDERSON:
State-building as Feudal Centralization
11:3.1 What is the economic basis under feudalism?
In Perry Anderson’s synthesis over the specificity of European historical 
development105, he attacks the traditional Marxist concept of the feudal mode 
of production: the diluted definition which describes as feudal just about any 
society combining large-scale landowning with small-scale peasant 
production, as long as it isn’t based on slavery or wage-labour. Anderson 
argues that if the theory of modes of production is going to have any 
explanatory power it has to identify the distinguishing features and dynamics 
of that particular kind of society which developed into capitalism:
‘No historian has yet claimed that industrial capitalism developed 
spontaneously anywhere else except in Europe and its American extension’, 
and if the economic system preceding capitalism in Europe was common to 
just about ‘the whole land mass from the Atlantic to the Pacific’, then this 
divergence has to be explained through differences in the superstructure, and 
the dismissal of ‘Laws and States’ as secondary phenomena is contradicted by 
the necessity to appeal to them for explanation: ‘A colour-blind materialism, 
incapable of appreciating the real and rich spectrum of diverse social 
totalities within the same temporal band of history, thus inevitably ends in 
perverse idealism’. (1974b:403)
The solution Anderson proposes, is that as all pre-capitalist modes of 
production ‘extract surplus labour from the immediate producers by means of 
extra-economic coercion’, this means that the different pre-capitalist modes 
can only be distinguished through the particular form of coercive 
appropriation and the institutional structure through which it is effected. As 
Anderson expresses this in terms of the super-structure defining the base he 
has been widely denounced as an idealist even by Marxists who in practice 
draw similar conclusions. Today the question of heresy will probably seem 
irrelevant even to his former critics, but what is more important is to notice 
the definitions actually included in his model: no wholesale incorporation of 
‘superstructural’ features, but of organizational forms of control over 
property, labour and power resources106
105‘The autobiography of Europe Agnes Heller calls it in her review.( Telos 33) 
lo6This broadening of the concept of what factors are ‘economic’ can be seen as a parallell on the 
Marxist side to a similar widening of neo-classic conceptions of ‘economic’ in the work of North 
and other neo-institutionalists.
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11:3.2 The uniqueness of Europe
The question of Europe’s unique development is of course by no means a new 
problem, but within the Marxist tradition there was a taboo on discussing that 
matter, as long as traditional historical materialist orthodoxy - stipulating 
one and only one necessary line of development - held sway. Marx’ early 
attempts to formulate a stagnant ‘Asiatic mode of production’ contrasting 
against the European experience had been resurrected as an anti-Sovietic 
argument by Karl Wittfogel - who used the notion of an ‘Oriental despotism’ 
to outdefine Russia from the European history - and was therefore 
contaminated by reactionary connotations until reintroduced in a less 
chauvinist context by Marxist anthropologists.
However, the attempt to solve the uniqueness problem by using this 
concept for a bifurcated development path has stranded due to the 
contradictory definitions involved in order to fit all of the great non- 
European civilizations under one label. Anderson writes a scathing obituary 
of the concept, and makes the appropriate demand that any theoretical 
conceptualizations of these societies must start from a close scrutiny of each 
particular historical trajectory in its own right, and not from defining them 
through their contrasts with Europe: ‘It is merely in the night of our 
ignorance that all alien shapes take on the same hue.’(549)
This offers no escape from the problem itself, though, and Anderson’s 
motivations may not be all that far from those advocating the concept of 
‘asiatism’. He emphatically defines Russia as part of Europe, but on the other 
hand he makes a sharp master division of Europe’s historical trajectories into 
a Western and an Eastern branch. This division leads to a clear disjunction 
between the Western development leading through bourgeois anti-feudal 
revolutions to democracy and the Eastern development, leading through 
feudal reaction and second serfdom, where the Russian absolutism is not 
destroyed until the proletarian revolution of 1917, which thus has no relevance 
to the prospect of socialism in the Wert107 Eastern Europe is separate and 
different from Western Europe, but it forms an integral part of Europe and 
the two halves share a common history.
Still, there is one region outside Europe that qualifies as feudal even in 
Anderson's sense. Japan is seen as a true feudal society - the claim is backed 
by Bloch and Boutruche as well as by Marx - although the lack of an ancient 
heritage made it unable to develop an autochtonous capitalism. Yet the 
structural parallellity with Europe allowed it to emulate the capitalist system 
faster and more completely than any other non-European country.
107This neo-Marxist declaration of independence from Bolshevism is clearly homologous to his 
propagation of the concept of a‘Western Marxism’, forming a heritage parallell to, but separate 
from, the Comintern tradition, and including Luxemburg, Lukacs and Gramsci.
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11:3.3 The division of Europe, the Ancient heritage 
and the Rise of Capitalism
The proximate source of the division of Europe, determining the contrasting 
pattern of their modern histories, is the different forms that absolutist state­
building took in the two sections. In the West, it was the internal 
development of feudal society, the emancipation of servile peasants and the 
growing strength of cities, that necessitated a concentration of feudal power, 
shifting ‘politico-legal coercion’ upwards, towards the summit of the feudal 
pyramid. (18-22)
In the East, on the other hand, it was an external military pressure brought 
about by the intensified interfeudal warfare that had escalated up to state 
level, that forced the Eastern aristocracies to develop ‘equivalently 
centralized state machinefs], to survive’ (197-8). This led to the formation of 
a state-system encompassing both of the halves of Europe, but without 
making them homogeneous, as can be seen from the contrasting trajectories 
described above. ‘The consequences of the division ... are still with us’, as 
Anderson remarks.(431)
Even if these contrasting processes of absolutist centralization have 
determined the form of the divergence, they are not the fundamental reason 
for the division. The different starting-points are the consequences of early 
medieval development: the original feudal synthesis in the West combined 
Roman and Germanic institutions into a decentralized poly-structural society, 
which slowly diffused into Eastern Europe through colonization. However, 
the heritage from the ancient slave societies and the political and economic 
institutions created there, only indirectly affected the East, but when 
feudalism was restructured into absolutism in Western Europe, surviving 
fragments of the institutional heritage from Antiquity were still available for 
new syntheses within the multiplicity of interconnected structures that 
constituted feudal society.
If I’m reading Anderson correctly, the further development of capitalism 
was also dependent on this exceptionally wide set of available institutional 
models which was further expanded through the Renaissance. To what extent 
this matrix of evolutionary possibilities was also diffused to the parts of 
Europe lacking a direct Ancient heritage - Eastern and Northern Europe - and 
to what extent later capitalist development in these regions were only 
imported adaptations onto a still feudal base - as in the case of Japan - 
Anderson doesn’t tell us, as he still hasn’t delivered the third volume of his 
project.
As the independent Western cities are important as loci for the survival of 
Ancient practices, and Anderson stresses the relative weakness and dependence 
of those in the East, he probably sees Eastern Europe as an in-between case. In 
another, weaker form the heritage is there, through the interaction of the
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European state-system, while Japan’s development is only structurally 
parallell, but completely separate108.
11:3.4 The Two-dimensional Divergence of Europe’s 
Feudal Trajectories
The different trajectories of European states described by Anderson diverge in 
two dimensions: the difference between Western and Eastern Europe discussed 
above, and the difference between countries where an absolute state was 
successfully developed, and countries where this did not happen, but a feudal 
fragmentation survived into the modern era. This gives us four categories, 
heading for widely contrasting destinies in the era of bourgeois revolutions :
(1) The succesfully formed absolute states of Western Europe were to 
be ‘defeated or overthrown by bourgeois revolutions from below’ 
(Spain ( ! )109, England and France)
(2) The fragmented principalities of those Western areas where 
absolute states did not develop, were ‘eliminated by bourgeois 
revolutions from above, belatedly.’ (Italy, Germany)
(3) In the East, on the other hand, where absolutism was necessitated 
by external military threat, failure to develop an absolute state led 
to annihilation. (Poland)
(4) The successfully formed Eastern absolute states were to have a 
longer life, as the whole development in the East was delayed. They 
were also to face more diverging destinies: Prussia drifted over 
towards the West through its fusion with Rhine-Westphalia and 
effected the ‘revolution from above’ uniting Germany, but Austria - 
on the contrary ‘pushed eastward' through its failure in the Thirty 
Years’ War - was destroyed by nationalist revolutions at the end of 
the First World War, and Russia by a proletarian revolution.(431).
One country is included in Anderson’s discussion without really being 
integrated into any of the alternatives. Sweden is seen as a kind of in-between 
case combining weak towns - like in the East, with free peasants - like in the 
West. Although he concludes that peasant freedom is the dominating variable, 
and that Sweden thus is incorporated in the West, it doesn’t easily fit into 
category (1) - where is the bourgeois revolution? Göran Therborn110 has
108Among the developments unique to European feudalism, and absent in Japan, Anderson 
enumerates the municipal freedom of cities, a separate Church, the Estates system, the 
development of an absolutist state , the concept of absolute private property and - in general - the 
phenomenon of the Renaissance (422-8).
10°Spain must be the country ‘defeated’, by the Dutch revolution which Anderson considers ‘the 
first bourgeois revolution’.
110Who is an important contributor to Anderson’s New Left Review.
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argued that the Swedish Parliamentary Reform of 1866 should be seen as a 
‘revolution from above’. This may sound more likely, but then Sweden, one 
of the earliest unified states of Europe and a very successful absolute state, 
would end up together with the surviving cases of feudal fragmentation.
If we reverse the opinion on East-West implacement we mightconsider it a 
parallell to Prussia in some ways, but no class of Junkers can be found, and 
the survival of parliamentary freedoms make the comparison absurd. Neither 
is the fate of Poland comparable, by any stretch of imagination. On the 
contrary, Anderson bestows the role of ‘Hammer of the East’ on Sweden, 
being the medium through which the military pressure of Western absolutism 
is applied to Eastern Europe, and he considers Sweden to have had a decisive 
formative impact on all the considered Eastern cases. Obviously the situation 
is even more complex, and Sweden seems to end up in a category all its own. 
This will have to be investigated.111
^The further discussion of his account of Sweden is largely adapted from Emilsson 1991.
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Map 3: Anderson's European categories
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Chart 7: Anderson's typology of feudal trajectories
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11:3.5 Sweden according to Anderson - unclear and 
questionable points:
1. External pressure caused by external pressure: Genesis of the 
Swedish state
Anderson asserts that ‘the emergence of the new state was precipitated from 
outside’. In 1520, when Christian II’s army marches in the opposition is 
united by ‘the prospect of a strong foreign monarchy imposing itself on 
Sweden’. Under the leadership of Gustavus Vasa Denmark is defeated and he 
can go on to found a 'stable monarchical state’ll73).
Comment: Not only does the Swedish state - supposed to transmit the 
external military pressure of Western inter-absolutist rivalry onto Eastern 
Europe - itself arise in response to external pressure, but the picture is 
further complicated by the source of this pressure, emanating not from any of 
the original Western absolutisms, but from Denmark. Not only does 
nationalism appear to be a somewhat anachronist explanation112, and, to the 
extent that it might have existed, necessary to relate to the preceding 123 years 
of Scandinavian Union.
Furthermore this entails a two step mediation of military pressure, as 
Christian II:s disintegrating Danish state would hardly fit the description of a 
‘political apparatus of a more powerful feudal aristocracy, ruling fa] more 
advanced societfjy}’ (1970. Denmark’s role would also have to be analysed, 
and, as 0sterud has pointed out, Denmark is as exceptional as Sweden, but in 
an antithetical way: ‘suppressed peasants and growing cities’113.
2. An absolutism on pre-feudal foundations?
This hybrid absolute state is erected on a foundation which Anderson hesitates 
to consider feudal, as a ‘small-holder peasantry of a pre-feudal type’(178) 
occupied half of the arable land. Still he concludes that the other half - ‘the 
royal-clerical-noble complex’ - was dominant, and that the extraction of dues 
and services through ‘extra-economic coercion’ justifies defining it as feudal, 
despite the lack of serfdom and ‘full-scale parcellization of sovereignty’.
112It was ‘foreign to the inmost nature of Absolutism’ Anderson asserts, and in the cases where a 
'diffuse existence of a popular proto-nationalism’ appears - as in Tudor England - it is ‘basically a 
token of bourgeois presence within the polity’(38-9)
113Rokkan has observed that this opposition can be extended into a tripolar contrast between the 
three Scandinavian countries: among the three secular Estates, the peasants had a much weaker 
position in Denmark, the burghers were unusually weak in Sweden, and the nobility in Norway.
66
Sweden and the European Attracted
Comment: His arguments are not convincing114 and in any case it would be 
unreasonable to make an analysis of Sweden ignoring half of the arable land 
and a corresponding part of the population115. If Sweden is to be considered 
feudal, then tax-paying peasants, i e freeholders, must be integrated into the 
argument - either as part of the feudal society or as a non-feudal element, in 
which case their role would have to be specified and analysed.
3. An absolutism without motivation?
‘Since depression of the peasantry was not practicable’, as it was in the East, 
and ‘control of the towns was not arduous’, as it was in the West, there was 
no ‘strong internal need for a centralized absolutism’, and as the nobility was 
‘small and compact’ without any ‘entrenched regional divisions’ it could 
easily adapt itself to centralization. Taken together, this leads to an 
‘unusually stable’ social order, a ‘comparatively dormant class 
configuration’, ensuring that Sweden, ‘alone in Renaissance Europe’, could 
build its army on conscription.
All in all, this implies a ‘fundamental underdetermination of Swedish 
absolutism’. The absolute state was ‘to a certain extent a facultative state’ for 
the nobility, that could ‘convert backwards and forwards to it without undue 
emotion or discomfort’. This leads to a remarkable ‘pendular trajectory’ 
between royal autocracy and a ‘representative’ state-form, where ‘the absolute 
monarchy suffered recurrent reverses whenever there was a royal minority, 
and yet later regained lost ground no less recurrently’(182-5).
Comment: This ‘oscillation’ is Anderson’s argument for concluding that 
absolutism was optional to the nobility, but what kind of evidence to the 
contrary could he possibly demand? That no minorities would occur, or that 
they would lead to usurpations? Hardly; what he could demand is that central 
state power would remain in firm grasp of the person maintaining 
concentrated monarchical power during the Regency, i e someone like
114‘It may be safely assumed that productivity and output were generally higher on the larger 
noble and royal estates - the normal rule in Europe'. If normal Western European patterns are 
valid in the Swedish case, is what this discussion really is about, and only a few sentences later he 
points out that ‘Demesne consolidation was very limited’. Surveys of manorial economy tend to 
refute the “safe assumption” both for Sweden in the 18th century (Magnusson 1980:145) and 
Normandy 1350-1550 - reasonably an area where ‘normal Western European patterns’ should be 
expected to prevail. (Bois 1984:249)
115A stronger case for the dominance of the feudal sector can be inferred from Herlitz’ observation 
that noble and church landowning were dominant in the political core areas, while most of the 
freeholders were concentrated to northern Sweden and Finland. Excluding Finland, Norrland, 
Dalecarlia and Bergslagen (the ‘mining law’ districts) - where more than three quarters of the 
freeholders lived in 1560 - the figures for that year would be 36% freehold cadastral units against 
28% noble, 19,5 % clerical and 9% royal domain (compiled from Forssell 1869, appendix II, pp
24-33).
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Mazarin, and that royal power would be restored on majority. That it was, 
and that Oxenstierna (1632-44) and - maybe less convincingly - De La Gardie 
(1660-72) did not attempt to redecentralize state power, rather indicates the 
strength of the motive forces behind the absolutist impulse116.
What can be questioned, though, is the ‘un-absolute’ widened usage of the 
term pioneered by Anderson, but if we accept it, the fact that the de facto 
(Tudor-like) absolutism of Gustav Vasa steadily kept recurring until the late 
declaration of de pire absolutism in 1680 shows that the motive forces did 
exist throughout this period. Another way of interpreting the ‘oscillation’, is 
to say that the strong control apparatus made it possible to maintain state 
power even under councillary governments117. The internal peacefulness is 
also highly exaggerated, and the stability of the social order was achieved 
through repression rather than harmony of interest.118 .
4. War for no reason?
The military expansion becomes quite difficult to explain, if we follow 
Anderson’s analysis. That an absolutism lacking any endogenous impetus 
would fulfil its mission as 'hammer of the East’ transforming the whole of 
Eastern Europe as the result of an original impulse from Western European 
interabsolutist military competition somehow transmitted through Denmark - 
although the propulsive force from this impulse had already petered out, so 
that the ‘pendulum’ had had time to swing back to some kind of aristocratic 
constitutionalism during Gustavus Adolphus’ Regency - this, is a causal chain 
removed so many steps as to lose any vestige of explanatory force.
Still, for some reason, Sweden really did more or less what Anderson 
claims: flowing out over its borders though poor in men and money, 
defeating richer and more populous adversaries, revolutionizing warfare, 
shocking neighbours into forced armament and coercive state-building, in the 
process conclusively thwarting the traditional pretender to imperial 
hegemony over Europe. If this is an exaggeration, half of it, or a quarter, 
would be far too much to explain as pure accident.
Wallerstein ( 1974:312f), on the contrary, adopts Malowist’s contention 
that it is the poverty and inadequate agricultural resources of Sweden that
1 l6Anderson’s comment about Charles XII being 'able to spend eighteen years abroad, nine of 
them in Turkish captivity, without the civil administration of his country ever being seriously 
challenged or disrupted in his absence’ doesn’t quite fit in with his general description either: if 
anything was ‘facultative’ to the nobility, it would seem to have been representative government. 
117S A Nilsson (1989:38); cf Anderson’ s notion of a 1 concurrent centralization, both of royal power, 
and of noble representation’ in medieval English development (114).
llB-phe ‘liberation struggle’ against Denmark was also, and maybe primarily, a civil war between 
those who considered the Union to serve their own interests and those who didn’t. Peasant 
rebellions were quenched with utter ruthlessness, and capital punishment was used as an efficient 
deterrent against any form of opposition.
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turns her into a ‘parasite living on the weakness of her neighbours’. By 
‘weakness’ Malowist means that the ‘enormous growth in the power of the 
nobility’ won through the profitable grain export to Western Europe, 
weakens the power of governments, and thus also of the defence against 
military aggression. A higher relative exploitability of neighbouring 
countries might provide enough of an explanation even without the inadequate 
agriculture component (criticized by Myrdal-Söderberg 1991:486)
5. ’Easy come - easy go’? Donations and reduction.
Anderson’s picture of of an ambivalent nobility who can take or leave the 
absolute state, is closely bound up with his unsatisfactory treatment of the 
Reduction119 and its prehistory: the extensive donations made especially 
during Christina’s reign. Anderson explain these as caused by the Queen’s 
irresponsibility: ‘Her reckless donations were made in peace-time’ he points 
out, and claims that the fact that they could be reclaimed by the Crown with 
the consent of the nobility through the Reduction, prove that they 
‘corresponded to no objective need of the monarchy’. Neither were they 
important to the nobility, he claims: ‘Won without effort by the higher 
aristocracy, they were abandoned without resistance’.(188n23)
Comment: That some of the abalienated crown estates could be retrieved 
without too damaging consequences for the position and composition of the 
nobility does not signify that these donations had been unnecessary120. 
Warfare had to be financed, and as war was largely made on credit, the full 
burden of payment did not appear until peace had come.
6. Sweden between Hast and West?
Anderson vacillates between on the one hand describing Sweden as an in- 
between case, and on the other including it among the Western absolutist 
states. Here I will use key indicators derived from his descriptions of the 
contrast between the Western and Eastern variants in an attempt to more 
closely determine Sweden’s place in the system:
I. Feasants: free or servile?
Swedish absolutism is neither a ‘compensation for the disappearance of 
serfdom’, nor a ‘device for the consolidation of serfdom’(195), and therefore
119A ‘reduction’ in older Swedish political usage signifies a restoration to the Crown of land 
given in fee to the nobility. When not further specified, the term refers to the great Reduction of 
Charles XI where he assumed full absolutist power and succeeded to make even the nobility accept 
a reduction as a lesser evil than loss of the tax-exemption privilege (Ågren 1973)- 
*^Sven A Nilsson has criticized the traditional ‘moralizing’ criticism against the ‘prodigality’ of 
Christina’s donations. He considers them to be part of ‘a system, a way of paying for war service 
and at the same time binding the nobility to the state.’(1988:22)
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the free peasants is not an entirely Western trait: it might as well be a case of 
Eastern development cut short.
II. Towns: ‘Ascendant’ or ‘subjugated’?
In the West feudalism ‘had to adapt’ to an ‘increasingly urban economy which 
it did not completely control’, while in the East the cities had already been 
‘curtailed and repressed’ by the nobility. The similarity to the Eastern pattern 
is thus only in appearance, as to the Western on the former point. Though 
trade had long been of great importance to Sweden, no important city sector 
had emerged - within the country, that is.
III. Control over cities or over the countryside?
In the West it was control over cities that was the ‘arduous’ problem; in the 
East control over the countryside, and in particular peasant mobility, was 
more fundamental. For Sweden, Anderson states that neither objective is 
imperative, and thus ‘the internal urgency of a centralized Absolutism was not 
great’(181, 2060- As I implied on the former point Sweden was enmeshed 
into an ‘increasingly urban economy which it did not completely control’, 
although this was located outside its borders.
IV. Exogenous or endogenous absolutism?
In the West the causes of absolutism were internal (the “displacement 
towards the top of the pyramid”); in the East it was caused by an external - 
military - pressure. Anderson explicitly claims that there was no internal 
necessity for Swedish absolutism (cf above), and that it was ‘precipitated from 
outside’(173).
Still: whether a cause is to be seen as internal or external depends on the 
how the area of analysis is defined. Sweden and Denmark as separate states 
might arguably be seen as the result of the state-building process culminating 
in absolutism, rather than a precondition.
V. Degree of militarization
The ‘influence of war’ on the ‘structure [of the Eastern Absolutist State] was 
even more preponderant than in the West, and took unprecedented 
forms’(212). As Anderson and others have observed, both Prussian and 
Russian state and military apparatuses were originally modeled on Swedish 
examples. The degree of militarization is of course difficult to quantify (but 
see the facts quoted in 1:3-2). However, to judge from Nilsson’s description 
of the reign of Gustavus Adolphus: ‘a time of violent exertion, of attempt at 
total enrolment of the population for fiscal and military efforts and of a next 
to total depletion of resources’ (1973:165; my translation), the influence of 
war could hardly have been more massive.
VI. Sale of office or service nobility: The ‘modes of integration of the nobility 
into the new bureaucracy created by [the absolute monarchies]’ constituted 
another ‘critical difference between the Eastern and Western variants’: sale of
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offices in the West, service nobility in the East (216-8). This is not easy to 
determine: although Charles XI:s system appears to conform to the 
description of a service nobility, prefigured in parts already during Gustavus 
Adolphus, it was also possible to achieve promotion through buying off the 
earlier holder of the appointment (Artéus 1982:318 n50). Neither system can 
probably be said to typify ‘the nature of the functional relationship betweeen 
the feudal landowners and the absolutist monarch[y]’ of Sweden. The 
integration of the Swedish nobility into the state was problematic: as ‘almost 
all held some form of office’ (Nilsson 1988:25) there was a potential conflict 
between a nobleman’s interest as a landholder and as an officeholder. This conflict of 
interests is probably the main reason why the Reduction was accepted by the 
nobility - if there was no clear-cut line of division between those who would 
lose and those who might gain.
11:3.6 Criticism against Anderson
Criticism of Anderson’s synthesis121 has focused on:
• The inconsistency of explaining the rise of capitalism emphasizing 
absolutism, the Renaissance and Roman Law, when these factors are not very 
typical for the country that did develop capitalism: England122. However, as 
can be inferred from his account of ‘the first bourgeois revolution in 
history’(75): the Dutch revolt against the ‘absolutist reforms’ of Philip II, 
no linear endogenous descent of capitalism is being claimed, and this would 
probably hold for his projected analysis of the English transition as well.
• His teleological tendencies have been widely questioned, most severely 
by Hirst, who insists that the problem of Europe’s ‘uniqueness’ is totally of 
Anderson’s own creation. As Europe developed capitalism first, Anderson has 
no way of knowing that other parts of the world wouldn’t have done it 
otherwise. Hirst seems to be perfectly certain that they would, though, and 
appears thus to merely hold a different teleology.
• Fulhrook-Skocpol have criticized his contradictory use of the concept of 
feudalism: on the one hand a ‘synthetic, totalizing conception ... closely 
identified with medieval Europe’, and in cross-epoch usage, a more general 
and partial notion stressing ‘private landed noble property and the use of 
extra-economic coercion to appropriate peasant surpluses’. In order to be able 
to claim that absolutism was feudal he has to stretch the concept as thin as in 
the conventional Marxist cross-cultural usage he has criticized.
121I will not discuss the wide-ranging controversies about his analysis of latter-day British 
retrogression here.
122The 'weakest and shortest absolutism’ according to Anderson himself (1974b: 113). Different 
variants of this criticism has been put forward by Runciman 1980:1696 0sterudl98O:l47, and 
McFarlane 1988:189.
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Comment: Anderson’s dynamic concept of feudalism implies a shift of 
emphasis from the composition to the evolution of social structures. 
‘Feudalism’ in his analysis becomes a category of trajectories (‘destined 
pathways’ in the apt formulation of Fulbrook-Skocpol) rather than a category 
of societal structures.
Interpreted in this way, the contradiction observed by Fulbrook-Skocpol 
may be possible to resolve. Even though there is a considerable amount of 
verbal legerdemain involved in Anderson’s alternately generous and 
restrictive usage of the term, a ‘dynamization’ of the concept along the lines 
suggested here would seem to be the interpretation most appropriate to his 
overall model and maybe to the ‘miracle-discussion’ as a whole. After all: in 
the wider historical perspective it is that type of society which developed into 
capitalism - whatever label we may care to put on it - that would be the most 
important to classify and analyse, and: What Anderson attempts to do is just 
that.
The teleological traps remain, though.
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11:4 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN:
Division of Labour as a World System
11:4.1 Development theory and global history
Immanuel Wallerstein’s vision of the rise of modern capitalism is as a 
system of interdependence through the growth of specialization for trade - an 
emerging international division of labour, where the benefit is not mutual, as 
in Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantages, but assymmetric, as the ‘core’ 
countries were complete economies with an internal division of labour and 
the ‘peripheral’ areas were drawn into the system as monocultures subservient 
to the needs of the ‘core’.
The key ingredients to his synthesis are - probably not in the order he 
conceived it, and certainly not in the order he expounds it, but in the order in 
which I find it most easy to reassemble:
(1) Marian Malowist’s description of early modern Eastern Europe as 
standing in a ‘colonial’ relation to Western Europe, with this 
‘colonial’ situation interpreted through:
(2) Andre Gunder Frank’s concept of development and 
underdevelopment as ‘two sides of one coin’ and this concept of a 
system of unequal trade used to resolve:
(3) the problem of the exogeneity of the trade factor in Sweezy’s 
alternative to Dobb’s endogeneous explanation of the rise of 
capitalism in the Science and Society debate through taking the whole 
trade-connected ‘world’ as his unit of analysis
finally identifying this unit with
(4) Fernand Braudel’s holistic conception of the totality of the outward- 
reaching European world and of this world’s ‘material civilization’, 
whereupon capitalism was to be built.
11:4.2 Structure as explanation
This holistic unit of analysis is extremely important, as the definition of the 
system is almost identical with the analysis and the conclusions: Today’s 
world is the extension to the whole planet of the Modern World-System’ that 
took shape somewhere around 1450. The early system shows us the real 
power structure of today’s world and today’s world shows us the real 
significance of the economy of the emerging system. Of the ‘three miracles’ I 
want to discuss, only Conquest and Growth have a place in Wallerstein’s 
model, and it’s more or less the same place. ‘Growth’ is the growth of the
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system, the extension of the ‘world-economy’ or system of division of 
labour. ‘Conquest’ is just how this extension took place.
This identity between the forcible subjection of the rest of the world, and 
an economic exploitation holding today's Third World in continued 
subjection to the Developed World, is inherent in the analysis through a 
structure designed to describe both systems, and the changing careers of 
separate countries in the course of the last semi-millenium. Although the 
structure of the model is static, its constant extension, and the competitive 
movement between the structural positions, leave plenty of room for 
dynamics, but put very strict constraints on what kind of dynamics that can be 
accommodated. Most importantly: ‘Growth’ as growth of productivity, and 
'Voice' as an increase in the extent of people included in the definitional base 
of a society, make no real sense in his model. They are more or less outside 
the context.
Even if productivity growth “gets a hearing” in vol III through his surveys 
of the large debates on the ‘agricultural revolution’ and the ‘industrial 
revolution’, and even it the question of ‘Voice’ is at least touched upon in the 
similarly charted debate on the French revolution, he dissolves productivity 
growth into a drawn-out secular development (and thereby into the ‘growth of 
the system’) while the entrance of the masses on the stage of Paris turns into 
the first attempt at anti-systemic revolution, and as such rather the beginning 
of a struggle not yet resolved, than any breakthrough for the interests of the 
majorities of this world.
The beginning of the story
Expansion is the key - but in contrast to what he disparagingly refers to as 
‘schoolboy textbooks’ Wallerstein emphasizes the need to supplement scarce 
necessities during the late medieval crisis, rather than the lust for luxuries, as 
the crucial impulse. The old and well-established Mediterranean trade 
networks, and the emerging North Sea-Baltic trade, were eventually connected 
as Portugal, stretching out into the sea in search of fish, also started 
colonising the Atlantic islands to grow cereals, sugar, dyes and wine, buying 
wheat and eventually timber from as far away as the Baltic, while also having 
links to the old trading cities of Genoa and Venice as well as being a 
neighbour to the highly monetized Islamic world. (1974:38-52)
Portugal was thus well placed as a spearhead for the expansion that 
Europe, according to Wallerstein, needed123, and having ‘achieved moderate
12 3 Why is not very clear, as ‘There was physical room for the population, even the growing 
population, in Europe’ (48). This meant that the land/labour ratio favoured the peasants, which 
was ‘one factor in the decline of seigniorial revenues, in the crisis of feudalism’. How this 
argument connects to the need for expansion is never properly clarified. Wouldn’t internal 
expansion have lowered the land/labour ratio, and brought about the conditions for the rents to 
rise again? Evidently the strength of the peasantry is an important factor as they cannot be
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political stability at least a century earlier than Spain, France and England’ it 
also had enough internal cohesion to embark upon that course.
This is the beginning of the establishment of the new world-economy, 
requiring:
(1) ‘an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question’
(2) ‘the development of variegated methods of labor control for 
different products and different zones of the world-economy’
(3) ‘the creation of relatively strong state machineries in what 
would become the core-states of this capitalist world-economy’ 
(38),
where the success of the first point is an important condition for the others. 
The expansion brought new areas into the system, where more coercive (but 
less efficient) forms of labour control were being used to produce necessities 
for the core: slave plantations produced sugar in the Azores and Madeira124 
and later in the Americas, while wheat was increasingly produced on the large 
demesnes in eastern Europe using the methods of forced labour usually 
described as the ‘second serfdom’. Wallerstein coins the term ‘coerced cash- 
crop labor’ to cover these methods, as well as those used in the Hispano- 
American encomienda and similar systems, used for cattle-breeding and 
mining.
Thus we have a beginning division of labour, where the production in core 
areas has been complemented with more exploitative production methods in 
the peripheries, and the road to a further development into zones of intensive 
high-wage production and extensive low-wage production, i e the ‘developed 
countries’ and the ‘Third World’ of today, has been opened.
East vs West as development of underdevelopment
An important difficulty central to this account, is the reasons for divergence 
between the eastern and western halves of Europe, having started out with 
very similar forms of society. Wallerstein argues on the one hand ‘in terms 
of the factors - geographical and social - which accounted for the spurt of 
western Europe’, and on the other ‘in terms of specific characteristics of 
eastern Europe’: the weakness of the towns relative to the west - an originally 
small difference growing into a big one - and the higher degree of vacancy of 
land.
Wallerstein argues that ‘the inclusion of eastern Europe and Hispanic 
America into a European world-economy in the sixteenth century not only 
provided capital (through booty and high-profit margins) but also liberated 
some labor in the core areas for specialization in other tasks.’ (102) Thus the
expected to give up what they have gained: ‘what the nobility (and the bourgeoisie) needed, and 
what they would get, was a more tractable labour force.’(/or cit)
124The Genoese having transferred production there from Sicily (43n. 100)
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core areas tend toward ‘variety and specialization’, increasingly having to use 
free labour, while the peripheries tended toward monoculture and different 
forms of forced labour.
England vs France- the struggle for hegemony
In Wallerstein’s account of the ‘struggle for hegemony’ between England and 
France following the decline of the Netherlands, the common internal factors 
are rising agricultural incomes and price level, and the differential 
development is explained through the contrast between which strategies 
proved most successful for landlords attempting to capture as large part as 
possible of these gains. In England enclosures proved more successful, and 
in France rent-raising.(III:64f)
11:4.3 Growth as redistribution
Looking only to the characteristics of the system as a whole, productivity 
growth is seen as inconsequential as it cannot be shown to have improved the 
relation between total labour expended and total rewards enjoyed for the total 
sum of household members within the aggregate work-force of the world125, 
and similarly democracy is seen only in the perspective of how anti-systemic 
movements are integrated into the system 126.
While this fundamental challenge to received conceptions of the present 
world merits very careful consideration, his revision of the traditional 
Marxist perspective in order to restore the full impact of its passion for 
social justice, at the same time sacrifices an important part of its analytical 
incisiveness. If the growth of productivity makes egalitarian redistribution a 
realizable goal, as Marx argued, then the question of to how large an extent 
rising profits are dependent on rising productivity, and to what extent on 
immiserating redistribution, cannot be irrelevant to the discussion of social 
justice, as it is crucial to the question of feasibility.
Still, to define power relations as the basis of economic relations is a quite 
arguable position, and not impossible to rephrase within a Marxist discourse, 
even if it’s pedigree can rather be found in the sociological or politological 
traditions. This does not mean, that the books do not discuss economy, on the 
contrary the largest part of the discussion are taken up by economic factors, 
but there is a continuous and very consistent treatment of economy and 
politics as congruent. Anderson’s remark that mercantilism represented the
125On the contrary, Wallerstein argues that 'the one Marxist proposition which even orthodox 
Marxists tend to bury in shame, the thesis of the absolute (not relative) immiseration of the 
proletariat’ holds when applied to a global perspective. (1983:99-105)
12i51983:107-1 10. He suggests that the reason that we do not apprehend this is because of a 
simultaneous reduction of inequalities within the 'middle classes’ of the world: 'that ten to fifteen 
percent of the population of the world-economy who consumed more surplus than they themselves 
produced’) 104f)
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conceptions of a still feudal ruling class’ ‘outlook on the unity of what 
Francis Bacon called ‘considerations of plenty’ and ‘considerations of 
power’(1974b:36) seems strangely apposite as a characterization of 
Wallerstein’s style of argument. As, in his eyes, mercantilism expressed the 
interests of a formerly feudal ruling class transformed into a capitalist one, 
this is maybe just consistent.
There is an identity in motivation for both political and economic power, 
but there is also a separation between the two kinds of power, which is what 
makes the ‘growth of the world-economy’ possible. This is that the economy 
has a wider reach than political power can grasp - exactly because of the 
‘failure of empire’: that no single power has succeeded to take control over 
the whole system, in contrast to what happens in China and other ‘world- 
empire’ systems.
11:4.4 Trajectories as positional careers
Within Wallerstein’s format, the particular trajectory of a single country 
(despite his denunciation of using national borders to define units of analysis, 
he in practice usually discusses in terms of the conventional ‘countries’ that 
we usually project backwards into history) is in essence defined by its 
movements through the positions of the world-economy’s structure.
The World-System comprises three (or four127) categories. Besides the 
exploitative core states and the exploited peripheral areas of the world-economy, 
and the external arena which is not (yet) part of the system, but has some 
contact with it, there is the important in-between category of the semi-periphery, 
to which a lot of the dynamics in the model are due. As the distinction 
between core and periphery originally comes from Latin American 
structuralist development theory (Prebisch’ center/periphery model) and the 
‘dependency school’ that grew out from it (Gunder Frank’s 
metropolis/satellite theory), the concept of semi-periphery is probably 
derived from the theory of ‘sub-imperialism’ (usually applied to Brazil) at 
that time current within similar circles.
Core-states have high wages and a diversified production structure, a strong 
state machinery and define themselves through a national culture. As 
unqualified labour is cheaper and more vulnerable to all-out exploitation in 
the peripheries, labour-intensive low-technology production tends to be 
moved there if transport costs and the general conditions of production 
permit, and production requiring more capital, technology and qualified 
labour tends to concentrate in the core. Inside the core countries, however, 
there can be ‘internal peripheries’ where conditions are very different. The 
normal state of the system’s core is that of a balance of power between the 
dominant countries, but temporarily one state may succeed to dominate the
127For the concept of hegemonic powers, see below.
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whole system as a hegemonic power (or simply ‘hegemon’). Only three 
examples exist so far: ‘the United Provinces in the mid-seventeenth century, 
... Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth, and ... the United States in the mid­
twentieth.’(1983:5 8)
In the peripheries raw materials (primary products) are typically pro­
duced for the benefit of consumption and production in the core. Originally 
slavery and ‘coerced cash-crop labor’ (labour under serf-like conditions, like 
in early modern Eastern Europe) are the typical forms of labour control. 
Wallerstein is very careful to emphasize that these forms of labour are not 
signs of different modes of production. Under capitalism - and the Modern 
World-economy is capitalist - capital is invested where the profit is greatest, 
and in many countries and in many branches of production it is more profit­
able to invest in production using coercive forms of labour control128. How­
ever, this does not mean that another mode of production is involved. The 
purpose of investment (to maximize profit), the imperatives put on produc­
tion (minimizing costs), and the use made of the profit (to accumulate and 
reinvest) are the same. Today low wages and semi-proletarian labour force 
(largely deriving their subsistence outside capitalist production and therefore 
cheap) are characteristic of the peripheral areas.
Semi-peripheral countries129 occupy an in-between position, being both ex­
ploiters and exploited. They can be ascending powers, that have succeeded to 
move up from the periphery (Sweden, Prussia), or descending: former core­
states who have lost their competitive edge (Spain, Portugal). Competition 
between powers aspiring to move up into the core is especially keen, as those 
who succeed do so ‘not merely at the expense of some or all core powers, but 
also at the expense of other semi-peripheral powers.’(1979:100-1)
128Marx’ contention that slavery in the American South was a part of the capitalist system is one 
of the fundamental sources for this standpoint.
129Only countries can occupy a semi-peripheral position as it presupposes an active state . The 
periphery, on the other hand, tends to have weak or non-existent states.
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Map 4-5: The World-system: 16th century to 1970's
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11:4.5 Sweden as the first rising semiperiphery
Sweden’s career as a great power has an important position in Wallerstein’s 
model, as it is the first case of a country rising from the periphery into the 
semi-periphery, even coming near to making it up into the core. As such it 
should be an interesting test case for the credibility of the model’s internal 
dynamics. Also the failure of Sweden as a core-status pretender leading to a 
decline parallelling that of Spain, downwards into the periphery again 
(although it would eventually make a re-entry through fast economic growth 
and industrialization; we do not know when Wallerstein would place the sec­
ond rise, but this time Sweden made it all the way up into the core (1979:83).
A semi-periphery is a state both exploiting others, in the periphery, and be­
ing exploited, by the core. It’s also a kind of ‘middleman’ between core and 
periphery, transferring surplus and getting a cut of it as it passes by. Waller- 
stein describes the tolls Sweden was able to collect during parts of the Thirty 
Years’ War - the ‘Prussian licences’ - in this way (1980:208). Also, Sweden 
was a very important producer of raw materials, especially copper, then also 
iron, and tar.
Although raw material producers are supposed to become dependent and pe­
ripheral, Sweden succeeded in improving its position due to a ‘piece of re­
source luck’: dominance in the copper production, unusually high quality in 
iron production, and the right combination of large forests and available 
labour to produce great quantities of tar, essential to shipping at this time. 
This gave Sweden a position of near-monopoly in copper, high-quality iron 
and tar, which it used as the basis for a ‘strong bargaining position’ as against 
core powers. ‘Sweden was in a sense the OPEC of its time’ (211)
These considerations are of course very important. They refer to the possi­
bility of manoeuvre, and counterbalance the strong emphasis on structural 
determination in the theory. For the analysis of Sweden it is necessary to dis­
entangle Sweden’s role in the emerging world-economy from it’s role as a 
military power. When Sweden falters and slips down towards peripheraliza- 
tion, it ‘should’ find itself at the mercy of its core trading partners. Instead 
bar iron production was subjected to increasingly severe restrictions during 
the very period of decline from Great power status.
Heckscher interpreted this as an attempt at monopolistic price-setting, 
which does not sound like an act of a country being peripheralized. According 
to a study by Per-Arne Karlsson, this was a long-term policy which does not 
seem to have been affected by changing trade situation, and thus must have 
another explanation. His conclusion is, that there was a conscious effort at 
keeping a sort of ‘balance’ between iron production and agriculture. This 
means that the degree of dependence upon integration into the world- 
economy cannot have been very important at this time. If Heckscher is 
right, Sweden’s trade partners should have been more dependent upon the iron
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trade than Sweden was, and if Karlsson is right, it is due to some kind of dis­
sociation policy. This is even more interesting: what are the possibilities for 
manoeuvre in a declining situation, and what internal effects may dissociation 
have had?
Credit or debt peonage?
In Wallerstein’s model, dependence should be expected to increase and leave 
smaller opportunities for self-determined endogenous strategies like those 
described. An important component in his equation between early modern 
Eastern European relations with the West, and (neo)colonial dependency on 
the European mother countries, is an identification between: (1) the system of 
credit trade used by Hansard merchants to tie up their suppliers and avoid 
competition130), and (2) the permanent indebtedness ensuring the subjugation 
of the workforce in the Latin American hacienda system. ‘Debt peonage’, is his 
designation for both of these systems, or, when the credit chains cross bor­
ders, ‘international debt peonage’(1974:121f,190)131.
A direct counter-example to this ‘debt peonage’ interpretation of credit 
trade, is found in Sven-Erik Àstrôm’s description (1977) of the 
(Swedish-)Finnish tar trade, where he argues that a purchase system based on 
similar principles could preserve elements of ‘reciprocity’ due to the inde­
pendent personal juridical status of the tar-burning peasants, and to the fact 
that debts had to be sued for at local courts with peasant jurors taking part132. 
Wallerstein doesn’t mention the tar trade in this context, but as to the other 
two ‘quasi-monopolies’ he clearly considers that: ‘The familiar pattern of 
international debt peonage was taking hold.’(1980:206), in the copper trade 
with Holland, and in the iron industry he claims that ‘small ironmakers’ 
were reduced ‘to semi-proletarian status through a Verlagssystem, by which they 
were indebted to foreign merchants’(210). A local study of mining peasants 
in 18th century Sweden (Sjöberg 1993) comes to the conclusion ‘that the min­
ing peasants’ economic activity ... was not subordinated to the ironworks to 
the extent that previous research has argued. The majority did not,...,renounce
130Described by Malowist (I960), who considered this system to be one of the factors underlying 
enserfment in Poland.
131This vocabulary in turn implies a parallellism between international debt crisis stranglehold 
on present-day Third World countries, and the situation of the early modern Baltic Area vis à vis 
the contemporary financial centres where the networks of credit obligations converged. However, 
an outright comparison would presuppose that the relationship between economics and politics is 
constant, though it is the shift in its character over time and the diversity between the initial 
conditions of this change, that is one of our central problems.
132Side effects of the tar production may also be of interest. Villstrand (1992) considers the rising 
tar production to be partly an effect of increasing need for cash among the peasantry, indirectly 
caused by war and conscription (a conscript peasant had the possibility of paying someone else to 
take his place).
81
Sweden and the European Miracle*
their independence. With support from the legislation the mining peasants re­
tained their property.’(E254)
From the Swedish examples, it seems quite evident that credit trade, Verlag- 
ssysteme etc, will have different social consequences in different social con­
texts133. More generally, how are the different economies tied together in the 
system? What kind of products create what kinds of dependence? Sweden pro­
duces goods of crucial importance for warfare (copper, iron, tar - but also e g 
cannons) and trade (tar, mastwood, copper as a coin material134), but when it 
starts slipping downwards it is replaced as a major semiperipheral power by 
Prussia (there is only ‘room for one [such] in central Europe’(225)). Prussia 
is primarily a grain exporter - like the peripheral Poland. It cannot possibly 
replace Sweden in its economic function in the system.
Obviously the economic roles and the positions of relative power are dis­
junct to a much larger extent than Wallerstein claims. How they articulate 
must be crucial to the entire concept of a dynamic system.
11:4.6 Important critiques of Wallerstein
The most influential critiques of Wallerstein’s model, appear to be those 
formulated by Theda Skocpol (1977), Robert Brenner (1977) and Patrick 
O’Brien (1982). Skocpol’s criticism centers on reductionism and the role of 
the state; Brenner’s on the deficient conceptualization of capitalism, while 
O’Brien questions the underlying assumption that the profits of colonialism 
were essential to the industrial revolution.
Skocpol’s Critique
argues that Wallerstein’s model ‘is based on a two-step reduction': (1) 
‘socio-economic structure’ is seen as determined by 'world market opportuni­
ties and technological production possibilities’, and (2) ‘state structures and 
policies’ are seen as determined by ‘dominant class interests’. Thus Waller- 
stein can argue that the dominant classes of the different zones of the system 
‘adopt’ different ‘modes of labor control’ in order to maximize possible 
profits from world market production under given conditions. Although in­
ternal exploitation is postulated as a matter of course135, the whole emphasis 
is put on world scale exploitation: the ‘appropriation of surplus of the whole 
world-economy by core areas’, effected through ‘the operation of “unequal 
exchange” which is enforced by strong states on weak ones’136
133Which Malowist also contends in a later article (1981).
134About the importance of Spanish copper vellon minting se Anderson 1974b:183.
135Although Skocpol claims that 'his reliance on liberal economics’ leads to ‘a nonexploitative 
picture of the process of income distribution within the world system”.
136Skocpol 1977:1079 quoting Wallerstein 1974:401.
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State strength, in its turn, depends on the strength of the economy, and on 
the world market interests of the ruling class. These reductions, Skocpol ar­
gues, weakens the explanatory potential of the model:
1. As the only dynamics of the model are market processes, he has no way of explaining 
'developmental breakthroughs’: the original emergence of the ‘capitalist world system’ is 
incongruously discussed in terms of‘how the crisis [of feudalism ] “had to be solved” if 
“Europe" or “the system” were to survive’, and the consequences of the Industrial Revolu­
tion 'are much discussed, but not a word is said about the causes’.
2. Treating ‘labor control’ as a market-optimizing strategy of the dominant class, leaves the 
relationship between classes and the ‘potential of collective resistance from below’ out­
side the picture. (She refers here to Brenner’s discussion of the divergence between West­
ern and Eastern Europe as a contrast to Wallerstein’s trade-centered explanation)
3. Wallerstein’s statement that ‘strong states’ was a fundamental feature of core position is 
contradicted by historical fact: the Dutch government ('a federation of merchant oligar­
chies') cannot be described as a ‘strong state’, and as the English Tudor state was weaker 
than the Spanish, French or Swedish, Wallerstein has to resort to ad hoc explanations, she 
claims. (1084f)
Comment:
As should have become obvious by now, I share Skocpol’s objections to the 
reductionist character of Wallerstein’s analysis, although I understand it as a 
reduction of economy to power politics instead of the other way around. 
Many reviewers have discerned a ‘change of emphasis’ or even a fundamental 
revision of his standpoint between volume I and II, as well as between vol­
ume II and III138, drifting towards an ever greater emphasis on interstate 
power relations.
However, interpreting also his earlier work in the light of the discussion 
in (1983) and (1992), it seems to me that his fundamental understanding of 
capitalism is as a zero sum redistribution based on political power, and that 
he sees the imperative of ceaseless accumulation of capital as a pathological 
result of the destruction of social constraints rather than the triumph of 
‘progress’, ‘productive forces’ or whatever139. If this interpretation is correct, 
then his earlier ‘economism’ might just be an impression created by a bor­
rowed terminology, which he has since step by step revised; the most impor­
tant aspect, though, is the identification of economy and political power.
13^If we accept Mann’s distinction between two kinds of state strength: Despotic power, or power 
over civil society, and infrastructural power, or the power to coordinate civil society. (1986:477, 
1988:5-11), then Wallerstein’s notion of state strength might be equated with infrastructural 
power, and Skocpol’s criteria with despotic. The controversy over Sweden cannot be solved by this 
reconceptualization, as its infrastructural power might be fully equal to its despotic.
138In Mann ’s review of volume III, he concludes that this change of emphasis have gone so far that 
‘writers like Skocpol, Tilly and me ... have been outflanked by a more committed militarist!’ 
(1990:198)
139He quotes Weber on the irrationality of a businessman ‘existing for his business, and not the 
other way around’, and Polanyi on the capitalist system being one where ‘instead of economy being 
embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’(1992:6l6).
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Brenner’s criticism
is to some extent parallell to Skocpol’s, although the thrust of his arguments 
is consistently economic: Wallerstein’s defective conceptualization of capital­
ism makes him blind to the difference between economic exploitation in gen­
eral, and competitive capitalism:
1. As serf lords could not be ‘put out of business’ by more efficient competitors (71), there is 
no objective economic imperative forcing a pre-capitalist upper class to maximize profits, and thus 
the notion of ‘selecting’ the most profitable system of ‘labour control’ in each zone, is ab­
surd: in fact ‘throughout this period, serf peasant plots maintained significantly higher 
productivity than did the lords’ demesnes’ (69)- Still this didn’t lead to the selection of 
other forms of labour control: ‘Serfdom remained as incapable as ever of developing more 
efficient means of production, but showed no signs of being replaced by competitors’(70). 
Also, how to explain the instances where the lords tried to (re)introduce serfdom, but 
failed?
2. This also makes it impossible to pose the problem of transition to capitalism: If systems 
of labour control are chosen by exploiters in order to maximize profits, the appearance of 
possibilities to make these profits (through trade) becomes the decisive turning point, 
but then the exploiters must already be profit maximizers at least in potential. ‘In other 
words, the rise of trade determines the emergence of capitalists and capitalism; 
‘transition’ becomes the result not the source of capitalism’(79; Brenner’s italics).
Also the mechanics of‘unequal exchange’ according to Arghiri Emmanuel’s theory, in­
voked by Wallerstein to explain the emergence of the core/periphery dichotomy, explic­
itly presuppose an ‘equalization of prof it rates in all regions and lines of production' (63, RB’s 
italics), which in turn requires a ‘free mobility of capital throughout the system’. As this 
is a tendency only (if anywhere) of fully developed laissez faire capitalism, it cannot be 
part of the preconditions of the original appearance of the capitalist system.
3. Because of this lack of a conception of the central motive power of capitalism, 
‘productivity of labour as the essence and key to economic development’ll) is also ne­
glected, and thus autarky becomes the logical political alternative, leaving no options for 
overcoming Third World misery.
O’Brien,
finally, takes a totally different angle, trying to make a quantative estimate 
of to what extent the industrial revolution might have been dependent on 
‘peripheral’ profits, focusing on England in the early stage of the industrial 
revolution. Commodity trade between core and periphery is estimated to ac­
count for not more than 4% of aggregate GNP for Western Europe around 
1780-1790, and O’Brien argues that ‘if a very high proportion (say 50 per 
cent) of the value of the turnover (exports plus imports) accrued as profits to 
core capitalists, and if they reinvested 50 per cent oi their profits; then the 
outer bound for the contribution of these trades amounts to only 1 per cent of 
GNP. And that could perhaps equal no more than 10 per cent of gross in­
vestment’ (5).
This exercise should only be seen as an attempt to establish the upper lim­
its of orders of magnitude, O’Brien is at pains to emphasize, and using the 
most optimistic estimates for savings rate and reinvestment rate during this
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period, he concludes that at the very highest, ‘commerce with the periphery 
generated a flow of funds sufficient, or potentially available, to finance 
about 15 per cent of gross investment expenditures undertaken during the In­
dustrial Revolution.’(7)
O’Brien concludes that ‘since Britain traded with and invested in other con­
tinents on a far larger scale than any other European country (with the possi­
ble exception of Holland)’, historians have ‘exaggerated the impact of inter­
continental trade’, because they have not related it to the scale of total eco­
nomic activity, and because they have judged the profitability of tropical trade 
only from success stories, failing to take account of the high risks and fre­
quent losses lowering the average rate of profit, which O’Brien takes to be 
around or below 10% in the long run.(8)
In a later contribution to this discussion, Bairoch (1993) concurs with 
O’Brien’s argument (80-84), but points out that ‘If the West did not gain 
much from colonialism, it does not mean that the Third World did not lose 
much’, and proceeds to attempt a quantification of the negative effects of 
European colonialism: de-industrialization, export crop specialization, speed­
ing up of population increase and growing global difference of income 140
O’Brien himself in a later article (1992) emphasizes that although the sig­
nificance of trade was not ‘as overwhelming as Wallerstein, Braudel and the 
World Systems school implicitly assume’, it was neither ‘as expendable as 
cliometricians suggest’141. He also points out that the theoretical maximum 
level of gross investment expenditures that could have been funded by profits 
generated in oceanic commerce - now more closely specified at 16,5% - ‘may 
have been sufficient to have funded almost all gross fixed investment expendi­
tures in mining, quarrying and manufacturing industry undertaken in the 
1780s’, and he poses the question if ‘those profits were sufficient to raise net 
investment rates in Britain above those achieved by the French and other rival 
economies ? ’(5 01 -2)
The relevance of O’Brien’s critique for the Modern World-System model 
can be questioned, as Wallerstein explicitly includes also Eastern Europe 
within the periphery. Still, the conception of colonial wealth accumulating in 
the core as the basic advantage making possible the meteoric rise of British 
capitalism is a keystone in his system, as it clinches his identification of Con­
quest, beginning in late 15th century, with Growth, beginning with an indus-
14(>The Third World, which around 1750 produced some 70-6% of the world’s manufactures, 
produced only 7-8% around 1913.’ and 'there had been hardly any increase in the Third World’s 
average living standards between 1800 and 1950’ (88-98).
l4lHe points out that the ‘great merit of Wallerstein’s research has been to integrate political 
with economic factors behind the growth of a global economy’, and takes care to criticize naïve 
comparative advantage models as well as dependency theory. Referring to Rosenberg/Birdzell’s 
How the West Grew Rich, he asks if they really ‘are prepared to believe that payments for slaves on 
the coast approximated to the capitalized values of black workers’ outputs over their lifetimes’.
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trial revolution in 18th century, or with an agrarian in the 17th, as One Proc­
ess and One System. O’Brien’s sobering devaluation of the scale of external 
appropriation is a useful admonition against facile generalization, but as he 
himself (nowadays) emphasizes, the matter is in no way settled.
Two further observations:
(1) Those figures that are available for this type of quantification are obvi­
ously very uncertain. Still, from selections out ol similar source material, 
Bairoch and Steensgard can come to quite different conclusions as to the rela­
tive importance of extra-European trade within the British economy:
Bairoch states that extra-European trade ‘represented some 33-9% of total 
British trade’ (82), while Stensgaard concludes that ‘more than half of Eng­
lish foreign trade by the middle of the eighteenth century directly or indi­
rectly [re-exports] depended on the intercontinental trade’ (1990:145).
(2) Indirect effects are very difficult to assess. H H Nolte (1992:32f) 
points to the very low interest rates in England, and to the significance of 
emigration outlets for the internal development of core countries142 O'Brien 
himself mentions ‘the savings and skills of merchants acquired in overseas 
trade which found their way into industrial enterprises’, maybe more often 
via banking, ‘creation of transportation and other forms of social overhead’, 
and the demonstration and diffusion of ‘advanced industrial techniques and 
commercial practices to other sectors of the economy’(1992:495).
Even Robert Brenner, who very consistently stresses internal factors, iden­
tifies ‘colonial interlopers’ as a key category in the English Revolution 
(1993:113-6, 159-61 684-6). These were ‘new men’ from a much lower social 
background than the privileged company merchants, who monopolized the 
most lucrative trades. As this barred out newcomers, the ‘New Merchants’ had 
to make do with the relatively high-risk and low-profit (and therefore com­
petitive rather than monopolized) colonial trade.
The very existence of a colonization project is thus part of the social and 
economic basis for a revolutionary transformation of society as well as for 
the shift from rent-seeking to profit-seeking within commercial capitalism.
l42An important point for Sweden as a part of the core; Sandbergs quantifications of the economic 
success and language-learning ability of Swedish US immigrants relative to other categories 
(1979:234-7) clearly indicate that the cultural and educational level of Swedish immigrants 
contributed to their relative success. Reasonably, this must be an important factor behind the 
possibility of using emigration as a safety-valve.
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11:5 CHARLES TILLY:
Statemaking through Coercion and Capital
11:5.1 Warmaking and diversity
Charles Tilly might appear in just about any discussion on comparative po­
litical development as a historian, as a sociologist, as a sharp-eyed critic of 
comparativist endeavours or as an editor of important contributions in this 
field. Here, though, I will primarily refer to his own interventions in the 
debates on ‘Big Structures, Large Processes (and) Huge Comparisons’1^, and in par­
ticular his most general and elaborate synthesis so far ‘Coercion, Capital and 
European States. AD 990-1990’144 It represents a fundamental revision of the 
positions he and his colleagues, a group of distinguished sociologists, 
economists, historians and political-scientists, had put forward in ‘The Forma­
tion of National States in Western Europe’145 There the development of European 
states was interpreted as the outcome of the interrelated activities of warmak­
ing, taxation (to raise money for warfare), repression (against popular resis­
tance to warmaking and taxation) and state-building (to organize war, taxation 
and repression)146.
Although he does not seem to have abandoned this viewpoint, he now 
(1990) considers it too unilinear. The ‘organization of coercion and prepara­
tion for war’ (p 14) is still crucial to his analysis, but th^diversity of forms 
this has produced among the European states has become the central ques­
tion: ’Why were the directions of change so similar and the paths so different?’ (p 
190). In search of an explanation, he pursues the development of various 
forms of interplay between political and economic factors in different parts 
of Europe from AD 990 to 1990, and the analysis he comes up with is based 
on a two-dimensional concept of development: the ‘logics of capital and co- 
ercion’(pp 16-20).
d Ctp Ttctl,
in Tilly’s wide and rather unspecified usage, represents all economic assets, 
and ‘the processes that accumulate and concentrate capital also produce cities’. 
Capital, capitalists and cities are connected to each other within the ‘realm of 
exploitation’, where surpluses arising in the relations of production and 
exchange are captured by capitalists147.
^To borrow the title of one of his books (1984).
l44Tilly 1990. All references in this section not preceded by year refer to that book.
147bdited by Tilly, this book was published in 1975 as the outcome of seminars held in 1970-1. 
l46His most lucid explication of this model can be found in Tilly 1981.
l47Tilly emphasizes that capitalists existed before capitalism, "the system in which wage-workers 
produce goods by means of materials owned by capitalists”. This system did not arise until “after
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Coercion
is his complementary fundamental concept in the political sphere, and it 
defines the 'realm of domination’. States are produced ‘when the accumulation 
and concentration of coercive means grow together’. The logic of coercion 
appears to be a more abstractly worded rephrasement of his old catchword: 
‘War makes states and states make war’148.
11:5.2 Poiver, Plenty or both
The model basically boils down to the proposition that in areas dominated by 
cities and commercial activities war made states of a ‘capital-intensive’ type, 
while in rural areas military pressure eventually had to be met by extracting 
the means of warfare from agriculture, which led to a more repressive 
‘coercion-intensive’ development. In other words: the coercion-intensive states 
have to finance the build-up of their means of coercion through applying this 
coercion to their own people - i e: their peasantry.
The division of Europe into contrasting regions dominated by capital- 
intensive or coercion-intensive development provides the dynamic force in the 
European states-system, and eventually those countries which tread a narrow 
middle way, balancing coercion with capital and vice versa, take the lead and 
become models for the nation-state that the different trajectories tend to con­
verge upon. The reason for this is that the form of nation-state confers a 
competitive advantage in interstate warfare, as it is capable to raise money 
more efficiently and less oppressively than the typical coercion-intensive 
state, while the increasing scale and frequency of warfare also renders obso­
lete the mercenary warfare system which capital-intensive states rely upon. 
This category of state-building is described as ‘capitalized coercion’.
His typology of European developments thus comprises three major cate­
gories of state-formation: coercion-intensive, capital-intensive and capitalized coer­
cion trajectories of state formation.
Coercion-intensive states
State formation in high coercion areas, with ‘few cities and little concentrated 
capital’ was sparked off by military pressure. State-building was financed by 
using land to reward military and bureaucratic personnel. This ‘encouraged a
1500, as capitalists seized control of production”(/öc cit ); the ‘transition to capitalism’ is thus 
explained in a rather off-hand manner, and the role of exploitation before capitalism is quite 
puzzling. The conventionally Marxist standpoint would be that exploitation was not effected 
through capital , but in other ways, until production was under its control. A non-Marxist view 
of capital would typically consider it to be productive rather than exploitative. Maybe Braudel’s 
conception of ‘capitalism’ as the level of making profits by manipulation of the money flows 
caused by trade is something like what Tilly has in mind.
148TiUy 1981.
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strategy of conquest in which territorial lords simultaneously leagued to­
gether against common enemies and fought each other for priority within 
their own territory, with the leading lord ceding control over land and labor 
to his fellows in exchange for military assistance.’ This strategy ‘left little 
space for an autonomous bourgeoisie’ or for ‘accumulation and concentration 
of capital outside the state’ .
Three varieties are described:
1. Areas where ‘warrior nobles retained great power, including the 
ability to install and depose kings.’
Examples: Poland and Hungary.
2. Areas where ‘a single power managed to establish priority by 
constructing a state bureaucracy that gave nobles and clergy great 
privileges with respect to the commoner population, but committed 
them to service of the state.’
Examples: Sweden and Russia.
3. Areas where noble absentee landlords draining resources to their resi­
dence in the capital co-existed with state officials reaching out into the 
provinces to execute royal policy with the help of priests and local 
nobles.
Examples: Sicily and Castile.
Capital-intensive states
The availability of capital permitted these states - typically city-states, city- 
empires or urban federations - to wage war in the interests of their commer­
cial enterprise and expansion without having to build up bulky 
administrations or permanent concentrations of military power that might 
emerge as alternative power centres. Instead they were run by efficient, ‘slim’ 
organizations, and representative but oligarchic institutions.
Examples: Venice, Genoa, Ragusa, Milan, Florence, Holland, Catalonia and 
the Hanse.
Capitalized-coercion states
Although these states are the central explanatory category for Tilly’s model 
of European development - it is the dynamic interplay between ‘concentration 
and accumulation of coercion’ and ‘of capital’ typical for such states that 
constitutes the European advantage - he has surprisingly little to say about 
how this interplay came about and how it functioned. Areas where ‘the 
concentrations of capital and coercion occurred in greater equality and tighter 
connection with each other’, is as close to a definition as he gets.
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The general path of the national statel49, though, once it has been developed 
by this pioneer category, sets the pace for the military survival struggle in 
Europe, and forces all other countries to adopt methods of warfare ‘whose 
support generated as by-products centralization, differentiation, and autonomy 
of the state apparatus’. This clarifies the picture a bit:
‘Those states took that step in the late fifteenth century both because they had 
recently completed the expulsion of rival powers from their territories and 
because they had access to capitalists who could help them finance wars 
fought by means of expensive fortifications, artillery and, above all, 
mercenary soldiers.’(183)
Map 6: Europe according to Tilly
Capital
intensive
Capitalized
Coercion
Coercion intensive
149TilIy now (1992) explicitly rejects the concept of ‘nation-state’, as an ideal category maybe 
‘approximate^]’ by present-day Sweden and Ireland, and very few others throughout history. 
‘Great Britain, Germany and France - quintessential national states - have never met the test {of a 
shared linguistic, religious and symbolic identity]’(3)
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Chart 8: Tilly’s typology of European state-building 
trajectories
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officials variant:
©
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1 Cities sparse, slow accumulation and concentration of capital lead to state formation without 
collaboration or opposition of capitalists (132)
“ Mentioned as a coercion-intensive state (142) but not explicitly placed in any of the 
subcategories. Position here chosen after the definition in the preceding note.
-1 No explicit definition in (1990), but described as ’sharply divided between Lisbon and its 
profoundly rural hinterland’! 188) and shown as closer than Aragon to the middle category in a 
diagram (60); in Tilly 1992, however, it's classified as coercion-intensive.
11:53 China as a contrast
Tilly’s conception of the European advantage also hinges on this articulation 
of military and economic competition150 He contrasts the European system of 
cities (capitalist) and states (coercive) to G W Skinner’s model of imperial 
China characterized by
‘the intersection of two sets of central-place hierarchies. The first, 
constructed largely from the bottom up, emerged from exchange; its 
overlapping units consisted of larger and larger market areas centered on
1-^Although the economic dynamic is never really specified. Its taken for granted as a matter of
course.
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towns and cities of increasing size. The second, imposed mainly from top 
down, resulted from imperial control; its nested units comprised a hierarchy 
of administrative jurisdictions. Down to the level of the hsien, or county, 
every city had a place in both the commercial and the administrative 
hierarchy. Below that level, even the mighty Chinese Empire ruled indirectly 
via its gentry. In the top-down system, we find the spatial logic of coercion. 
In the bottom-up system, the spatial logic of capital. We have seen two 
similar hierarchies at work repeatedly in the unequal encounter between 
European states and cities.’(127)
I quote this passage at length because it not only puts his categories into a 
comparative perspective, but also contains some interesting implications for 
the further discussion. First, though, the uniqueness of Europe:
The bottom-up structure, the interconnecting network of trading cities has 
during the post-Roman period had enough time to develop enough of 
independent diversity that no top-down power structure ever succeeded to get a 
full grasp over the whole network. On the other hand - and after a long 
process - a number of different top-down structures of coercion eventually 
succeeded to establish stronger states and in those most successful in the long 
run we eventually find the interrelated interests of ruling warmakers needing 
money and urban moneymakers needing protection constructing national 
states.
For Tilly, it is this dynamic collusion between commercial and coercive 
power that has conferred a military and financial advantage upon Europe. In 
China political and economic power were more disjunct, with political power 
holding on to the central power, but leaving commercial interest fairly free 
hands in the periphery of the system. The relationship between Conquest and 
Growth are thus at the very center of his model. What’s lacking is any 
conception of Voice. Reviewers of Tilly (1990) have primarily objected to 
the wide and varied category of ‘coercion-intensive’ states, comprising the 
Scandinavian states as well as the eastern European. McNeill concluded that 
this example shows that two variables aren’t enough, and Claessen has 
suggested ‘legitimacy’ as a third.
11:5 A The position of Sweden
There is in fact a considerable ambiguity in Tilly’s handling of the Swedish 
example. Within the very chapter where he defines the three types of 
trajectories, he first distinguishes the Scandinavian states as a sub-category of 
their own, describing the varieties of their developments, but finally 
concludes that they all ‘cluster round the coercion-intensive path', and when 
he sums up the variants of the coercive path the Scandinavian road is forgotten 
and he emphasizes the similarities between Sweden and Russia instead.
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In his subsequent book, however, European Revolutions, 1492-1992, in his 
depiction of Europe at the beginning point, he describes it as still dominated 
by its
‘well-connected network of mercantile cities, most of them having 
substantial hinterlands that combined small-scale manufacturing with 
commercial farming. The rest of Europe divided into two kinds of regions: 
those of warrior-landlords ... who extracted their revenues from peasant 
households, and other regions in which small-holding farmers, fishermen 
and foresters coexisted with merchants, soldiers, priests and officials. 
Hungary exemplifies the first, Scandinavia the second.’(26)
This picture is very different from his standard three-path one, but then the 
road towards the modern state has barely started. Military reorganization for 
inter-state competition forces rulers to ‘augment... the power of their states at 
the cost of extensive bargaining with their national populations’. ‘Where great 
concentrations of capital appeared’ - primarily around the central urban band - 
‘merchants and financiers played central roles ...[in] financing state activities, 
especially war’, but try to do without standing armies, bureaucracies and 
powerful centralization. In ‘zones of herding and subsistence agriculture’ 
with capital ‘slight and dispersed’, cities and trade being ‘choked by magnates’ 
the only way to build a strong state was ‘by seizing or co-opting the private 
armies formed by great landlords’, resulting in ‘the paradoxical combination 
of large, privileged nobilities and substantial state bureaucracies. Russia, 
Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Castile illustrate different versions of this 
coercion-intensive path.’
The path of Sweden is not very easy to recognize in this version of the 
story. One path remains:
'In between lay those regions that combined some concentrated capital with 
substantial armed force in the hands of autonomous landlords - areas to 
which historians of the Middle Ages have most comfortably applied the word 
‘feudal’, and those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the word 
‘absolutist’. They typically interlaced networks of trading cities with large 
agricultural areas that produced surpluses (including domestic manufactures) 
for the urban market. In such environments, rulers could often expand their 
power by pitting the bourgeoisie against the nobility only to fuse them 
eventually in service to the crown.’ This is, of course, the path ofcapitalized 
coercion(p\), and - at least by this description - it can hardly include Sweden.
What has happened to Sweden? Have we been excluded from the map? It is 
not likely that Tilly considers Scandinavia marginal, as Moore does. In his 
criticism of his (Norwegian!) friend, colleague and co-worker Stein Rokkan, 
whose influence on his own model he is very explicit about, he points out 
how Rokkan’s diagrams of correlated social and geographical patterns fail to
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capture the full variety of historical trajectories, taking as his example - 
Sweden:
‘But Sweden, to take an obvious instance, is not simply a 'case' located 
somewhere in the nothern reaches of a giant cross-tabulation. The Sweden that 
appears on Rokkan’s conceptual map is a shrunken remainder of the 
expansive power that at one time or another dominated Norway, Finland, 
Estonia, Livonia and other important parts of the North. Can we reconstruct 
the political development of Sweden - or, for that matter of Norway, 
Finland, Estonia and Livonia - without taking this into account?’(1984:139)
The answer is still - I think - no. I think this is also a strong indication that 
we cannot leave the problem of Voice outside the discussion - that would just 
produce historically insensitive conclusions. Another interesting element that 
would be worthy of careful consideration, is Tilly’s discussion of ‘top-down’ 
and ‘bottom-up’ structures. He far too easily identifies the ‘bottom-up’ 
structuring principle with trade, and thus with merchants, cities, capital and 
bourgeoisie. What about the ‘bottom-up’ structures for adjudication and 
conflict-resolving? At some level these structures articulate with a ‘top-down’ 
structure that is more or less identical with the coercive apparatus, but the 
forms for this is probably extremely varied. Here specific traits in the posi­
tion of the Swedish peasantry151 might be possible to identify and correlate 
with the presumedly more ‘objective’ forces of ‘capital and coercion’
As Sweden’s position in the early state- and nation-building processes and 
its role in the inter-state rivalry intensifying militarization and promoting the 
form of the nation-state (cf Anderson’s analysis!), corresponds more closely 
to the road of capitalized coercion, than to the coercive category where Tilly 
has situated it, the problem might lie in the definition of the concept 
‘capitalized coercion’. It is also reasonable to presume that Sweden’s role as a 
producer of copper and iron gave it a much greater access to ‘means of war­
making’, than its ‘nugatory cities’ (in Anderson’s words) would make 
apparent.
151In Sweden the top-down structure of bailiwicks (fögderier) was adapted to the bottom-up 
structure of hundreds (härader) by the Crown during the 16th century (Wirsell 1968:15);cf 
Aronsson, Gustafson and Österberg on local self-government; also compare with other countries: 
Hilton on rural communes in France, Blickle on peasant communalism in Germany and 
Switzerland, Brenner's discussion of the relative strength of peasant resistance and Moore's 
distinction between ‘conservative and revolutionary solidarity’ among peasants.
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11:6 ROBERT BRENNER:
Property Relations as Class Reproduction
11:6.1 Class struggle and comparative transition
Robert Brenner entered the discussion on transition from feudalism to capi­
talism through a sharp criticism of trade-centered as well as demographically 
based explanations of divergent development, focusing on contradictory ten­
dencies of development and arguing class interests as the basic reason for 
these divergences (1976). Although the main focus in his earlier articles was 
polemic - he criticized ‘commercialization models’ and ‘demographic models’ 
in (1976), transition theories implicitly presupposing capitalist market com­
petition within the pre-capitalist society in (1977), inconsistencies within 
Dobb’s theory of transition in (1978)152 - from the beginning he has also 
propagated an alternative theory, focusing on the ‘class struggle’ conception 
of historical materialism 155 and attempting a comparative explanation of the 
transition problem, most ambitiously in his 1982 article where he defends his 
positions against a formidable array of opponents from diverse traditions. A 
more theoretical discussion of the problems can be found in (1986), and the 
most comprehensive survey of his present standpoints, including his first 
full typology of European development, is presented in (1989). His research 
on the role of merchants in the English Revolution (1993) opens perspectives 
which he has not yet endeavoured to integrate into his general model, and 
will therefore be left outside the discussion. (But cf above, section 11:4.6!)
11:6.2 East vs West and the ‘Brenner paradox’
Brenner’s crucial argument in his original article is most obviously pin­
pointed in what we can call the ‘Brenner paradox’, i e the contradiction he has 
pointed out between attempts to use the late medieval fall in population to 
explain either the disappearance of serfdom in Western Europe, (as labour be­
comes the scarce factor, peasants find themselves in a stronger bargaining po­
sition and eventually succeed to win their freedom), or the imposition of the 
‘second serfdom’ in Eastern Europe (as labour becomes scarce, the lords have 
to tighten their grip over their peasants, in order not to lose them154).
152Hehas also continued in this polemic vein through critiques against the 'techno-determinist’ 
Marxism of Cohen in (1986) and against the French ‘regulation school’ in (1991).
155As against ‘structural-determinist’, ‘techno-determinist’ and ‘circulationist’ variants. This 
means taking up the Dobb-Hilton tradition from the transition debate, but Brenner’s version of 
this theory has also been criticized from within this tradition: for ‘voluntarism’ (Bois in Aston- 
Philpin 115) or for neglecting the peasant contribution to the development of capitalism (Katz). 
^^The first explanation is attributed to Postan and Schlicher van Bath, the second to Carsten and 
Malowist.(Aston-Philpin 34f)
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Nota bene that noone has claimed that both of these cases can be explained 
with demographic conditions as a sufficient cause, and the counter-attacks 
against Brenner tend to defend the first proposition through disclaiming va­
lidity (or relevance) for the second one155 claiming that conditions were not 
comparable. What Brenner offers is, though, an attempt to explain in what 
way they were not comparable, and a logical explanation for how it is possible 
for two sets of historians to use the same argument to explain contradictory 
developments. The theoretically fundamental question is therefore:
if changing demographic conditions (lundi'labour ratio) can be argued to have 
a decisive influence on the development of a society, how come the same demo­
graphic development (falling llr) can be used as explanation for two diametri­
cally opposite developments (emancipation and enserfment)?
Brenner’s explanation is that the changing situation can be resolved in ei­
ther of two ways: in the interest of the peasants (because the scarcity of la­
bour strengthens the peasants’ bargaining position), or in the interest of the 
lords (who have to take control over peasant mobility in order not to lose 
their workforce). What then decides the outcome must be the relative strength 
of the contending classes.(76:340
11:6.3 England vs France - the medieval background
As to the question of England versus France, Brenner emphasizes the early 
centralization of power under mutual dependence between monarchy and aris­
tocracy in England, ensuring an efficient domination over the peasantry, ver­
sus full feudal fragmentation in France leading to a weaker position vis-a-vis 
peasant communities, where the competitive exploitation forms of taxes and 
rents exacerbated the late medieval crisis, eventually making the aristocracy 
converge around the more efficient alternative of taxation, compensating de­
clining rents by getting a slice of the state revenue through taking up office.
The end result would eventually arrive in the form of the absolute state, 
the ‘tax/office state’ in Brenner’s term. Meanwhile the English aristocracy 
were not really hit by the late medieval crisis until more than half a century 
later than the French, but when it did arrive, even if the rent level was main­
tained surprisingly long, peasant resistance made a full ‘feudal reaction’ al­
ternative unfeasible, and there was no emerging centralized state tax machine 
to turn to. The result, after the eventual failure of the attempt to solve the 
problem at the expense of France was civil war (1982:269-72). For the fol­
lowing development, see below.
^'’Ladurie claims that his model is regional to western Europe (Aston-Philpin 104), Postan- 
Hatcher that eastern serfdom was caused by economic factors and not demographic ones (66).
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11:6.4 Brenner’s typology of Europe
Western Europe: Peasant proprietorship and the Absolutist state
In the old Carolingian heartlands, where feudal relations had first evolved, 
they also appeared in their most primitive, decentralized forms. Centuries of 
‘village-by-village struggle’ had evolved a strong communal solidarity, that 
won them a great degree of autonomy and eventually made the peasants ck 
facto proprietors, i e customary holders with full rights of inheritance and 
fixed seigneurial dues. Through inflation landlords faced falling revenues 
while at the same time inter-seigneurial rivalry increased.
Upholding military competitiveness demanded stronger resources and the 
need for feudal lords to hold their own through this ‘political accumula­
tion’156 resulted in a tendency towards state-building, making feudal property 
relations reorganize around monarchs and princes, collecting centralized taxes 
and providing their followers with means of reproducing themselves through 
holding offices as military leaders, judges or administrators. (1989:40f) 
Essentially, this ‘tax/office state’ is a reconstructed feudalism, based on the 
same foundation of ‘extra-economic compulsion’, and subject to the same kind 
of cyclical dynamics.
Northeastern Europe: the landlords’ solution
Feudal property relations were spread through a colonization process into 
East Elbian Germany and Poland, where easy terms were offered to attract 
colonizers. To compensate themselves, landlords tended to go in for continu­
ous expansion, requiring a more or less constant flow of immigrants. As this 
dried up during the late medieval crisis, landlords turned against each other, 
organized for external warfare, and tried to tighten control over peasants. 
This led to a downward demographic-economic spiral similar to the crisis in 
Western Europe157 in the end resolved through the success of a common 
landlord front against the peasants, tightening control, raising dues and fi­
nally turning to enlarged demesne farming based on enserfed labour and 
geared to export production.
Brenner ascribes peasant defeat to their less entrenched position compared 
to Western European villages, to the lords’ control over the colonization pro­
cess, and to the more individualized and dispersed settlements, less conducive 
to the development of strong village self-management. These processes of
156To gain and retain the loyalty of their followers, the overlords had to feed and equip them 
and, in the long run, competitively reward them. Minimally, the overlord’s household had to 
become a focus of lavish display, conspicuous consumption and gift-giving, on par with that of 
other overlords.’(1987:312)
157Brenner makes reservations about how far this is valid for Poland, but as the beginning and 
end results are parallell to the East German case, he presumes the mechanisms at work to be 
similar as well.
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increasing oppression are self-reinforcing and tend to erode the productive 
forces of the system through systematically increasing demesnes at the ex­
pense of peasant plots (1989:42-5).
Southeastern Europe: local possession under a distant state
This is really a variant of the tax/office state, but the special situation of di­
rectly replacing a decentralized rent-taking structure with a centralized tax 
system unleashed the productive potential of the peasantry, who were given 
full effective possession of the land, when the old local aristocracies were 
eliminated by the conquering Ottoman regime. Guaranteed possession, lower 
surplus extraction and peace led to rapid growth, until the Malthusian ceiling 
was reached and the tensions between stagnating growth and increasing state 
requirements - in response to external military pressure as well as to the need 
of tightening internal control in order to effect the extraction of ever increas­
ing amounts of surplus, thus eroding the basis of agricultural productiv­
ity.(1989:45-7)
Map 7: Brenner’s typology of Europe
CAPITALIST
BREAKTHROUGH
Peasants too strong to be 
subjected, but lords do not 
lose control over property 
rights; instead they evict or 
wait out tenants and lease 
land to commercial farmers
TAX/OFFICE STATE
Peasant communities too 
strong to be subjected force 
lords to accept de facto 
peasant ownership and 
centralize exploitation 
through state office holding 
and taxation
ROBERT BRENNER'S 
^TYPOLOGY OF EUROPE:
FEUDAL REACTION
Facing labour shortage 
feudal lords tighten seig­
neurial control, raise 
dues and develop market 
production on demesnes 
using serf labour
SE-EUR TAX/OFFICE VARIANT
Ottoman conquest eliminated local 
aristocracy and left peasants in full 
possession of plots. Reduced exploi­
tation leads to fast growth until 
undermined by increasing taxation
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Early Modern England: A Breakthrough to Development
In the wake of the War of the Roses, reconstruction of the English state 
did not provide the ruling class with the options of reenserfing the peasantry 
or supplementing rents with a stake in taxation, open, respectively, to the 
nobilities in Northeastern and Western continental Europe. The 
extraeconomic control capacity of the lords was already broken by peasant 
resistance and mobility, but the landlords had retained relatively broad 
demesnes, and held on to their property rights, enclosing, evicting or waiting 
out peasants and leasing out their land to commercial farmers, thus in effect 
creating a capitalist system of agriculture, where tenants - often the more 
successful freeholders - competed for the best leases, while landlords had to 
compete for the best tenants.
11:6.5 Important points of criticism against Brenner
• His description of English landlords as strong enough to maintain full property 
rights against customary tenants (as opposed to their French counterparts), while at the 
same time they were too weak to impose a ‘neo-serfdom’ {as in Northeastern Europe) 
has been attacked as contradictory.
Either the landlords were stronger than the peasants or they were not, the ar­
gument seems to be. Even if we accept the somewhat one-dimensional concep­
tion of ‘strength’ indicated by this line of reasoning, gradations should be 
possible: English landlords could be stronger than the French, but weaker 
than the Prussian and Polish ones. This would be a bit misleading, though, as 
different aspects of class power were implied in the different conflicts dis­
cussed.
Even more fundamentally: Class power is a relationship between classes, not a 
quality intrinsic to the powerholding class. Though Brenner’s crucial argu­
ment is that you must analyze both sides of a class conflict (cf the ‘Brenner 
paradox’) he has left himself open to attack by relapsing into a one-sided 
argument on this point. To be fully consistent with his overall perspective 
his argument would have to be refocused in this way:
The English lords were unable to achieve their most favourable outcome: to re-enserf 
their peasants (as in Eastern Europe), but the English peasants were also unable to 
achieve their most preferred solution: full property rights in customary holdings 
(more or less what happened in France, according to Brenner).
In both of the other examples either of the contending classes had the ad­
vantage of a superior level of class organization, but in England both sides 
were well enough organized to block the other class’ most preferred alterna­
tive. That the English landlords succeeded with the slower but safer strategy 
of waiting out their tenants and strengthening formal ownership also in part 
depended on the consequences this process had among the peasants. The soli­
darity among the peasants was undermined by growing differentiation, and
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freeholders and richer peasants with insufficient land would have common in­
terests with the lords in this respect, (cf Hilton, Katz)
• He underrates the potential of peasant production and overrates the im­
portance of large-scale agriculture.
This objection seems largely valid to the extent that he tends to overrate 
the possibility of economies of scale in agriculture. However, this is not the 
basis of his argument concerning the superiority of the English system with 
its ‘trinity’ of landlords, capitalist tenants and agricultural workers:
its fundamental advantage lies not in the scale of production, but in that the re­
quirements of class reproduction are based on production for a competitive market and 
thus conducive to economic growth, while peasant reproduction creates incentives for di­
versification rather than specialization and for labour-intensive rather than capital- 
intensive production.
However, these discussions are closely tied to the question of forces be­
hind the transition to capitalism; what happens when production for a capital­
ist market has become the norm, is a totally different question. The question 
of peasant productive performance under market pressure (mediated through 
bank-loans for equipment, eg) may fall outside the scope of the transition 
question, but the productive potential of peasant agriculture under rent and 
tax pressure hardly enters the picture either.
This is somewhat surprising, as Georges Duby, Rodney Hilton and Perry 
Anderson, ail of whom he refers to for his fundamental theory of ‘political 
accumulation’, all emphasize the importance of rising rent pressure forcing 
peasants to intensify and develop production. Claudio Katz’ version of a 
class-struggle interpretation of the Marxian theory of the transition to capi­
talism158 closely parallells Brenner’s, but also integrates a Hiltonian concep­
tion of the internal dynamics of the peasantry; to assimilate this standpoint 
with Brenner’s theory would hardly demand much restructuration as it is im­
plicit in important parts of his source material.
11:6.6 Once again: Sweden - eastern or western?
If Brenner’s argument about the east/west divide holds water, one of Ander­
son’s distinctive factors is undermined: the role of the cities. Looking for 
clues regarding Sweden’s implacement in Brenner’s model, we might expect 
some relevant data to appear in the findings of the ‘Scandinavian Research 
Project on Deserted Farms and Villages’. Eva Österberg, one of the leaders 
of that project, has used some of its results in a discussion of ‘Peasant Up­
heavals, Economy and Ownership\199l-ch.9). Though this article doesn’t touch
158Katz 1989,1993.
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upon questions concerning the east-west contrast159, some of her arguments 
have parallels within that debate.
Thus she claims that ‘significant rent reductions at the end of the fourteenth 
century or the start of the fifteenth century should probably be seen as an ex­
pression of a situation where the tenants were able to push the rents down be­
cause the landowners could not risk losing their labour’, i e the Postan - 
Schlicher van Bath argument, as in Western Europe, (cf the ‘Brenner paradox’ 
above), although there was, especially in Denmark and Sweden ‘also indica­
tions that the landowners tried to offset the fall in rents by imposing new du­
ties in the fifteenth century’ and ‘the sources convey a definite impression that 
the large landowners had a labour shortage and was anxious to keep their ten­
ants on the farms’; statutes and provisions to that effect are known from Swe­
den, Iceland and Denmark.
This appears quite compatible with Brenner’s synthesis of the two demo­
graphic models, where a lowered population pressure leads to a situation 
where the peasantry attempts to exploit their ‘scarcity’ to improve their situa­
tion, while the landlords try to sharpen their control over the peasants in or­
der to prevent this. Which side that succeeds will ‘come down to a question 
of power, indeed of force’ as Brenner comments.
The ‘peasant risings in the fifteenth century’, which according to Österberg 
‘occurred at a time of economic improvement for this category’, and that she - 
with strong reservations - views as a possible corroboration of the theory of 
uprisings associated with Tocqueville, might in Brenner’s context receive a 
much simpler explanation: direct conflict between the manifest economic in­
terests of peasants and landowners160. As Brenner concludes the cited passage: 
‘in fact there was intense Europe-wide lord/peasant conflict throughout the 
later fourteenth, fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, almost always over 
the same general issues: first, of course, serfdom; second, whether lords or 
peasants were to gain ultimate control over landed property, in particular the 
vast areas left vacant after the demographic collapse.’(Aston-Philpin 34f).
In Brenner’s perspective Scandinavia would follow the western pattern, but 
the picture is rather unclear - particularly in the case of Denmark. Despite 
certain doubts Österberg includes Denmark in her generalization of the situa­
tion as a fall in rents has been observed to occur before the later imposition of 
vornedskab (a kind of adscription). Otherwise this would rather imply an 
‘Eastern’ development, but the reasons for the delay would have to be inves­
tigated.
159Her discussion deals with theories of social unrest, and the relationship between economic 
situation and propensity to revolt.
160I find it more reasonable to explain tendencies to social revolt from the perspective of the 
relations between the parties of the conflict, rather than searching for general correlations between 
the conditions of one of the parties and this side's propensity to resort to violence.
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11:7 Excursus: Michael Mann and the ‘four 
sources of social power’
Michael Mann has attempted a ‘grand synthesis’ encompassing almost all ear­
lier theories of ‘social power’ which turns out to be an attempt at synthesizing 
economic history, political history and intellectual history as well. As his 
model avoids a priori contentions about the relative importance and interrela­
tionships of his four ‘forms of power’: ideological, economic, military and 
political, any attempt at a capsule summary will be unfair. It is a model at 
least fully as audacious as any ot those I have treated, but its explanatory 
ambitions are partly of a very different kind: where the other theories each in 
its own way can be described as reductionist (this applies the least to Moore 
and Anderson), Mann’s ambition is to avoid reductionism as far as possible, 
which means a balance act on the brink of chaos - a ‘patterned mess’ is his 
conception of history.
Though his account is full of interesting conceptual distinctions, and the 
scope and level of totalizing ambition in his undertaking is only rivalled by 
Wallerstein, I will not introduce it here as a seventh model (which I had 
originally planned). Although at heart a neo-Weberian model, it strives to in­
tegrate the perspectives found in other analyses - including all of those con­
sidered in the present discussion - as well. In other words, what Mann at­
tempts to do is a kind of ‘synthesis of syntheses’, but where he is using the 
concept of four different forms of power as an organizing principle for his 
metasynthesis I will try to use the Swedish perspective as a guideline for 
formulating my own conditions, and the concept of a triple miracle to set the 
scope of the inquiry. Thus it would seem more appropriate to use Mann’s 
theory as a counterpoint in my discussion of how to reconcile the six perspec­
tives with each other in the Swedish case.
I therefore adjourn a closer scrutiny of his model to a later stage in my 
exploration of the Swedish problem: the confrontation between theory and the 
realities of Sweden’s history, for which purpose the final part of this essay 
will complete my reconaissance tour.
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PART THREE: THEORIES 
CONFRONTING PROBLEMS - A 
PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL
111:1 Agenda and balance-sheet
Through scrutinizing modern-era Swedish history in the light of these con­
cepts and models, I hope to gain new insights not only
(1) regarding the specific position of Sweden’s development within the 
range of those interactive society-specific trajectories that have constituted 
‘Europe’ as a distinct part of the world, and at the same time constituted the 
separate states of Europe and the conditions for political and economic repro­
duction over the whole planet,
but also (2) regarding the complexities of the processes involved in these 
developments and the degree of sophistication required in any serious attempt 
at macrohistorical synthesis.
To anticipate the results by advancing conclusions - however preliminary - 
at this stage, would put an unwarranted constraint on the scope of this open- 
ended enterprise. Therefore I will at the moment limit myself to suggesting 
lines of inquiry generated by the confrontation between the analytical perspec­
tives discussed here, and problematic features of the Swedish example. A full 
comparative evaluation of the models must await the results of such an in­
quiry, but there are similarities and divergences in their treatment of the three 
‘miraculous’ problem complexes that need to be summarized.
Therefore I will start by discussing the contributions of the various theo­
ries in the context of their competition, and of the ‘Triple Miracle’.
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111:2 Theories confronting each other 
- and the miracles
111:2.1 My selection of theories - a defense
To begin with, I have to confront the question of selection: What kind of 
theories have I chosen to discuss, and why these particular six? The ‘new syn­
theses’ of the early seventies were symptomatic of a shift from deductive ex­
emplification to exploration of contrasting historical trajectories and at­
tempted theoretical reintegration. Admittedly, North-Thomas start out with 
the ambition of proving the validity of a widened-scope version of neo-classi­
cal economics as an explanation of historical change and diversity, and simi­
larly Anderson’s enterprise purports to revive the explanatory potential of 
Marxian historical enquiry through an explicit repudiation of the concept of 
orthodoxy. Still their wrestling with the complexities of the actual historical 
record persistently tugs them over into inductive reasoning. Moore’s inquiry 
is the sharpest contrast to deductive explication. His method has been de­
scribed as 'analytic induction’161 or 'macro-causal analysis’162
In Skocpol’s typologies of comparative theories, Brenner 1976 and her own 
comparative study of revolutions (1979) are cited as additional examples of 
the same category. Anderson 1974b is treated as a hybrid between ‘parallel’ 
and ‘contrast-oriented comparative history’ (1980) or between ‘general model 
application’ and ‘interpretive sociological history’ (1984). The latter descrip­
tion covers Wallerstein as well. Still they both argue their cases from 
‘bounded comparisons' similar to those explored by ‘macro-analyses’. Thus 
the combination of generalization and contrast common to all the theories 
cited here, tends to break up the categories163. In Tilly’s differently organized 
typology comparisons can be individualizing, with the purpose of grasping the 
peculiarities of each case, universalizing, in order to establish the general va­
lidity of an explanation, variation-finding, to explain systematic differences, or 
encompassing, which signifies integrating the different instances into a self-ex­
planatory structural totality (1984:81-83 and passim for the remainder of the 
book). The encompassing category seems to correspond fairly well to the 
kind of theories l have been discussing, and to those difficult to pinpoint in 
Skocpol’s scheme.
161Rueschemeyer et al 1992:36-38 and nl4.
l62Skocpol-Somers 1980; Skocpol’s 'analytic historical sociology’, applied to Moore in 1984:377- 
80, is a virtually identical concept. To simplify the language of reference I will not explicitly 
credit Somers’ contribution to the closely related typologies in these two articles.
163As Skocpol puts it, ‘the most ambitious of comparative historical analysts end up borrowing 
emphases from our two first strategies of historical sociology to help them frame their questions 
and results in more encompassing or epochal ways’ (1984:385).
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What I endeavour to situate Sweden in, is the field of discourse defined by 
two comparative dimensions: the singularity of the European experience and 
the divergence within it, and three aspects of the uniqueness: the level and ef­
ficiency of the organization of extroverted violence, the dynamic non-circular­
ity of economic development, and the expanding inclusiveness of political 
organizational forms. Each of the theories, models, approaches or perspec­
tives I use to locate this discourse without a priori committing myself to any 
one of them, attempts to grasp over the whole field, more or less. I can think 
of no other synthetic enterprise, with the important exceptions of Stein 
Rokkan and Michael Mann164, that tries to cover - or ‘encompass’ - as large a 
part of this multidimensional problem complex
111:2.2 Economic history or historical sociology ?
Discussion of this kind of general-level questions is often nowadays classi­
fied under the label of ‘Historical Sociology’. I would rather consider it to 
be the home ground of Economic History: surely the transformation of a so­
ciety of peasants and aristocracies into one of firms and workers is almost 
part of the definition of our discipline, and although the rise of the modern 
state has usually not been problematized, it is inescapably part of that trans­
formation.
Barrington Moore is a sociologist analyzing the origins of political sys­
tems, but his central explanatory concept is variation in the form of commer­
cialization of agriculture - quintessential economic history. Douglass North 
is an all-out economic historian, but he is - within his economic argumenta­
tion - prepared to concede considerable decisive influence to factors like mili­
tary technology, secure political and civil rights and even ‘a unified belief 
structure’ (1993b:3). Like the four remaining authors he struggles with the 
question of ‘Why in Europe?’ as well as with explaining diversity within the 
modernization process, and with clarifying the relations between statemaking,
l64Stein Rokkan has, particularly in his ‘conceptual maps of Europe’ (1975:578-9, 1981:54; also 
in Tillyl984:133-4), systematized the question of diversity in a striking and thought-provoking 
way. When, however, position in a grid defined by variation in church-state relations on one axis, 
and in economic resource base (defined by the combined effects of city networks and 'territorial 
incorporation of primary-producing peripheries’) on the other, is squarely identified with 
geopolitical location, the factors are locked so tightly into their places that change seems all but 
impossible. 'The time dimension’ (1975:570-5) has to be imposed from outside - i e, independent 
of any dynamics inherent in the map variables; this means that the factors driving the four-phase 
development of state- and nation-building have to be insulated from the factors explaining the 
scope of its variation. This accounts for the 'remarkable flatness’ and ‘lack [of) dynamism’ observed 
by Tilly (1984:139). I consider that Tilly’s attempt to follow up his criticism through developing 
the original insights of Rokkan into a more historically conscious synthesis (1984:139-143 reads 
like a draft for Tilly 1990) gives me an open enough access to Rokkan’s contribution without 
having to take on the deadweight of his functionalist premises. Mann I have discussed at the end of 
part I.
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armed struggle and economic development - and the sociopolitical implica­
tions of these processes.
Thus questions concerning the ‘Miracle of Voice’ are at least implicitly 
touched upon also by Anderson (institutional preconditions and 'bourgeois 
revolutions’), Wallerstein (‘antisystemic movements’), Tilly (forms of col­
lective action, mobilization and revolutions) and Brenner (organizational 
strength of class interests)165. Dynamics of internal military competition are, 
although they also appear in the argumentations of North, Brenner and 
Wallerstein, most heavily stressed by Anderson and Tilly, where they are 
seen as preconditions of the ‘Miracle of Conquest’, and, at least in Anderson’s 
case, also of the ‘Miracle of Growth’166. The weakest spot common to the so­
ciologists - Moore, Wallerstein and Tilly - is a deficient conceptualization ol 
economic growth, which is usually treated as an unquestioned given. For a 
problematization of economic growth we have to turn to the economic histori­
ans - North and Brenner167.
111:2.3 The Miracle of Growth 
- Adam Smith revised from two directions
If we’re looking for an identifiable discontinuity in the development of eco­
nomic growth - a true Miracle - the industrial revolution has been the classic 
point to search. Recent estimates of growth in England during this period 
(roughly identified as 1760-1830, give or take a decade) have undermined the 
traditional view of a sharp break with the past (Crafts, Harley), indicating a
l65TiIly 1990, however, is only concerned with the repressive aspects of power and with the 
constraints imposed on this by the necessity of making compacts with constituents in order to 
survive in the long-run interstate competition. This is because he has explicitly restricted his 
argument to what can be explained by the interplay of capital and coercion. Wallerstem seems to 
consider democracy as part of the ‘relatively dramatic flattening of the curve between the very top’ 
and the rest of the ‘ten to fifteen per cent of the population of the world-economy who consumed 
more surplus than they themselves produced’) 1983:104).
l66This is explicitly formulated only by Anderson. Tilly takes the growth of commerce and the 
‘concentration of capital’ into the cities for granted as the second master process shaping European 
history besides the ‘accumulation and concentration of coercion’ indispensable to state-building. As 
only a balanced interaction between these processes - ‘capitalized coercion’ - is successful in the 
long run, the coercive dynamics appear to be necessary for long-run growth as well, although he 
doesn't spell it out in this book. In Tilly 1985, however, he employed Lane’s theory of‘protection 
rents’ to argue this necessity.
167Brenner does not appear to be an economic historian by department affiliation, but as his 
doctoral dissertation dealt with the importance of imports and reexports for the commercial 
expansion in Elizabethan England, as he has presented papers to the Economic History Association 
as well as to the American Historical Association, and he has published in Journal of Economic 
History And Cambridge Journal of Economics as well as in historical and political journals, I think 
it’s fair to consider him as an at least de facto economic historian, especially as the main focus of 
most of his production is on problems of economic development.
106
Sweden and the European Mir acted
much longer and slower transition. Harley concludes that ‘Growth probably 
began to accelerate in the last years of the seventeenth or the early years of 
the eighteenth century’ and that ‘Modern economic growth became fully es­
tablished in Britain only in the railway age.’ (1993:208). This seems to move 
the decisive step much further back in time168. As Mokyr points out ‘The 
Wealth of Nations was a century out of date when it was published: What it 
advocated had already largely been accomplished’169.If we thus move back to 
the seventeenth century, we encounter the arguments of Brenner and North. 
To both of them (neo-) Malthusian dynamics are relevant to medieval and 
(very) early modern Europe in general, and both of them identify England’s 
and the Netherlands’ success in ‘breaking through the Malthusian ceiling’ 
during the ‘crisis of the 17th century’ as the decisive indication that the 
threshold has been passed170.
In some ways they might also be able to complement each other. In order 
to make the two perspectives more compatible,hidden class arguments of 
North have to be dragged out into the open:
There is an inherent uneasiness about classes within North’s body of works. 
In principle he rejects argument by class (‘too large and varied a group to 
serve as a primary unit of action’) in favour of the ‘individualistic calculus 
of neoclassical economics’, but argues that aggregation by ‘commonality of 
interest’, even up to class scale, is a more flexible substitute (1981:61). In 
practice, he sometimes slips into using the word, sometimes talks about 
‘groups’ or implies class interest without specifying the subject. When (in 
1981) he tries to explain differences between various national evolutions: the 
‘successful countries’ England and Holland vs the ‘less successful countries’ 
France and Spain, he argues more or less as if the different incentive struc­
tures condition everyone in the same way. If this were so, then all the mem­
bers of a society would either have incentives to ‘direct ... resources into in­
ventive and innovating activity’ or they would all have incentives to ‘do just 
the opposite’. In other places, when discussing how the different property 
rights structures were established, class argumentation is at least implicit:
168In his discussion of the beginning of this drawn-out growth period, Harley emphasizes ‘greater 
separation of ownership, entrepreneurship and labor’ in agriculture, and more rapid 'release... [of] 
factors of production to other activities’ (224 and 194f, where he ascribes this argument to Brenner 
1976), and to the British state’s ‘provision of] security in a turbulent international environment’ 
and ‘creat[ion of] an institutional framework that supported growth’ (NB an argument congruent 
with North’s). For different reassessments of the concept of industrial revolution, see Mokyr 1993, 
Landes 1993 and Hudson 1992.
l6°Except for its strictures against the state’s intervention in foreign trade’(1993:48f)
170North 1981:157, Brenner in Aston-Philpin (5If, 225, 325). On this point Le Roy de Ladurie 
agrees with his adversary Brenner, but concludes that France reached the same point slightly 
earlier than Brenner thinks - after about 1720. (Aston-Philpin:104f)
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In the British case, the crown tried to use continental-style economic strate­
gies - trading monopolies etc - hut it ‘ran into effective opposition’ in the 
form of ‘a group whose own interests were best served by private property 
and elimination of crown monopolies’ (156). In France it was the emergency 
situation towards the end of the Hundred Years’ War that ‘allowed the crown 
to seize the right to tax without ... consent’ ( 149) but the choice of directing 
taxation towards exploiting the existing fiscal extraction ‘infrastructure’ of 
the guilds and neutralizing potential rivals in the “protection market” 
through tax exemption for nobility and clergy {ibid ) locked France - as well 
as Spain that had developed along similar lines - into a path where the nobil­
ity acquired increasing vested interests in the preservation of this property 
rights structure171 If we try to sum up the implicit arguments, we see that:
• groups having different economic incentives and preferences oppose each 
other in more or less effective ways in order to preserve or transform the ex­
isting property rights structure.
What is this but a class argument? As soon as we admit this, we have to 
take into account not only different property rights structurés but also differ­
ent classes whose interests are ‘best served’ by different property rights struc­
tures. North argues that secure property rights are essential to growth, but 
what then about Brenner’s argument that secure property rights for the peasants 
became an obstacle to growth in France? Then the question is not only which 
property rights structure ‘fosters efficiency’ but also which classes will be 
‘best served’ by a property rights structure fostering efficiency, and why ex­
actly those classes’ interests would be congruent with the goal of general eco­
nomic growth?
Here we come close to Brenner’s discussion of under which conditions 
Smithian causes of economic growth are operative (1986:23-26), and of the 
necessity of a correspondence between the conditions for class reproduction 
and the conditions for economic growth. Actually North and Brenner are at­
tempting to make complementary qualifications for under which circum­
stances the Smithian explanation of economic growth is valid:
If the fundamental Smithian standpoint is that specialization, costcutting 
and innovation under competitive pressure lead to continuous economic 
growth, North would add that the economic actors need stable rules that 
allow them to profit from their profit-maximizing behaviour, while Brenner 
would add that as long as the pre-existing economic system makes other re­
production strategies rational, the actors have no incentive to invent Smithian 
strategies.
In other words: at the point of transition between two contrasting economic 
systems the Smithian explanation refers to the distinctive mechanism of eco-
171That ‘hidalgos had an aversion for trade and commerce and a preference for careers in the 
church, army, or government suggests that they were rational men.’(151)
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nomic growth characteristic of the new system, but as soon as Smith’s pre­
supposition of market growth as a necessary explanation of the transforma­
tion is rejected, the contrast between the new system - where these mechanisms 
are operative - and the old system - where they aren’t - has to be explained. 
Both North and Brenner reject the growth of market theorem, but they focus 
on preconditions on opposite sides of the point of transition:
North on the preconditions necessary for the dynamics of the new system 
to start operating, and Brenner on those necessary for the old system to stop 
operating 172
These versions of the crucial breakthrough tend to equate growth with capi­
talism, although North would usually call it ‘efficient economic organiza­
tion’.
^72That the increased economic efficiency of capitalism as such could be a sufficient reason for pre­
capitalist mechanisms to stop operating is emphatically rejected by Brenner, especially in his 
critique of Cohen’s ‘techno-determinist’ interpretation of Marxism ( op cit 40-48, esp.46 nl3); his 
fundamental point is that establishing capitalist productive relations requires a break-up of the 
institutionalized relationships that ensure the reproduction of lords as well as of peasants.
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111:2A Very long-term growth: Deeper European roots
Extensive and intensive growth
There is, however, an alternative, much longer lineage of European dynamics, 
stretching back to the early medieval economic growth identified by Duby 
(1974). Some theorists would claim that this is the period where the decisive 
advantage is located; none more resolutely than Michael Mann, who claims 
that ‘each and everyone’ among a long list of ‘popular factor explanations’ of 
the European dynamic are deficient ‘as a general explanation of the European 
miracle, for one reason: They start too late in history.’173. In a similar vein, 
the claim of ‘very long-term economic change’ as the essence of the ‘European 
Miracle’, made by E L Jones (1981: 225) was revised by himself in (1989). 
There he turns the whole conception on its head by insisting on extensive eco­
nomic growth as a normal and general condition, with an ever present poten­
tial of developing into intensive growth174, though permanently chased by the 
parallel development of rent-seeking stimulated by widening possibilities. 
Somehow there developed a ‘positive feedback between intensive growth once it 
started and the erosion of the more brutal forms of pie-slicing’( 193), at least 
in Europe and Japan, where ‘political competition [in contrast to its more 
general destructive role} diverted enough energy into fostering market growth 
for long enough to make a real difference, to change the world, no 
less.’(191) The envisioned tug of war between economic growth (whether ex­
tensive or intensive) and rent-seeking opens the door for an amalgamation be­
tween North’s winner/loser categorization, Jones’ revised theory, and the 
‘rent-seeking paradigm’ of Ekelund-Tollison (1981). To argue such a theory 
without taking the logic of violent redistribution and the competitive growth 
of military potential175 into account would result in a neoclassical parallel to 
the naïve economism of traditionalist Marxism, open to the same challenges 
of underestimating the realities of violence-backed state power. (Lane, Tilly 
1981).
North does discuss the role of military competition in the context of the 
rise of the nation-state. To that we will have to return, but the roots of this 
process stretch as far back into the medieval shadow as do the roots of the 
‘very long-term growth'. The question of how these cumulative processes in­
teract takes us back to the fundamental issues concerning the nature of pre­
capitalist European society.
173(1986:500f; cf 1988) His notion that Europe ‘was leaping ahead by A.D. 1000’ in the 'range of 
[intensive] power achievements ... especially in agriculture’ has been sharply criticized, cf Anderson 
1992b:85 and Wickham 1988 
^4/ e: growth per capita
^^1 e the dynamics eventually making the ‘Miracle of Conquest’ possible.
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Long-term growth and the dialectics of Conquest and Growth
In the Science & Society debate over ‘the transition from feudalism to capital­
ism’ 176 Sweezy posed the question whether feudal society had an endogenous 
driving force propelling its development, analogous to the dynamic of capital 
accumulation in modern society. Hilton’s suggestion that the requirements of 
inter-feudal competition and of overcoming the peasants’ unwillingness to 
part with their surplus led to the necessity of perpetually strengthening 
seigneurial coercive power, has later been developed in somewhat different 
ways by Anderson and Brenner. In Anderson’s version of the 'feudal dy- 
namic’(1974a:II, ch4), the need for increasing revenues leads to a ‘tug-of-war’ 
forcing the peasants to raise their productivity. In Brenner’s analysis these 
factors, which, he insists are essential to the lords’ reproduction as a class, 
lead to the necessity of strengthening lordly power individually, but also 
collectively, and thus he defines ‘political accumulation’ as more or less 
identical to ‘state-building’ in a wide sense. Although he refers to Anderson as 
well as Hilton and Duby, he does not seem to share their view that rising 
pressure on the peasants would tend to raise productivity177
However they may differ, Anderson and Brenner both consider these 
mechanisms as characteristic of the feudal economy. What happens to this in­
dependent logic of violence under capitalism?178 Tilly has criticized (1981) 
Marxists for assimilating the logic of warfare to the economy, and non-Marx­
ists for ignoring it or treating it in an ad hoc manner. The logical connection 
between the successive steps of war -> taxation -> protest -> suppression -> 
state-building that he describes in that article, is obviously supposed to be 
valid up to recent times, and as far as I can understand, his double dynamic 
of capital and coercion in (1990) more or less incorporates the earlier stand­
point.
On the question of war and economy, Anderson makes an interesting con­
trast between the ‘zero-sum game’ of inter-state warfare as the most efficient
176Hilton(ed)1978
177To this extent, he seems to accept the ‘Neo-Malthusian cum Ricardian’ arguments of Le Roy 
Ladurie and others. Karl Gunnar Persson(1988) has argued a general tendency of long-run 
endogeneous technological progress, where population growth ‘generated factors that countervailed 
diminishing returns in agriculture’(88) through more intensive methods of land use, higher labour 
inputs and gains from specialization. In his analysis this progress is not necessarily always visible 
as rising per capita production - increased leisure and land-saving techniques can conceal a rising 
productivity (2-3) which might not emerge until it becomes necessary. This theory might provide 
an explanation for the potential for rising productivity implicitly assumed in Anderson’s ‘feudal 
dynamic’.
178Colin Mooers, who has applied the concept of ‘political accumulation’ to the development of 
capitalism in France and Germany seems to regard Bismarck and Napoleon III as perpetuators of 
what is still in essence pre-capitalist, political accumulation, although the incorporation of 
production into ‘the circuits of international capitalism had ultimately eroded the social relations 
upon which the extra-economic surplus extraction depended’ (1991:147)
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way to increase accumulated surplus under feudalism and absolutism while 
the ‘additive’ logic of capitalism permits competitors to expand at the same 
time ( 1974b:31). North and Thomas make a somewhat similar observation in 
(1973:80f), but do not draw the full implications for the contrast between 
different kinds of societies. Otherwise North mainly assimilates warfare to 
the economy (as Tilly accuses Marxists of doing), even to the extent of 
claiming that changes in military technology, which have a very important 
role in his explanation of late-medieval change, can be analyzed as ‘changes in 
relative prices’ (along with demographic change etc). This hardly seems too 
convincing, as military success and failure cannot be reduced to functions of 
how much money is invested on either side. The military efficiency of the 
technology cannot be abstracted away, like productive efficiency of competing 
firms, precisely because of the difference between military-redistributive 
(‘feudal’) and productive (‘capitalist’) competition noted by Anderson.
Wallerstein, as argued earlier, rather makes a contrary assimilation of 
economy to military-political power through reducing economic growth to 
the growth of the system and employing military-political status as his prime 
indicator for position within the economic system of international division of 
labour. This interpretation is corroborated by his zero-sum conception of 
capitalism in (1983) and (1992).
111:2.5 The logic of violence and the ‘Miracle of Con­
quest’
To Wallerstein, I have already argued, the conquest of an increasing part of 
the globe is more or less identical to that ‘growth of the system’ which is the 
unitary ‘miracle’ - or rather ‘malady’ (1992) - analyzed in his model. The 
process of strengthening the state internally and externally is essential to 
core-states as their economic advantage has to be defended against competitors.
In Moore’s model extra-European conquest has no independent role. Nei­
ther has it in Brenner’s, although the key role that interloping colonial ‘new 
merchants’ play in his endeavour to formulate a ‘new social interpretation of 
the English revolution’ (1993) suggests a possible connection between the 
‘political accumulation’ of warlike state-building, and a developing struggle 
between rent-seekers and profit-seekers 179The notion that world conquest was 
made possible by the cumulative process of military competition is common 
to Anderson and Tilly, who stress the leading role of the early national 
states/absolutisms - Spain, France and England - in setting the pace of this 
state-building process180; North’s vision is rather similar, although described
179Cythe discussion of interlopers in Ekelund-Toilison 1981:142-4. Their view of absolutist state 
power (24-5) also seems compatible with Brenner’s ‘political accumulation’.
180I will return to these questions later.
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in terms that might be summarized as “economies of scale in the protection 
business”.
The essential question, though, must be how this cumulative build-up of 
military force could lead to military superiority over the rest of the World, i 
e the miracle of Conquest.
To get a perspective on this, the miracle may have to be disaggregated. 
From Geoffrey Parker’s (1988, 1991) accounts of the military balance be­
tween Europe and the rest of the world, we can distill the following decisive 
turning-points:
Three stages of Conquest:
(1) the discovery and more or less immediate conquest of areas on a 
lower level of military development181,
(2) the military revolution, which gave Europe the necessary advantage 
to over-come the previously highly competitive military apparatuses 
of the moslem world, and
(3) the further advantages in military technology and logistics made 
possible by the industrial revolution, without which the both tech­
nologically and organizationally advanced East Asian powers 
(China, Japan and Korea) could not have been vanquished182 .
Considered like this, we may have to conclude that Conquest (1) was in one 
respect a windfall and a result of a geographical advantage - the Iberian pen­
insula and the Atlantic islands were well positioned to discover America from 
- but in another perspective we would still need an explanation of the outward 
expansivity of the countries involved. Conquest (3) - on the other hand - 
would rather be interpreted as an epiphenomenon of Growth. The essential 
problem would then be Conquest (2) and the military revolution, reasonably 
propelled by the internal mechanics of the state-system. This, of course, 
would make Sweden’s role even more crucial.
111:2.6 The deeper roots of Voice 
- Downing and Koenigsherger
Among the theorists considered, Moore is the only one to whom this problem 
complex is the central concern. Still he doesn’t say much to clarify why 
democracy developed, although he discusses at length under what conditions this
181By 1650 the West had achieved military mastery of four separate areas: central and 
northeastern America, Siberia, some coastal areas in sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the 
Indonesian-Philippine archipelago. At this stage Europeans merely exploited an advantage of 
military technology which they had found that they possessed. (Parker 1991)
182Similarly, the conquest of tropical Africa etc, required a mastery of climatic disadvantages 
achieved through advances in medicine, building technology, communications (reducing the 
necessary amount of constant on-location presence for supervision) etc
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could happen. Condition 5, the ‘revolutionary break with the past’ seems to be 
the point most crucial to him, as he seems to take for granted the traditional 
liberal-Marxist consensus about democracy being somehow in the interest of 
the bourgeoise183. However, the revisions of ‘traditional social interpreta­
tions' of the English and French revolutions have severely undermined this 
perspective. One of Moore’s followers has instead tried to put condition 1 
into the centre of the explanation.
Brian M. Downing (1992) emphasizes the role of medieval constitutional­
ism as a precondition for later democratic development184 - and of autocratic 
destruction of such institutions as an explanation of later authoritarianism. 
Stated in my terms inclusion (the extent of voice among the population) was 
successively widened in early modern Sweden, although there was no equality 
of voice, little responsibility towards it and not much efficiency - especially 
not for the peasants we might suspect185 Downing distinguishes the ‘Caroline 
absolutism’ ol 1680-1718 from what he terms the ‘military-bureaucratic ab­
solutism’ of France, Prussia, Russia and Austria.
Because Swedish absolutism did not destroy the participatory forms of in­
herited medieval constitutionalism, but instead exploited lower-class resent­
ment against the aristocracy and thus at least symbolically widened participa­
tion186, he describes it as a ‘populist-military absolutism’ or ‘caesarism’, and 
compares it to Dutch development under the stadholders. England under the 
protectorate is seen as a partly similar but more idiosyncratic case - more like 
some sort of temporary aberration - but the final result of surviving constitu­
tionalist traditions permitting a further development towards democracy is 
the same.
183C/ Stephens' criticism against the tactual basis for this. See also Therborn 1977, as well as my 
observations above about North’s attempt to argue the point theoretically (p45).
184The argument is similar to those of Joseph Strayer and Gianfranco Poggi.
185On the other hand the mere fact of having an institutionalized outlet for their grievances 
might have lowered the threshold for the crown's attentiveness to possible causes of public unrest 
and its ability to prevent it (cf Österberg 1990). This discussion concerns the national level of 
representation - on the local level peasant interest must have had a much stronger position (cf 
Österberg, Aronsson, Gustafsson). As to the conception of voice as something extended from a 
narrow aristocratic oligarchy to broader segments of the population: I only wish to express the 
simple fact of a wider definitional base, but one important reason to use ‘extent of voice' instead of 
‘inclusiveness of democracy' is that ‘democracy means nothing if not a share of political power 
controlled by the many’, as Rueschemeyer et al put it, polemizing against the concept that ‘First 
democracy is set up ... and then it is extended to broader and broader parts of society’ (1992:44). 
To use the expression voice for aristocratic constitutionalism as well as for peasant political 
influence does not have to carry the same contradictory implications, though: each class has very 
different interests to voice. The Miracle of Voice, though, is this very extension, that changes the 
very meaning of politics through including the formulated interests of non-privileged categories. 
186This interpretation is supported by the fact that active influence from the Estate of Peasants 
hardly appears in the Swedish Riksdag until after the collapse of absolutism.
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This comparison between Sweden, England and the Netherlands has a par­
allell in Koenigsberger’s discussion (1989) of similarities between the Swed­
ish Riksdag, the English Parliament and the Dutch States General, where he 
tries to identify the conditions necessary for parliamentary survival during 
the time of growing monarchic power. These assemblies, despite their differ­
ences, 'all won their long-term struggles with their monarchies’, and it 
should therefore be possible to identify the necessary conditions for parlia­
mentary survival:
(1) the medieval constitutional principle of dominium politicum et regale 
(as distinct from dominium regale) must have existed in the 16th cen­
tury
(2) the existence of a ‘myth of parliament’: ‘the conviction that, in 
times of crises, these assemblies were the best venue to solve the 
country’s problems and that ... [it] had of itself a legitimate author­
ity, independent from that of the monarchy’
(3) a major crisis provoking strong resistance to the monarchy. In the 
Netherlands this crisis came after 1572, in England after 1640. 
Koenigsberger concludes that ‘the crisis of the last decade of the 
sixteenth century was not as deep as the crises in Netherlands and in 
England’ because both the royal and the representative authority was 
divided (Sigismund vs. Duke Charles and Riksråd vs. Riksdag), and 
therefore the conflict did not develop into a polar opposition which 
could have driven the representative assembly ‘to make claims for 
its authority which went beyond the norms of dominium politicum et 
regale.
However, when the next crisis of monarchical authority came the situation 
was different. ‘Charles XI, by breaking the autonomous authority of the 
Riksråd in 1680, left a strong myth of the Riksdag intact, even though he had 
tamed it as an institution. There was therefore a united opposition to the mon­
archy at the next major crisis when the dramatic loss of empire coincided with 
a problematical succession.’ Thus, the crisis of 1719 - which, Koenigsberger 
argues, might be regarded as part of the ‘extended seventeenth century’ - could 
led to the victory of the Riksdag. It should be noticed that this kind of sur­
vival of representative assemblies conforms to North’s condition for a posi­
tive institutional development in early modern Europe187.
187Furthermore, the Swedish case at least partly conforms to what North identifies as the ‘most 
important’ difference between ‘England’s political institutions’ and ‘those of its neighbors on the 
continent’: the ‘unity of its parliament. There was a single parliament for the entire country; no 
regional estates as in France, Spain, and the Netherlands’(1993b:18). In this respect, Sweden 
resembles England, although not in the absence of a ‘division into towns, clergy, and nobility’ 
noted in the same discussion.
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111:2.7 What is the connection between Voice and the 
other ‘Miracles’?
North’s argument links the survival of Voice to the preconditions for Growth 
in the cases of England and the Netherlands. If Sweden falls within the same 
category, as the arguments from Downing and Koenigsberger suggest, we 
will have to analyze the composition of the Swedish Riksdag from what is 
really a class perspective: what kind of property rights structure would serve 
the interests of Sweden’s parliamentary classes best, and is this a structure 
‘fostering economic growth’? If not, this calls for some revisions in North’s 
explanation.
Although Downing’s discussion of parliamentary survival is inspired by 
one of Moore’s conditions for democratic development, in Moore’s own ex­
position the most important linkage goes the other way, connecting Growth - 
as an unspoken precondition for ‘commercialization of agriculture’ - to Voice. 
To clarify this relationship we have to specify different stages of Voice. 
Moore’s argument can be reconstructed thus: without a starting point includ­
ing voice for the aristocracy, a later development, where the commercializa­
tion of agriculture caused by Growth opens possibilities for the extension of 
voice, will not be possible.
As to the connection between Voice and Conquest the notion that voice for 
the peasants is a precondition for employing them for military purposes is 
present as an implicit assumption in many contexts, as well as stated outright 
by Anderson (concerning Swedish peasants) etc.
Conversely, Voice is widely understood as a consequence of war mobiliza­
tion, as participation in a war effort is often seen as an argument for civil and 
political rights188.
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argue that ‘capitalist devel­
opment is associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, 
strengthening the working and middle classes and weakening the landed upper 
class. It was not the capitalist market nor capitalists as the new dominant 
force, but rather the contradictions of capitalism that advanced the cause of 
democracy.’(7) Their perspective is thus quite different from Moore’s as well 
as North’s. If we accept their well-documented conclusions about democratic 
breakthroughs, the early institutional heritage of Sweden may seem to be be­
side the point. On the other hand - might not the relationship between capital­
ist production and the density of civil society work in the other direction too, 
as an interactive process?
Robert D. Putnam (1993) has studied the contrast between Northern and 
Southern Italy, trying to quantify and explain differences in the performance
188E g Therborn 1977 Rueschemeyer et al 1992:70f. Anderson 1974a makes similar points about 
Ancient democracy.
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of political institutions, and has come up with surprisingly strong correla­
tions implying not only that the widely varying present-day potential for 
democratic efficiency in different regions is strongly conditioned by ‘civic 
traditions’ reaching as far back as the city republics of Northern Italy and the 
‘feudal monarchy founded by the Normans in the Mezzogiorno’(133), but 
also that ‘economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict econom­
ics, better indeed than economics itself.’189
Putnam’s arguments, including the concept of ‘social capital’190 would ob­
viously be relevant for Sweden’s contradictory combination of institutional 
precociousness and late, but - when finally arrived - very rapid and thorough, 
modernization. His emphasis on traditions of cooperative behaviour in hori­
zontally organized communities versus traditions of corruption and strategies 
of distrust, in vertically organized ones, as the fundamental divergence be­
tween North’s vicious and virtuous cycles of path dependence also seem con­
sonant with Brenner’s description of the fundamental differences between 
peasant collective power in Western and Eastern European villages.
189The ratings on ‘civil involvement’ during the first decade of this century is a better predictor 
than the ratings on ‘socioeconomic development’ during the same time, not only of civil 
involvement in the ‘70s, but also of socioeconomic development during the ‘70s! ‘Institutional 
performance’ in the ‘80s is also much better predicted by civic involvement than by socioeconomic 
development. These very striking results should not be taken at face value, though, as 
'socioeconomic development’ turns out to mean ‘size of industrial workforce’ combined with 
decrease of infant mortality. The ‘civic involvement’ variables may simply be more adequate 
indicators of what we might call "socioeconomic sophistication” as they include incidence of 
cooperatives and membership in mutual aid societies.(152-8,205) Such a ‘weak’ interpretation of 
the results would, however, still retain force as an argument for close interaction between 
economic and civic development.
190NB: this concept is not to be confused with Bourdieu’s homonymous concept, which is a 
metaphor for an individual asset: the economic advantage of social status, while Putnam’s concept 
is a collective asset: the economic advantage of being able to cooperate. See 167-176 and 241 n20.
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III. 3 The theories confronting Sweden: 
Preliminary assessments
Two fundamental questions have motivated this discussion: (1) what use can 
we make of this kind of generalizing perspectives within the study of Swedish 
history, and (2) how would these theories be affected by including the 
Swedish experience?
To answer these questions would require undertaking a full integration of 
the Swedish case into each of the analyses, thereby modifying theory as well 
as historiography. My ambition here is far more modest: I will only 
summarize my arguments as to (1) why each of these approaches is relevant 
to the discussion of Sweden and should be capable of yielding important 
insights191, and (2) why each of these models should be obliged to integrate, 
or in some cases to reconsider, the Swedish example, in order to fully realize 
its explanatory potential.
I start with the first question, but as the challenges posed by the different 
theories overlap, my discussion will be somewhat peripatetic:
111:3.1 The utility of synthetic perspectives for the 
comparative study of Sweden
In Anderson’s analysis of the two halves of Europe, Western absolutist 
development - eventually leading to capitalism and to democracy - is 
explained by the internal dynamics of feudalism, and the need for the noble 
ruling class to consolidate their power as economic growth leads to stronger 
cities and freer peasants. When legal-coercive power is thus displaced towards 
the top of the feudal pyramid, inter-feudal rivalry is also raised onto a higher 
regional level, as is the scale and intensity of warfare. In Eastern Europe, 
where the lords had succeeded to suppress the peasants and undercut the 
position of the towns192, absolutist statebuilding did not grow out of internal 
compulsion, but became necessary for national survival under external 
military pressure. This military pressure is applied by Sweden, which, as I 
have tried to show, does not conform very well to Anderson’s description, 
except in one way: as an in-between case. On this very point, he backs off, 
though, and redefines it as predominantly Western.
Whatever we may think of Anderson’s argument:
191Of course many of these questions have been raised before, often requiring no synthetizing 
perspectives to be formulated, but to my purpose the important thing is to raise them in this double 
context - as problems ol European history as well as of Swedish.
192The rise of manorial economy decreased the utility of towns to landlords, to whom the towns 
became rivals for labour power, for monopoly revenues and ultimately also for control over the 
export market.(1974a:2 51-60)
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(A) The contrast between Western and Eastern European development is a 
well-established historical fact19’
(B) Sweden’s intermediary position in the aspects noted by Anderson is 
incontrovertible
Thus it seems to me that:
•The political implications of what historical implacement we ascribe to 
Sweden should be of particular interest in the present situation194
Here Brenner’s analysis also comes into the picture, giving a different 
perspective on (essentially) the same divide:
• What patterns of class conflict and class conflict resolution conditioned 
the formation of the Swedish state? Patterns similar to the English-Dutch, 
the French-Western German or the Northeastern? Or still another variant, 
conferring what historical legacy ?
• What conflicting requirements for class reproduction, implying what 
various dynamics of development, conditioned these class conflicts ?
As to the question of economic dynamics, Brenner’s insistence that it is 
ultimately the threat to class reproduction - in the final instance bankruptcy 
as a result of not keeping up with competition - that ensures the dynamic 
development of productivity under capitalism, might give us reasons to view 
the Swedish tax-peasants in a different light. The institution of skattevrak, (‘tax 
eviction’) making a peasant lose his freehold if he failed to pay his taxes for 
three years (Herlitz 1974:156n29), put a similar kind of pressure on the 
freeholder - especially in conjunction with the recurrently increasing level of 
taxation during the first stages of Sweden’s rise to Great Power status195.
195if Chirot (ed)1989, passim.
l94Ie: At a time when Sweden’s relationship to the EC is hotly debated, and when the East-West 
tension is (temporarily?) dissolved, but the historical and political conclusions to be drawn from 
this development have hardly yet reached the stage of formulating the relevant questions. That the 
historical roots of the modern East/West conflict dimension are an important motivation behind 
Anderson’s analysis should be evident, as the roots of today’s North/South conflict dimension are 
traced by Wallerstein, and the danger of reversal from democracy is a central concern of Moore’s. 
The traditional neutrality of Sweden is now being questioned, as is the entire “Swedish model” of 
societal development. That the twin dangers of self-devaluation and self-complacency tend to 
polarize the discussion is a reflection of a mode of thought where the context of Sweden is kept 
separate from the context of the world, [comment: this note was written a few months before the EU 
membership referendum ]
^^There is some historical evidence indicating that peasants could succeed to raise productivity 
in face of the increasing burden of war-time exactions, both taxes and conscription.(Lindegren 
1980:ES302-3). Although ‘evicted’ peasants generally were allowed to stay on as tenants of the 
crown (or of the nobility, if the farms were enfeoffed), the security of allodial property rights were 
so important to the peasants that the crown could get buyers even for incomplete birthrights at 
high prices during the reign of John III.(c/Loit 1979) This is of course not a matter of life and 
death, but neither is bankruptcy. A totally different problem of class (?) reproduction with 
complex implication is traced by Artéus, who shows that there were strong material incentives for
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And, as we have seen, North’s approach - despite the contrasting political bias 
- also implies class interest as an unacknowledged last instance determinant, 
though his indicators as well as his mechanisms are quite different.196 Thus 
we should also ask:
• What kind of property rights structure developed in Sweden, as a result 
of which development of transaction costs, implying what economic 
consequences, being in the interest of what social group (class) ?
The system of different kinds of property rights in land197 peculiar to 
Sweden, and the redefinition of property rights structure/property relations 
entailed by the Reduction and the Allotment system ( should offer a rich 
material for analysis within transaction cost as well as class reproduction 
perspectives. The complexities are not to be slighted: what may at first look 
like payment in kind, like in the tax rolls closely specifying dues in rye, 
eggs, tallow, dried pike, manure, iron, hops and whatever, might very well 
turn out to have been paid in cash, but the sums of taxes due converted into 
money is conventional and may bear little relation to what was actually paid 
according to regularly revised local prices-current. This system, though 
unwieldy, offered great opportunities for shifting the burden of transaction 
costs, or, conversely, the opportunities for making realization profits. Al­
though in principle suited to preserve real value in the face of inflation, its 
rigidities might conceal considerable inflationary redistributions.
The role of this transaction cost problem complex facing the early modern 
Swedish state, first in making it move towards a sort of “national house-hold­
ing partly in kind” under Gustavus Vasa198 then, during the period of impe-
officer breadwinners to avoid war(364) during the 18th century; although he gives plausible 
evidence for his view that the military during this time were so powerful that they ‘did away 
with three constitutionally established systems of government - Carolean absolutism, the 
parliamentary rule of the Liberty era, and the Gustavian autocracy - which had become 
detrimental to their vital interests as a corporation’, he also describes the average 18th century 
Swedish officer as ‘more of a country squire ... than a soldier’(415 ;English in original).
196But, as we have also seen, his criteria for a society conducive to economic growth are congruent 
with Brenner, as is his identification of which societies that were.
^^Different kinds of jordnatur (‘land nature’) ‘constituting totally different kinds of property in 
land’, according to Herlitz, who argues that to own skatte land(tax-peasant or freehold land) is to 
own the right to pay rent/tax to the crown, while to own frälse land (‘free’, i e noble land) is to 
own the right to receive rent. (Herlitz 1974:145-6; the system is described in English onpp 382- 
3 and in Herlitz 1982) Other ‘natures’ of land were krono land (Crown land) where the Crown 
received rent from tenants with various degrees of security of tenure, and skattefrälse where 
freeholders payed their tax to a nobleman holding the tax, but not the land, in fief.
^^Heckscher’s opinion that this represented a survival of medieval practices and that it was an 
indication of low level of economic development - taken at face value by Roberts and through him 
Anderson (178-9) and Wallerstein (1974:312-3,1980:203-4) - has been re-evaluated by historians 
emphasizing that this policy was deliberately chosen for economically rational reasons. Repaying 
loans from Lübeck in butter, e g was not a sign of primitive economic level, as Heckscher 
believed, but motivated by favourable relative prices, the possibility of levying extraordinary
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rial expansion, for its attempts to solve the problem of financing warfare by
enfeoffments, sale of privileges etc199, and, once again, in finally
necessitating the change of system heralded by the Reduction. Over the entire 
period there was a slow, gradual, but for a long time reversible, drift from 
taxation in kind (including allotted taxes; the same thing holds for rents200 to 
monetized taxes. Both the long term consequences and the possibilities of 
shifting the costs and benefits.of the system at various points in this devel­
opment would require a lot more of investigation.The question of how to
finance warfare moves us over into Tilly's domain. It is crucial to his theory
that military competition exposes the superiority of the national state - under­
stood as the form of state characteristic of the capitalized coercion path - and 
thereby forces other countries to converge onto this path201 In 1555 ‘only 
France and England resembled our conventional models of national 
states’(31), he claims. However, so did Sweden, to at least as great an extent. 
despite being classified as a ‘coercion-intensive state’.
• How can we reconcile the precocious form of the Swedish state with its 
supposed economic backwardness, and its similarities in repressive state­
building to what is essentially Anderson’s and Brenner’s Eastern 
pattern202? This paradox is closely related to the contradictory coexistence of
taxes in kind and the reluctance to deplenish the treasury.(Hammarström 407-25, 465-7). Myrdal- 
Söderberg conclude that the Swedish economy during late 16th century was more varied and 
dynamic than Heckscher, Malowist and Wallerstein believed: e g were Swedish long distance 
transports in the internal cattle trade of comparable relative dimensions as those in continental 
Europe.(483-7,532-5). On this last point Christina Dalhede - who has studied the continental 
European trade in oxen - has expressed serious doubts (personal communication). 
l°°Lindegren 1985 argues that converting crown incomes into internationally negotiable form to 
finance warfare was the central objective for national economic policy during this period - even to 
the extent of incurring substantial nominal losses (eg through tax exemption) in order to acquire 
products with internationally acceptable exchange-value. This problem complex I have discussed 
elsewhere in terms of a ‘feudal realization problem’ (Emilsson 1992)
200Compare Brenner’s criticism of Bois’ ‘falling tendency of feudal levy’, where he observes that 
inflation loss because of fixed rents in money could have been averted if the landlords had had the 
power to revert to rent in kind (Aston-Philpin 246). In Sweden noblemen were very aware of this 
problem and tended to avoid money rent (Munktell 1982:106).
20 ^’Why didn’t Venice or Russia become England?. The question is not absurd; it follows from 
the recognition that European states in general moved toward greater concentrations of capital and 
coercion, converging on the national state. Part of the answer is: they did. The Russian and 
Italian states that entered World War I had far more of the traits of national states than had their 
predecessors... But even the successor states bore marks of their previous identities’(l60).
202The different logic of Tilly’s typology and his inclusion of Castile and Siciliy into the same 
pattern makes no difference to the basic problem of Sweden’s implacement. His nation-state or 
capitalized-coercion category is of course congruent to Anderson’s ‘Western absolutism’ pattern: 
England, France, Spain - and Prussia after incorporation of the Rhineland (to Tilly this is a fusion 
of coercive and capitalist trajectories, like Castile-Aragon-Catalonia; to Anderson it is at least the 
beginning of a ‘westward drift’)
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an - in an international perspective -unusually high degree of control over 
individuals with an unusually wide extent of personal freedom.204
Tilly’s nexus between lack of easily taxable monetary flows and necessity 
of repressive tax exploitation is made more conditional in Downing's analy­
sis (780, where ‘advanced economy’ is but one of four factors that can soften 
the repressive consequences of war-induced tax-financed absolutist statebuild­
ing. Geography/topography is not all that relevant to the Swedish case204, but 
alliances and mobilizing foreign resources through conducting war abroad are 
both highly pertinent factors205 This reinforces the questions about Sweden’s 
role within the wider European system, whether in an Andersonian or 
Wallersteinian sense. First, let us return to the opening discussion in this 
overview, and the problem of Sweden’s role within the European inter-state 
militarizing dynamic:
• Are the reasons for Sweden’s military expansion connected to an inter­
nal European dynamic of militarization, and, in that case, how? What 
European and Swedish causes lay behind the ‘Military Revolution’ and 
how were they connected? Is Sweden’s formative influence over eastern 
European development purely accidental or is it somehow part of the general 
dynamics of European development, whether Anderson’s model holds or 
not206 ?
The post-idealist range of explanations for Sweden’s military expansion 
have comprised207: (1) geopolitical necessity - the traditional viewpoint, revived 
by Roberts, (2) trade-control rivalry - most forcefully argued by Attman (1979) 
- and, now and then appearing as a heretical counterpoint, (3) externalization of 
class struggle. (Strindberg, Lindegren).
The second variety is of course the one most easily assimilated into a 
model like Wallerstein's. As we have seen, though, the mechanisms of trade, 
exploitation and dependence are not unilinear: even in exploitative exchange 
relations there is an element of mutual dependence which either side can try
205The personal freedom and independent legal status of Swedish peasants, which e g made it 
possible for freeholders to hold their own against noblemen who had been awarded their tax in 
fief, (if Bördor, bönder, börd...). Their political representation and participation in local political 
self-government in parish and hundred assemblies (if Österberg, Aronsson, Gustafson). On the 
other hand the personal registration of the population and their place of birth, age, domicile, 
religious orthodoxy etc (Roberts 1973:168-70, Nilsson 1988:34).
^o4A parallell to the traditional English or Swiss arguments about protected geographic position 
equalling less need of a standing army and less risk of internal repression would not make sense in 
this context - after all, Sweden did raise an army of record-breaking proportions.
205Åström 1973:82-5
20°In Tilly’s model the early national states set the pace for coercive accumulation in the same way 
as Sweden does for the east in Anderson’s model.
207These categories roughly correspond to Roberts’ division of Swedish scholarly opinion into an 
'Old School’, a'New School’ and a more ‘tendentious’ social interpretation (1979,ch.l).
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to turn to its greater advantage, and where outcome will be contingent both on 
the institutional context (cf North) and on the strength of the parties (cf 
Brenner).
• How should we evaluate Sweden’s (conditional?) early integration into 
the European and extra-European “division of labour” as a semi-monopolist 
supplier of strategic products208, the mutual dependence relations inherent 
in these trade relations, and in the chains of credit I advance! investment 
connecting buyers and suppliers with each others and with financial 
centres?
Interpreting every step in the chain either as ‘debt bondage’ or as 
‘commercial credit’ or as ‘capital investment’ would probably be totally mis­
leading. We cannot take for granted that even a single step was interpreted in 
the same way by both sides, or even, that in such cases, one of the parties 
would be objectively ‘in the right’209. Comparing early Swedish forms of 
credit and investment with those of other European economies will be neces­
sary210. Essential to the possibility of a ‘reciprocal’ rather than purely ‘ex­
ploitative’ relation in these contexts is some form of independence: personal 
(as in the case of Àstrôm’s tar-burners compared to Malowist’s Polish 
peasants), or national (as in the case of 18th century Sweden compared to a 
(neo)colonial primary product producer). This takes us back to the question 
of Swedish peasant freedom, and, since we are still within the domain of
20sNote that copper, bar iron and tar are by no means raw materials, but intermediate products 
with a considerable value added component - especially by the standards of the time. Among 
finished products, the role of Sweden’s arms industry should be of importance in this context. (cf 
Cipolla)
209This would require that there was a general rule system that was ‘appropriate’ or ‘legitimate’ 
for the whole range of societies affected. The limited degree of integration between economies, and 
the uneven and unparallell development of these, renders such speculations quite pointless.
^ ^Adamson 1966 discusses the relations between merchants and ironmasters during the earlier 
19th century throwing considerable doubt on the presumption that merchant credit put 
ironmasters in a state of dependence. He also surveys discussions of similar arrangements in 
international literature, but observes that the disparity of source material and treatment makes it 
difficult to reach any conclusive results. His general evaluation is that no a priori assertions about 
the role of merchant credit and the role of middlemen can be upheld {cf similar conclusions in 
Malowist 1981). Rita Bredefeldt confirms the picture for the 17th century: mortgage loans were a 
common form of financing iron production, and the relations between ironworks owners and 
credit grantors was in general businesslike and non-exploitative. As to the mining peasants during 
the same century, Maria Sjöberg compares their situation to petty producers involved in putting- 
out systems in other parts of Europe, and to specialized peasants in the Netherlands (de Vries), 
concluding that the independent social position of the producers, and the development of local and 
regional markets, are important factors in an explanation of their successful resistance to merchant 
capital controls 194-9) Maria Àgren’s (1992) study of credit regulation reform observe a certain 
improvement of creditor protection, but emphasizes the growing impersonal and formalized 
character of debt regulation. Also cf the studies by Karlsson and Åström referred to earlier.
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power politics, the relation between coercion abroad and strict constraints on 
internal coercion should have to be explored:
• What connection is there between Swedish peasant freedom and exter­
nal aggression? Was the inclusion of peasants into the constituency a pre­
condition for the expansion (as Anderson would have it), a cause 
(Lindegren) or maybe a result (if we date factual peasant inclusion to their 
appearance as an articulate political force in the mid-17th century) ?
This is a question of Voice, and thus Moore’s problematic is brought to the 
fore. If we accept Hall’s useful but brutal summarization of his central argu­
ment, the political system of a society is shaped by its ‘style of peasant dis­
possession’, or ‘the way it loses [or disciplines] its peasantry’(l49-50).
The Swedish peasantry has been disciplined rather than dispossessed211. 
This was effected by the state (as in Moore’s Russian and Chinese examples), 
though not in a third stage modernization spurt by a totalitarian state brought 
about through political manipulation of ‘revolutionary peasant solidarity’, 
but by an Ancien Régime making use of (or creating?) what Moore has called 
‘conservative peasant solidarity’, which derives its cohesion by ‘tying those 
with potential and actual grievances into the prevailing social structure’ 
thereby ‘providing] a legitimate if lowly status for those with little or no 
property both in modern and premodern times’(476,477)212. Such an interpre­
tation could serve as a counterbalance to an otherwise maybe too easily ideal­
ized interpretation of early peasant representation. As to full democracy, and 
the appearance of a working class demanding franchise: This new actor 
appears on each national stage not until the setting is in place, and the casting 
is done. The question is: what kind on roles exist? A tradition of ‘conservative 
solidarity’ among the peasants supplies a model for patriarchal integration 
possible to extend to workers as well.
111:3.2 Summing up: The necessity of integrating the 
exceptional case
These roundabout movements through problems and peculiarities that com­
parative historical approaches might render more amenable to analysis, are of 
course at the same time an argument for comparativists to rise to the chal­
lenge of accepting these aspects as parts of the explicanda of international and 
general European history as well. I will, however, also return to the more 
precise question of why I consider this to be necessary for each of the theoreti­
cal approaches I have discussed.
211 Unless we speak about the crofters, which we probably also should.
212This is a feature of his Indian and Japanese examples, except for the early role of the state. 
There is also a variety called ‘weak solidarity’ typified by France and Western Germany.
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Thus l argue that the failure to fully integrate the example of 
Sweden leaves:
•Moore’s theory without an answer to how democracy can have developed 
anywhere after the industrial revolution, and thus in its present form largely 
irrelevant to those questions of contemporary world politics, that must have 
given it its original impetus
• North's analysis without having to confront the contradictory and vacillat­
ing trajectory of a country neither on the ‘dead-end path pursued by Spain and 
Portugal’, nor consistently on ‘the successful paths to evolving more effi­
cient institutions pursued by the Netherlands and England’213
• Anderson’s model bereft of his crucial link between the endogenous forces 
creating Western absolutism and the exogenous military pressure enforcing 
an Eastern counter-absolutism
• Wallerstein’s system without consistent mechanisms for changes of position 
in the structure, and without consistent criteria for identifying these structural 
positions
• Tilly’s analysis unable to discriminate between sharply contrasting trajecto­
ries in the emergence of political systems, and hiding a glaring inconsistency 
within its crucial identification of the national state, the path of capitalized 
coercion and the European advantage,
and, finally,
• Brenner’s theory escaping the obligation to confront a full-scale challenge 
to his large-estate bias214.
213 Although he in the quoted passage argues that ‘Path-dependency suggests that we can learn as 
much’ from both kinds of paths (1991:36), he does not really confront the possibility of any 
middle ways. The strict dichotomy of either vicious or virtuous circles is not allowed to be broken 
up by any discussion of mixed cases - not even in the case of France.
214In this last case, as in many of the others, Sweden by no means provides the sole 
counterexample. I believe that similar claims of uniqueness could be made for many other ‘small 
countries’, although I doubt that any of them would have moved along quite as contradictory a 
trajectory as Sweden - with the possible example of the Netherlands. Jan de Vries’ analysis (1974) 
of the dynamics of specialization among peasants is an important challenge to many of the 
presumptions made in the models treated above, but it is formulated according to conditions in 
such a singular case (hegemonic core power, capital-intensive, bourgeois revolutionary or 
whatever) that the full force of the challenge hits the models in different weak spots than a 
‘Swedish peasant model’ might (but i/Myrdal-Söderberg’s attempt to adapt his model for Swedish 
use 1991: 35-8, 53, 517-9).
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-J .
The question of why and how Europe could rise to world dominance was an 'old question' 
already to Max Weber. Since the early seventies the debate over this 'Rise of the West' or 
'European Miracle' has been vigorously reopened from several different perspectives, without 
reaching any kind of consensus except on one point: the importance of the internal dynamics 
of the European state system.
The arguments of this book are:
Any explanation will have to deal with no less than three 'European miracles': world conquest, 
economic growth and a widening public participation in the political system. It is further argued 
that these processes constitute Europe as a historical concept.
The role of Sweden in these three 'miraculous' processes is, in a number of respects, so 
crucial, exceptional or contradictory, that it would have to be integrated into the analysis of 
European historical dynamics.
Swedish history has to be understood as an integral part of European history, which poses 
a challenge for macrohistorical synthesis, as well as for Swedish historiography.
These questions are discussed in the context of six synthetic approaches ambitious enough to 
take on more than one of the miracles, and inclusive enough to also take on the problem of 
diversity within the European development: Those of Barrington Moore, Douglass North, 
Perry Anderson, Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles Tilly and Robert Brenner. According to the 
arguments advanced, none of these models is - in its present state of development - equipped 
to deal with the Swedish example.
Erik Örjan Emilsson (born 1950) is doing doctoral research at the Department of Economic 
History at Gothenburg University. This book is a revised version of his licential dissertation.
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